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Abstract 
South Africa is facing a severe shortage of medical doctors and has a government that is sceptical of 
reliance of foreign skills known as skilled immigration. The government and the national Department of 
Health (DoH) have implemented a variety of intervention measures in order to alleviate the negative 
impact of this shortage caused by medical skills shortage in the sector. However, the DoH’s reluctance 
to recruit foreign medical doctors, and particularly its prohibition on the recruitment of doctors from 
South Africa’s neighbouring countries, undermines the government’s effort to increase the number of 
doctors in the health system.  
Skilled immigration, the importation of scarce skills from outside the country, made little 
progress with the enactment of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. The priority of South Africa’s 
immigration policy is still focused on controlling skilled immigration, as is underlined by its protectionism 
and restrictiveness. The Department of Home Affairs’ (DHA) immigration policy and its counter-
productive approach to attracting skilled foreign labour has drawn criticism from a wide range of people 
including academics, politicians and businesspeople. The DHA itself has in its white papers of 1999 
and of 2017 admitted that its inflexible approach to immigration has resulted in the country’s failure to 
attract skilled foreign workers.  
In this study, I use archived parliamentary meeting minutes and parliamentary documents as 
the primary data source to understand the deliberations of stakeholders on skilled immigration which 
resulted in the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. The Act had a direct effect on the DoH’s approach to the 
recruitment of foreign medical doctors. More specifically, this dissertation aims to explore how 
stakeholders who were involved in the drafting process of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 deliberated 
on the existing cultural and structural conditions that resulted in the Immigration Bill which preceded the 
Act. By exploring the changes in the immigration policy, the dissertation aims to understand the impact 
of the immigration policy and institutional xenophobia on the recruitment of foreign doctors. Margaret 
Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle is used to understand the development of South 
Africa’s immigration policy from 2000 to 2006 as this was the period in which the discussion of the 
Immigration Bill started. I argue that institutional xenophobia which is manifested in South Africans’ 
antagonism towards foreign nationals, the deeply-entrenched employment equity policy that promotes 
national workers, the weakened state of the civil society, and the consolidated power of the government 
in decision-making all contributed to the DoH’s decision to restrict the recruitment of foreign medical 
doctors. In the absence of government’s support, it is unlikely that there will be a conducive 
environment to put in place a skilled immigration policy that can harness skilled foreigners’ skills and 
facilitate skilled foreigners’ entry.  This dissertation suggests that the government critically review its 
immigration policy which is deepening South Africa’s skills gap in the medical field. This dissertation 
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further recommends the government to consider the option of allowing foreign doctors to work in the 
private sector. This would not only increase the overall number of doctors in the health sector, it would 
also dispel the public’s concern that the employment of foreign doctors would cost a hefty amount at 
the expense of the public. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Overview 
This chapter is an introduction of this dissertation. It outlines the key research concepts of what this 
dissertation will be exploring and studying, namely, doctors’ shortage and skills shortage as well as the 
causes of difficulty to implement a skills-driven immigration policy in South Africa which had led to the 
national Department of Health’s (DoH) restrictive recruitment measures  placed on foreign doctors. This 
chapter begins with a brief overview of South Africa’s shortage of doctors and a discussion about the 
country’s need for more doctors. In spite of this shortage, this chapter moves on to reflect on how the 
government’s protectionist stance towards employing skilled foreigners has impeded South Africa’s 
immigration system from proactively attracting skilled foreigners. The same protectionism applies to the 
health sector. The chapter then briefly describes the DoH’s restrictive policy on the recruitment of 
foreign doctors against the backdrop of a huge demand for doctors and a severe crisis of a doctors’ 
shortage in South Africa. The DoH’s restrictive policy document, Policy: Recruitment and Employment 
of Foreign Health Professionals in the Republic of South Africa implemented in 2006, is highly 
restrictive towards the recruitment of foreign doctors. The terrains overlap between the DoH’s 
discouraging stance on the employment of foreign doctors and the government’s lack of long-term 
vision about skilled foreigners’ participation in South Africa’s economy. It is this lack of vision which has   
led to a concomitant lack of progress in skilled immigration. This leads to the research question for this 
dissertation: how did that deliberations around the creation of an immigration policy for South Africa 
influence the DoH in its recruitment policy in towards the employment of foreign doctors? These 
deliberations  began with the Department of Home Affair’s green and white  papers on international 
migration in the late 1990s,  the Immigration Bill ( enacted in 2002)  as well as its amendments of  2004 
and 2006  and they and their outcome reshaped the country’s perception on skilled immigration? 
Overview of literature: Examining key concepts 
This section outlines and discusses some of the key concepts around the subject being studied in this 
research dissertation. These concepts include the demand for doctors in South Africa, the doctors’ 
shortage in South Africa, the definition of skilled immigration as well as the difficulty to recruit foreign 
doctors for South African health employers. These concepts provide the background of this research 
study and lead people to ponder: why is it that the national Department of Health (DoH) is not engaging 
in proactive recruitment of foreign doctors despite of the huge demand for doctors in South Africa? What 
is the influence of the immigration policy over the DoH’s stance in recruiting foreign doctors? 
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Demand for doctors in South Africa 
In South Africa, the demand for doctors and healthcare services is high. There is a high percentage of 
key types of diseases such as HIV and AIDS and Tuberculosis, high maternal neonatal and child 
morbidity and mortality among its citizens (ECONEX, 2013: 21; [DoH], 2019: 10). According to the DoH’s 
National Health Insurance Policy: Towards Universal Health Coverage in 2017, the combined impact of 
these diseases contributed significantly to the mortality rate for South Africans.  
The combined impact of these epidemics has influenced the doubling of the death rate between 
1997 and 2006 in our country. HIV, AIDS and TB have contributed the most in this increased death 
rate. In 2012, an estimated 6.4 million people living with HIV resided in South Africa. The estimated 
number of new HIV infections in South Africa was 1.08% in 2012. According to the UNAIDS 
estimates, the national HIV prevalence among the general adult population aged 15 – 49 years old 
has remained stable at around 17.3% since 2005 and the estimated number of people living with 
HIV and AIDS is 6.4 million in 2012 ([DoH], 2017: 10). 
In addition, the high rate of crime and injuries and trauma caused by violent crimes in South Africa further 
increases people’s demand for doctors. South Africa has an injury rate of 158 per 100 000. Interpersonal 
violence is identified a leading cause of Years of Life Lost (YLL) in the most recent South Africa Burden 
of Disease data DoH, 2019: 11). For instance, in the Western Cape, the Community Safety MEC Albert 
Fritz stated that  
Between midnight Friday and 06:00 today, there were 55 unnatural deaths which resulted from 
gunshot wounds and sharp objects in the Province, 33 of which were in the Metro West region. We 
are indeed facing a crisis. In June 2018, there were 344 alleged murder admissions; however, in 
June 2019, there were 448. Of the 448 admissions, 369 were in the Metro (Thebo, 2019).  
The expected accomplishment of policy frameworks such as the National Development Plan 
2030 requires sufficient doctors in the health sector. The government has stated in the National 
Development Plan that by 2030 the life expectancy of an average South African should reach 70 years. 
In relation to that NDP’s objective, ensuring sufficient doctors to provide healthcare services to people is 
of paramount importance. As for now, achieving the objective set in the NDP framework looks bleak. In 
2016, the life expectancy of a South African man was 50.7 years and a South African woman 48.7 years, 
so the government still has a long way to go.  
The magnitude of these diseases such as HIV and TB and increasing violence-related trauma 
and injuries and government’s policy framework all are indications of South Africa’s demand for more 
doctors in the health sector. But the reality in South Africa is that there is an insufficient number of doctors 
to accommodate for its population.  
Doctor shortage  
South Africa has a lower doctor to population per 100,000 ratio than other countries in the world. Using 
the doctor population per 100,000 ratio as one of the formulas to determine healthcare standards, South 
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Africa’s low ratio of 70 physicians against 100,000 people according to the World Bank’s data of 2012 
indicates that there is a severe doctors’ shortage in the country needed to meet its growing population’s 
demands. On the Continent, World Bank’s indicator shows that South Africa ranks above some larger 
economies such as Nigeria and Egypt but lags behind countries such as Algeria and Tunisia in terms of 
the doctor to population ratio. At the international level, data show that the physician/population ratio of 
South African is significantly lower than those of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries and is also lower than those of the BRICS, an association comprising 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. World Bank’s 2012 data show that South Africa’s 70 
physicians per 100,000 citizens is in stark contrast to the world average of physicians (149.8 per 100,000) 
people and those of the OECD countries (UK 280, Canada 250, Australia 330). Among BRICS countries, 
data from the World Health Organization (WHO) also show a similar pattern. South Africa ranked as last 
in terms of its physicians per 100,000 citizens ratio being at 81.8 physicians to 100,000 people in 2016 
compared to Russia’s 397.5 per 100,000 populations in 2015, Brazil’s 185.2 in 2013, China’s 181.2 in 
2015. These figures have shown that South Africa lags significantly behind other countries in its number 
of doctors in the health sector. Hence, it is evident that South Africa faces a doctors’ shortage crisis.  
In South Africa, the shortage of doctors’ crisis is such that it makes it even more difficult for poor 
people to access healthcare services. In addition to the country’s overall doctors’ shortage, the shortage 
in the public health sector and in rural areas on which the majority of South Africa’s poorest population is 
dependent is even worse. Data shows that there were 25.1 general practitioners and 5.6 specialists for 
per 100,000 population in the public sector against 92.5 and 86.5 respectively in the private sector in 
2013 (Wildschut, n.d.; ECONEX, 2015: 6). More urbanised and affluent areas such as the provinces of 
the Western Cape and Gauteng enjoy a significantly higher density of health professionals than poorer, 
rural regions such as Limpopo does (Komape, 2013:7; ECONEX, 2015: 7; Ntuli & Maboya, 2017). This 
disparity of doctors’ distribution implies that the crisis in doctors’ shortage is even worse in the public 
health sector and in rural areas. At the Presidential Health Summit in 2018, it was revealed by the HPCSA 
that only 14 046 which is less than half of the 29 310 health practitioners in South Africa were working in 
the public sector in 2018 serving 84% of the country’s population (Shisane, 2018). Poverty, as a result of 
South Africa’s apartheid history, has the implication that the majority of its population who live in urban 
areas are dependent on public health services and those in rural areas can only access health facilities 
in their areas of residence. Both are characterised by a shortage of doctors which has the implication that 
poor people may not able to receive quality healthcare services when needed. In fact, both the former 
and the current health ministers Dr Aaron Motsoaledi and Dr Zweli Mkhize have made similar remarks 
that South Africa’s health system does not benefit the poor (“Inequality in health…”, 2018). In a country 
where 85 percent of the population do not have access to health professionals in the private sector, 
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ensuring sufficient number of doctors working in public sector and in rural areas is paramount to people’s 
health (Biermann, 2006; Wildschut, n.d.).  
Skilled immigration in South Africa 
Over two decades ago, Gaillard and Gaillard (1997) noted the pattern of that new waves of well-educated 
scientists and technicians that are poised to capitalise full opportunities of globalisation. These “well-
educated scientists and technicians” constituted the first wave of skilled immigrants. For the last two to 
three decades, the composition of skilled immigrants expanded and skilled immigrants are now seen as 
human capital that are pivotal to the economic development of receiving countries (Kapur & McHale, 
2005).  
Competition to attract the brightest minds has become more intense globally in the knowledge-
based modern world that is on the brink of the fourth industrial revolution. Policymakers worldwide, 
cognizant of the important role that skilled immigrants play in the economic development of receiving 
nations, increasingly devises immigration policies and programmes to attract those highly skilled 
immigrants.   Globally, particularly developed countries such as countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have historically attracted the largest proportion of 
high-skilled immigrants (Artuç et al., 2014). H1-B visas in the US, Blue Cards in Europe, and points-
based systems in Australia, the UK, and Canada are some of the examples of skilled immigration policies 
that politicians in those countries use for recruiting high-skilled workers (Chaloff & Lemaître, 2009). 
`The White Paper on International Migration in South Africa which was published in 1999 is South 
African government’s acknowledgement of the global competition for skills and its attempt to participate 
in the knowledge-based economy. Although the White Paper of 1999 recognised the priorities of 
importing skills, Boynton (2015: 38) argues that it nevertheless placed strong emphasis on immigration 
control with the aim to contain the number of foreigners’ population in South Africa. Nevertheless, there 
are a growing number of organisations and individuals calling for government to facilitate the movement 
of skilled foreigners as South Africa has been experiencing an increasing skills deficit. The Department 
of Higher Education and Training (DHET) published Skills Supply and Demand in South Africa in 2016, 
a document  which asserts that the level of education in South Africa, although improved since 1994, 
remains lower than most economically productive countries (DHET, 2016: 86). Public policy organisations 
that advocated for skilled immigration such as Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) point out 
that there is a rise in the exodus of critical skills professionals’ exodus since 1994. Between 1989 and 
2003, South Africa had lost an estimated 120,000 skilled people and the number of skilled people leaving 
the country was larger than the number entering South Africa by an average of 9000 skilled people per 
year between 1994 and 2003 ([CDE], 2000; 2010: 43). These figures all demonstrate that there is a 
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massive skills shortage crisis in South Africa.  A call for the government to engage in a vigorous skilled 
immigration policy is heard consistently from stakeholders such as the private sector and research and 
academic organisations in order to get those scarce skills from outside the country.  
Skilled immigration will be possible only if the government were to remove unnecessary 
regulations in the immigration policy such as the restrictions on employing foreigners and would adopt 
an unambiguous immigration policy that encourages and welcomes skilled foreigners. Despite South 
Africa’s urgent need for scarce skills, South Africa’s stance to skilled immigration is paradoxical and 
rhetorical. On the one hand it acknowledges the need to attract skills immigrants for economic 
development, while on other hand, because of South Africans’ lack of resources, particularly  among 
those who were previously disadvantaged, redress imperatives present huge pressure on the 
government to place maximum limitations on the entry of immigrants1 (Kahn, 2015: 384). No remarkable 
progress has been made in South Africa’s immigration policy to make the country an attractive destination 
for skilled foreigners because its continued national sovereignty-oriented control approach in managing 
migration.2. Instead, the national sovereignty-driven immigration policy derived from the government’s 
own institutional xenophobia has cost the country its opportunity to keep up with the global migration 
dynamic such as harnessing scarce and critical skills that South Africa needs for the development of the 
country.  
The three most pertinent factors that characterised South Africa’s society prior to the discussion 
of South Africa’s first immigration policy in the post-apartheid era were skills shortage in the country, high 
unemployment facing South Africa citizens as well as the high antagonism that citizens had towards 
foreign nationals (Fallon & de Silva, 1994; [DoL], 1998; May & Govender, 1998; Klasen & Woolards, 
1999; Crush, 2004; 2008; 2014). These factors were key societal characteristics that were instrumental 
in the shaping of the immigration policy. As antagonism and high domestic unemployment tended to push 
the government into adopting a restrictive immigration policy, skills shortage presented a challenge to 
the government to consider and carefully calibrate its immigration policy. A well-balanced immigration 
policy was needed to attract skilled foreigners to fill the skills shortage gap but also to ensure that skilled 
foreigners’ presence would not jeopardise South Africans’ work opportunities and interests. Given the 
huge pressure to address societal equity challenges in South Africa, despite that there have been 
attempts to advance more effort and emphasis directed towards skilled immigration, the call for 
immigration policy reform faced tough resistance from the opposition bench led by senior ANC politicians 
 
1 The White Paper states that the best way to manage immigration, is to have in place “maximum possible limitation on the 
entry of any immigrant” ([DHA], 1999: 9). 
2 The Department of Home Affairs recognises in its  2017 White Paper that South Africa’s immigration policy has so far 
failed to attract skilled immigrants because of  its continued focus on a national sovereignty-oriented border control policy 
,despite of  its declaration in its 1999 White Paper which attempted to build a skills-driven immigration policy (DHA, 2017). 
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and trade unionists (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008; Segatti & Landau, 2011; Klotz, 2012). Because of these 
politicians’ and trade unions’ influence in the political arena, any major reforms to immigration policy were 
stalled. In the absence of the support of powerful political alliance, an enabling immigration policy that is 
in favour of attracting skilled foreigners is difficult to advance. The situation in the health sector is one 
that demonstrates South Africa’s lack of enthusiasm to pursue a skills-driven immigration system. 
Difficulty in recruiting foreign doctors in the South African context 
Despite of the looming doctors’ shortage crisis and its devastating impact on the poor the DoH’s Policy 
on the Recruitment and Employment of Foreign Health Professionals in 2006 discouraged the recruitment 
and employment of foreign doctors which could otherwise alleviate this shortage. Its revised version in 
2010 is even more restrictive categorically outlined more types of foreign doctors in detail and prohibits 
them from legally working in South Africa ([DoH], 2010: Clauses 31, 32 & 35). The policy prohibits the 
recruitment of foreign doctors from up to 110 countries, of which mostly are doctors developing countries 
who are interested in working in South Africa, against the backdrop of a looming doctors’ shortage crisis 
([DoH], 2006; Breier, 2009 ; Segatti, 2014; Mahlathi & Dlamini, 2017). Even for those foreign doctors who 
are already in the system, the NDoH through this policy imposed various restrictions on foreign doctors’ 
work conditions. For example, the contract for foreign health professionals, in line with the requirements 
set out in the DoH’s policy, restrict their workplace and area of service in the public sector and in rural or 
underserved areas. Their contracts are temporary, non-renewable and to a maximum period of three 
years. In addition, foreign applicants face difficulties in sorting out their paperwork at the DHA, the DoH 
and their registration at the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPSCA) (Segatti, 2014: 88).  
The difficulty for an individual foreign doctor to legally work in South Africa against the backdrop 
of a doctors’ shortage crisis has led some scholars to argue that the DoH’s discouraging stance towards 
employing and proactively recruiting foreign skilled workers should be understood in the DoH as well as 
the government’s lack of enthusiasm towards skilled immigration and its own institutional xenophobia 
(Breier, 2006 [CDE], 2010: Segatti, 2014: 46). When the DoH included in its Strategic Framework in 2006 
to control and limit the number of total foreign health workforce including foreign doctors to under 5 per 
cent, media speculated and stated that it was a protectionist policy to preserve jobs for South Africans 
(Monare, 2006; Kassiem, 2006; Stent, 2006; Urbach, 2006; Bateman, 2006). In South Africa, 
protectionism to preserve jobs for citizens, in spite of skills shortage, stalls the progress to reform the 
country’s immigration policy in order to attract more skilled foreigners. The opposition of skilled 
immigration is a powerful political alliance (Segatti & Landau, 2011). Some high profiled African National 
Congress politicians and public servants, the pervasive influence of organised labour and some South 
African citizens from previously disadvantaged background whose livelihoods have not been bettered 
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since the end of apartheid forged a powerful opposition alliance that resisted any attempt to promote the 
employment and recruitment of foreign skilled labour and stalled the progress for skilled immigration 
(Crush, 2008; Desai & Walsh, 2010; Segatti & Landau, 2011; Klotz, 2012). These stakeholders believe 
that their primary interests in promoting low-skilled workers and creating avenues for previously 
disadvantaged populations to access resource are at loggerheads with the presence of foreign nationals. 
For these stakeholders that opposed skilled immigration, there was a popular belief shared amongst them 
that enabling skilled immigration would undermine the employment opportunities of South African 
workers (Chairperson of the Home Affairs Committee Ms Maggie Maunye on White Paper on 
International Migration: hearing, 16 May 2000, Source: PMG). Under the circumstance, objecting to 
immigration is a predominant narrative in the government.  
Oppositions of skilled immigration are more in favour of addressing the skills shortage crisis by 
supporting training and developing skills among local workers than sourcing skilled labour from overseas 
(Kahn, 2015). The DoH’s intervention is evident of this view. The DoH addresses doctors’ shortage crisis 
with a range of financial and non-financial incentives to retain existing health workforce and uses a variety 
of measures to increase South Africa’s training capacity (Crush et al, 2014 ECONEX, 2015). These 
strategies included building more medical schools and putting medical students on Nelson Mandela/Fidel 
Castro Medical Collaboration Programme. All of these strategies aim to build local capacity of medical 
skills in order to address the shortage crisis. But the DoH constantly ignores the option to access an 
existing pool of foreign doctors. Recruiting foreign labour, even in scenarios where the skill is desperately 
needed such as doctors’ medical skill, is seen as undesirable by the DoH. Politicians that opposed skilled 
immigration had also made similar remarks that it is better to train locally rather than source workers from 
overseas so that employment opportunities would be reduced and jobs will not be lost to foreigners 
(Centre for Development and Enterprise [CDE], 2010; Bernstein, 2014). The DoH’s reluctance to recruit 
foreign doctors is an example of South Africa’s lack of enthusiasm to foreign skills.  
The objection to importing scarce skills which are needed for South Africa, as seen here in the 
health sector, is a result of South Africa’s immigration policy. Thus, the immigration policy is the major 
driver that influenced the DoH’s stance towards the recruitment of foreign doctors.  
Research problem 
Despite all that the government and the DoH have done to capacitate South Africa’s health system, it has 
been reported by many newspapers and the media generally that an existing pool of foreign doctors are 
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finding it difficult to work legally in South Africa due to ’red tapes’ in  the  DoH’s policy 3 (McLean & Prince, 
2010; Green, 2014; Watkins, 2016; Govt ‘obstructs’ more than 200 foreign doctors from working in SA”, 
2017). The DoH’s objection towards immigration caused further concern by imposing restrictions to 
prohibit and discourage the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors. In addition, the DoH’s 
discouraging stance has had damaging consequences. Not only does it counter the country’s objective 
to increase the number of doctors in the sector, it also has significant damaging effect on health of the 
poor who are dependent on public health system (Segatti, 2014). Those who have opposed skilled 
immigration indicated that their opposition was based on their belief that enabling skilled immigration 
would have a deteriorating impact on the employment opportunities for South African citizens and that  it 
is their intention to promote South Africans’ interests, yet their discouraging stance towards recruiting 
foreign doctors seems only  to deepen the doctors’ shortage crisis with its  negative consequences on 
the poorest. It needs to be noted that developed nations such as the U.K., Australia and New Zealand 
are excelling by developing competitive schemes to attract foreign doctors and retain foreign medical 
graduates (Woodcock, 2005; Gorman & Brooks, 2008;  WHO, 2015; OECD, 2016; Kentish, 2018). Many 
South African medical doctors are considering or have already taken full advantage of those schemes 
and have settled in their new countries (Bezuidenhout et al, 2009; Breier 2009; Crush, 2014; Crush, 
Chikanda,  Bourgeault, Labonte & Murphy, 2014). The emigration of those South African doctors, as a 
result of the better conditions offered by those developed countries, has further exacerbated the doctors’ 
shortage crisis in the South African health sector. Given the complexity of the circumstances, doctors’ 
shortage and the DoH’s objection towards employing foreign doctors, it begs the question: how did South 
Africa’s immigration system impact the DoH‘s policy on the recruitment of foreign medical doctors? 
Overview of research theory—morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle  
The formation of immigration policy is a complex process. It involves the participation of many actors and 
the influence of domestic and international contexts. There are two commonly used migration theories 
regarding immigration, one of these theories is micro-level one, the other macro-level (Iosifides, 2011:18-
32). Micro-level theories primarily focus on the analysis on the factors that resulted in migrants’ rational 
choice to migrate. With macro-level theories, migration is seen as movements motivated by the disparity 
between economies in different regions. But theorists such as Castle (2010), Bakewell (2010), Iosifides 
(2011) and De Haas (2016) argue that neither of the approaches can fully explain migration. 
           In order to understand immigration policy, these theorists propose an integrated approach which 
combines both micro-level and macro-level theories. Moreover, the model which they propose focuses 
 
3 McLean & Prince, 2010; “Slow, unresponsive and unconcerned: How the Health Professions Council hurts patients” in 
GroundUp, 2013; “HPCSA's inertia sinks foreign medics” in Mail and Guardian, 2014; Watkins, 2016; Govt ‘obstructs’ more 
than 200 foreign doctors from working in SA” in Medical Brief, 2017 
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on examining the interaction between migration actors (agency) and the contextual factors in which 
migration takes place.  In addition to these scholars’ proposition that migration studies should take an 
integral approach that includes both structure and agency, the formation of South Africa’s immigration 
policy, which is the focus of the study, is an evolving process. Margaret Archer’s (1995) theory of 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle provides a useful framework to capture the evolvement of South 
Africa’s immigration policy from 2000 to 2006 which is the central focus of this dissertation. Its three-
phased analytical approach begins with contextual factors that conditioned the migration process. Its 
middle phase focuses on the interaction between agents and structure to describe how agents such as 
politicians, members of the private sector, etc. deliberate upon contextual factors and act to modify or to 
reproduce the existing structures in order to make changes. It ends with the examination of the effects 
that changes have on agency and structure. Through those three phases, Archer’s (1995) theory of 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle is able to describe not only the stakeholders (agents) that were 
involved in the drafting process of the immigration policy, the contextual factors (structure) which those 
stakeholders deliberated and acted upon, as well as the effect of the changes in the immigration policy 
had on the DoH’s recruitment and employment of foreign doctors.   
            Therefore, this research dissertation will employ Archer’s (1995) theory of 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle which is an integral approach that incorporates both agency and 
structure to explore and understand South Africa’s immigration policy. It will focus on examining the 
stakeholders and their positions on skilled immigration, the contextual factors upon which the drafting 
process of the Immigration Bill took place, and the amendments to the Immigration Bill. By studying these 
components, this research dissertation will then attempt to explain how the immigration policy influenced 
the DoH in its discouraging stance towards the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors.  
Research design and research question  
Many studies in the migration area have explored immigration in South Africa. Crush’s (2008; 2014) 
studies as well as Nyamnjoh (2006), Neocosmos (2006) and Peberdy (2009) are focused on 
understanding South Africa’s xenophobic issue as well as some of the possible causes such as citizens’ 
lack of resource that could explain South African society’s antagonism towards foreign nationals. Other 
studies such as Erasmus and Breier (2009), the Centre for Development and Enterprise (2010), Segatti 
and Landau (2011) and Bernstein (2014) place more emphasis on how South Africa’s immigration policy 
deters the country from attracting skilled foreigners and alleviate its skills shortage crisis. This dissertation 
continues their work, but it intends to explain more specifically the impact of South Africa’s immigration 
policy from 2000 to 2006 on the DoH’s recruitment of people with scarce medical skills. It draws on 
parliamentary documents to explore stakeholders’ views on skilled immigration and to track the changes 
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to the immigration policy from 2000 to 2006 in order to determine which stakeholders had a more decisive 
influence in shaping South Africa’s immigration policy. The more influential stakeholders and their views 
on skilled immigration were more likely to have influenced the DoH in its own decision on the recruitment 
of foreign doctors. Hence, it explains South Africa’s discouraging stance towards the recruitment of 
foreign doctors, particularly foreign African doctors against the backdrop of a doctors’ shortage crisis.  
The formulation of the immigration policy was a collaborative and widely consultative process 
among all sectors of society in the early 2000s. The initial policy document the White Paper on 
International Migration of 1999 and the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 had both invited the public to 
comment. Hence, the Act passed in 2002 and its amendment Acts passed in 2004 and 2006 were the 
outcomes of careful calibrations of the interests amongst all stakeholders (Trimikliniotis et al., 22008; 
Segatti& Landau, 2011). It is imperative to compare the changes to the immigration policy in relation to 
stakeholders’ deliberations on immigration in order to determine which stakeholders played a more 
decisive role in the final outcome of the Immigration Bill (Archer, 2019, personal communication 28 
March). Since the DoH’s discouraging stance towards recruiting foreign doctors was more likely to have 
been influenced by those stakeholders who played a more decisive role, they had a direct impact on the 
DoH’s restrictive policy on the recruitment of foreign doctors in 2006. Since the drafting process of the 
immigration policy and later amendments of the Immigration Bill coincided with the DoH’s policy on 
foreign health professionals, I have decided to locate the examined time period on immigration policy in 
between 2000 to 2006 for this dissertation. 
The central research question is: How did the deliberation on South Africa’s immigration policy 
from 2000 to 2006 among key stakeholders influence the national Department of Health’s (DoH) 
restrictive approach to the recruitment and employment of foreign medical doctors?  
In this dissertation, stakeholders’ deliberation will be assessed from parliamentary documents 
such as stakeholders’ submissions to the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and parliamentary meeting 
minutes which contain nuanced details of stakeholders’ rationale and motives for supporting and 
opposing skilled immigration. Scholars such as Scott (1990), Carter (2000) and Prior (2003) all assert 
that archival records of  parliamentary  discussions are documents that contain rich and useful materials 
for social science researchers to understand the formation or emergence of social reality. Thus, 
parliamentary documents will be useful not only to understand stakeholders’ positions on skilled 
immigration, but also to understand the process which all stakeholders had gone through which resulted 
in the Immigration Act  in 2002 as well as its amendment in 2004 and those proposed in the Immigration 
Bill of 2006.  
Following the main research question, the sub-research questions are  
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1. What does academic literature say about skilled immigration in South Africa?  
2. Who were the main stakeholders involved in the policy discussion from 2000 to 2006 and what 
were their interests and agendas in relation to skilled immigration? 
3. How did the stakeholders involved respond to the contextual factors and what outcomes 
contained in the Immigration Act passed in 2002 and its subsequent amendment in 2004 and 
the Bill deliberated in 2006 pointed to those responses? 
4. How did the amendments to the Immigration Act impact the DoH’s recruitment policy on foreign 
health professionals?  
Significance of the study 
This research dissertation contributes to the migration scholarship in two ways. One is in its content which 
provides a deeper understanding of the obstacles for the government to pursue skilled immigration in 
South Africa and their implication to the doctors’ shortage in the country. The other is in the application 
of Archer’s (1995) critical realist theory morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach of this study which 
demonstrates how her three-phased analytical approach can be effectively used to track the changes in 
South Africa’s immigration policy and thus analyse the DoH’s reluctant recruitment stance towards 
employing foreign national doctors.  
The dissertation examines two prominent societal phenomenon in South Africa: the shortage of 
doctors’ and the national Department of Health’s (DoH) reluctance to recruit foreign doctors in relation to 
South Africa’s immigration policy and the government’s protectionism to pursue an economically driven 
skilled immigration policy. Its focus is on the analysis and the consequent understanding of the DoH’s 
reluctance through the lens of the government’s immigration policy. By locating the time period between 
2000 to 2006, this dissertation investigates how stakeholders from different sectors of South African 
society had deliberated on the skills shortage crisis and high unemployment and also explores their own 
sentiments towards foreigners, all of which resulted in the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. Furthermore, this 
dissertation aims to compare the parallels between protectionism in the immigration policy and the DoH’s 
restrictive recruitment policy of foreign doctors to explain the impact of the immigration policy on the 
DoH’s recruitment of foreign doctors. Nyamnjoh (2006: 1) describes that migration is an inevitable part 
of globalisation. It is marked by accelerated flows and dissolving boundaries for capital, goods and 
electronic information, but it is also marked by its intensification and the actualisations of borders, 
divisions and violent strategies of exclusions. This research dissertation explains how the intensification 
and actualisation of borders, divisions and violent strategies of exclusion which characterise South 
Africa’s immigration policy is the product of South Africa’s powerful and influential opposition to skilled 
immigration. The opposition to skilled immigration and the slow progress in the reform of immigration 
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policy have contributed to a severe skills shortage. The doctors’ shortage is a significant example of a 
country’s protectionist immigration policy which aims to contain migration flows and preserve jobs for its 
own citizens. In  the light of the doctors’ shortage that is endangering the health of the South African 
population, it is important that scholars and leaders attempt to understand why the DoH had adopted its 
policy in 2006 to restrict the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors in the first place so that these 
implications may be addressed in the future.  
From the social theory perspective, this dissertation operationalises Archer’s (1995) critical 
realist theory and morphogenetic/morphostatic approach to explain the development of South Africa’s 
immigration policy from 2000 to 2006. The approach that this dissertation takes acknowledges the distinct 
roles and the ‘conditioning effect’ that stakeholders (agency) and social conditions such as antagonism 
towards foreigners, high unemployment and skills crisis (structure) each played in the formulation of 
South Africa’s immigration policy (Archer, 1995). Hence, it offers a different perspective of analytical 
framework for social science research to study the evolvement of a social event.  
Outline of chapters 
The structure of this research dissertation is outlined and briefly explained below. 
Chapter 2 is a detailed account of critical realism and Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic cycle 
to define all the key concepts that inform the design of the research dissertation. Chapter 3 is the 
research methodology chapter which discusses the types of data collected for this research, the 
rationale for data selection, data analysis method as well as ethical concerns. The literature review in 
chapter 4 delves deeper into the doctors’ shortage crisis and the DoH’s measures to address the 
shortage issue. Then it leads up to the question: Why is the DoH so reluctant to recruit foreign doctors 
despites of all the efforts made to boost the number of doctors in the sector? The chapter then delves 
into South Africa’s immigration politics. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are finding chapters dedicated to explain 
the stakeholders’ involvement in the drafting process of the immigration policy. The discussion chapter 
constitutes phase three of Archer’s framework which aims to answer the main research question. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis and contains my own reflection on the employed methodology, social 
theory and the contribution of this study.  
  
21 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 2 Morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach on migration 
Overview 
This chapter discusses Margaret Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle theory, the social 
theory used in this research dissertation. It draws on migration theorists’ work to critically review the 
existing theoretical attempts to theorise migration—micro-level theories and macro-level theories, 
pointing out that the methodological deficiencies in them render them unsuitable to attain a holistic 
understanding in migration studies (Castles, 2010; Iosifides, 2011: 18-31; Bakewell, 2010; De Haas, 
2016). In the pursuit of such a holistic social theory to study migration, there is an emerging theoretical 
trend that shows an integration of incorporating both micro-level and macro-level theories vis-à-vis 
human agency and social structure in migration studies. Moreover, this trend distinguishes the distinct 
roles that human agency and social structure play in migration and emphasises on seeing migration as 
a social phenomenon produced by the interaction between human agency and social structure. 
Archer’s theory of morphogenesis/morphostasis is able to fulfil this function and it illustrates the distinct 
status and agency and structure as well as distinguishes the stratified, emergent and transformative 
nature of social reality.  
Rationale: Using Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach to theorise South 
Africa’s immigration policy 
Since the purpose of the research question is to understand the deliberation of South Africa’s 
immigration policy from 2000 to 2006, it involves stakeholders and the external factors on the basis of 
which  they had deliberated in relation to the immigration policy. The interaction between human 
agency and social structure determined by the research question indicates that the study for this 
research question will require a social theory that features the roles of both human agency and social 
structure on migration. 
There have been various theoretical approaches to migration (Castles, 2010; Iosifides, 2011: 
18-32; De Haas, 2016; Pahl, 2016). Existing theories either regard migration decision-making as an 
individual rational choice seeking to maximise utility (micro-level approaches) or as behaviour 
determined by external structural conditions such as the global North-South migratory pattern (macro-
level approaches) (Iosifies, 2010; Pahl, 2016). Whilst micro-level theories are criticised for their 
neoclassical economic sense and methodological individualism, macro-level theories have been 
criticised for their presumptuous Global South to North migratory pattern. Because of the lack of 
robustness and rigour in the methodology in migration studies, findings and conclusions generated by 
migration research are highly fragmented and conflicted (Fawcett & Arnold 1987: 456; Goss & Lindquist 
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1995: 325-6; Castles, 2010; Iosifides, 2011: 18-31). Hence, to address these highly fragmented and 
conflictual theories that were used to theorise migration, findings produced under such circumstances 
tend either to be focused overly on explaining the role of structural factors of migration or on the role of 
human agency to migration. 
Anthony Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory is an early theoretical attempt in the social 
theoretical realm to resolve the impasse of the structure versus agency theorisation. Although not 
necessarily successfully, to a certain extent it separated human agency and social structure and paved 
the path for future social theorists to work on (King, 2010; Bakewell, 2010). Giddens’s (1984) theory 
uses the word ‘structuration’ to refer to the actual change or reproduction of social reality. His 
theorisation of structure and agency asserts that  
• Agency is dictated or patterned by structures and acts in the world to reproduce or change 
the social structures in which they encounter (King, 2010: 253-4).  
• Structures and agency always operate to either change or transform the society in 
coherence because when agents instantiate structure into practice, they simultaneously 
affirm not only the structures of rules but also of the system itself (Giddens, 1984: 19). 
Although Giddens (1984) should be given credit for bringing new insight into the social theory realm,  
his theory is far from satisfactory to explain the relation between agency and structure and has been 
criticised for its lack of clear ontology for social structure from scholars such as Danermark et al. (2002: 
179-80), King (2010:  254) as well as Bakewell (2010: 1705). These scholars argue that the existence 
of social structure is virtual and is dependent on the instantiation of human agents’ modification of 
structures in Giddens’s theory (Halfacree, 1995; Danermark et al., 2002: 179-180). Because of the 
virtual status of structure of social reality in Giddens’s theory, agents’ freedom in relation to structure is 
always consistent with the objective to either change or to transform society (Halfacree, 1995; King, 
2010: 254). For Giddens, agency actions and social structures are the two aspects of the same thing –
social practice. Thus, although Giddens’ structuration theory does separate human agency and social 
structure, it fails to appreciate the distinct roles that agency and structure play in the formation of social 
reality.  
A number of scholars such Bakewell (2010: 1705) assert that despite the structure-agency 
impasse in the migration theory which is yet to be resolved, over the years, there is an emerging trend 
that shows using an integrated approach by combining micro- and macro-level factors and place equal 
emphasis on both structural and agential factors could be the way forward for migration studies 
(Castles, 2010; Bakewell, 2010; Iosifides, 2011; De Haas, 2016). Bakewell (2010: 1705) suggests that 
a critical realist analysis of the relationship between structure and agency, using Archer’s theory of 
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morphogenesis that accepts analytical dualism between structure and agency, can provide a much 
more sophisticated theoretical basis for understanding processes of migration and social changes. This 
approach to theorise migration, of which Archer’s morphogenetic cycle approach features, resolves the 
difficulty in migration theories bordering into neoclassical thinking.  It also sees macro factors and micro 
factors as, respectively, the human agency driver on migration and social structure’s contextual effect 
driver for human migration and that both factors are equally important in shaping migrants’ trajectories. 
It emphasises that migration is not only determined by migrants themselves, it is also determined by the 
external factors that influenced migrants, most importantly, migration is a phenomenon produced by the 
interaction of human agency deliberating on external social factors. Margaret Archer’s 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach is thus an ideal theoretical framework to answer the 
research question. Firstly, its analytical dualism retains the relative independence of structure and of 
agency avoids producing theories which are bordering on either being biased towards structural-
focused or towards agential-focused. Analytical dualism is an important component which defines 
Archer’s theory of morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle.  
Secondly, Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach has great explanatory power 
that recognises the development of the event that is, the formulation of immigration policy. Through 
Archer’s three phases approach consisting of conditioning, interaction and elaboration, it could explain 
the evolvement of a social issue capturing both the roles that social structure and human agency play in 
migration. Since immigration is a complex and evolving process, the three-phased development 
approach used in analysis will help track the development of the immigration policy in South Africa.  
Thirdly, Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic espouse the differentiation not only between 
human agency and social structure. Within social structure, it further distinguishes between cultural and 
structural external factors. Archer (1995: 179) argues that these three factors which all play a role in the 
development of a social event all have their own “emergent properties”. She defines  
• A Structural Emergent Property (SEP) is primarily dependent on material resources.  
• A Cultural Emergent Property (CEP) is primarily dependant on logic and ideas (Archer, 
1995: 179) 
Hence, employing Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach could sufficiently explain the 
role of antagonism towards foreigners (CEP), high unemployment and a skills crisis (SEPs), as well as 
the contribution  of  various stakeholders , in the shaping of South Africa’s immigration policy from 2000 
to 2006. 
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Applying Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle theory 
Archer (1995) explains social changes by describing how human agency deliberates on existing social 
structure after which it either keeps the social structures’ status as quo (reproduction) or modifies social 
structures (transformation). This social change takes place through a three-staged development process, 
namely, stage 1 conditioning; stage 2 interaction; stage 3 elaboration. This process which Archer 
describes is illustrated below. The table illustrates the morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle in three 
sections. The first stage is called the pre-existing conditioning which comprises cultural and structural 
conditions as well as the conditions of agency. The second stage is called the interaction between agents 
and structure (culture and structure). The final stage is called the social elaboration stage in which 
cultural, structural and agential conditions are either transformed into new forms or reproduced in its 









To contextualise Archer’s theory into practical application in order to explain the research question, the 
dissertation needs to examine these following questions.  
• Who were the stakeholders that participated in the drafting of the Immigration Bill? 
• How did those stakeholders deliberate on the antagonism towards foreign nationals (CEP) and 
the existence of high unemployment and skills shortages (SEPs) which informed their support or 
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• Since those stakeholders had different levels of influence over policy makers, the more decisive 
stakeholders and their views on skilled immigration had shaped the government’s narrative 





phostasis of Agents 
Morphogenesis/Mor
phostasis of Culture 
& Structure 
                                       
Pre-existing Conditioning 
 








25 | P a g e  
 
Stage 1: Conditioning (T1) -- Stakeholders involved in the drafting of the Immigration Bill 
There are two objectives at stage one of Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle. One is to identify 
structural and cultural conditions which constitute the pre-existing social structure. In this dissertation, 
the pre-existing Cultural Emergent Property (CEP) and Structural Emergent Properties (SEPs) are 
South African’s antagonism towards foreign nationals, high unemployment and skills shortage, 
respectively. Together, they constitute the pre-existing social structure prior to the drafting of the 
immigration policy.  
The other objective is to identify the relevant human agents involved. Carter (2000: 99) in his 
application of Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach suggests the identification of 
agents could start by assessing agents’ motives (projects) and trace empirically their efforts used to 
achieve their motives. Archer (1995: 198, 2000: 4) uses the term ‘concern’ to refer to the ‘commitments 
constitutive of who we are, which are an expression of our identity’. It is through agents’ reflexive 
deliberations that they prioritise their most important ‘concerns’ which she calls their ‘ultimate concerns‘ 
and accommodate subordinate ones to devise a project through which they believe that they can 
realise their ultimate concerns (Archer, 2000: 4). For instance, the private sector was one of the main 
stakeholders that was involved in the drafting of the immigration policy. The private sector consisted of 
many businesses, ranging from multi-national corporations to small businesses as well as self-
employed entrepreneurs. There would a whole range of concerns for every single individual and 
organisation that falls under the ‘private sector’. The most pertinent ‘concern’ in relation to skilled 
immigration for this sector was the impact of the skills shortage that was stalling the growth of 
businesses. Thus, this sector deliberated on the skills shortage and came to the conclusion that 
supporting skilled immigration would solve such a shortage, which would then contribute to business 
growth. The private sector’s deliberation on the skills shortage led the sector to uniformly agree with 
pursuing a skills-driven immigration system that could attract and expedite the entries of skilled 
foreigners.   
The identifications of structural and cultural conditions and relevant agents constitute stage one 
of the morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle. By completing these identifications, Archer (1995) provides 
the background for both social structure and human agency prior to the actual interplays between 
structure and human agency take place. In this dissertation, the end of stage 1 means that the 
background information for social structure and human agency are adequately provided and is fully-
fledged to move to the next stage of analysis.  
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Stage 2: Interactions (T2-T3) –Stakeholders’ deliberation on skilled immigration 
At stage 2: This is the stage where agency responds to the constraining or enabling conditioning 
factors. For example, skills shortage, a structural condition, might be seen by organised labour as a 
constraining factor which compelled trade unions to pursue a more restrictive immigration policy in 
order to look after the interests of South African workers whereas it might be seen as an enabling factor 
for private sector to pursue a more enabling immigration policy. The main objective of this stage is to 
track the strategies that each interest group used to influence policy direction and to determine which 
group is the most decisive in shaping the compromise reached at the next stage elaboration (Archer, 
1995). 
The drafting of South Africa’s immigration policy was a well-negotiated process which involved 
all sectors of the society (Trimikliniotis, Gordon & Zondo, 2008; Segatti & Landau, 2011). Immigration 
Act 13 of 2002 as well as its amendments in 2004 and the proposed Bill in 2006 were the final 
outcomes of the deliberations among stakeholders and government (Immigration Act. 13 of 2002, 2002; 
Immigration Act, 13 of 2002, as amended, in 2004; Immigration Amendment Bill, 2006). The Bill and 
amendments to the Act were the outcomes of the deliberation process between stakeholders and pre-
existing social structure (antagonism, high unemployment, skills crisis). According to Archer (personal 
communication 2019, 28 March), after knowing how stakeholders responded to structural constraints or 
enablement, it is then important to determine which stakeholders had a greater decisive role in the 
shaping of South Africa’s immigration policy. This will involve comparing the proposed immigration 
strategies of stakeholders against the outcomes which were shown in the changes in the immigration 
policy.   
Stage 3: Elaboration (T3-T4)—Stakeholders’ roles over policy makers 
Stage 3 is the elaboration stage. This will be the stage to answer the main research question: how did 
South Africa’s immigration policy influence the recruitment of foreign doctors? The objective of this 
stage is to set out the conditions under which morphogenesis versus morphostasis ensues from 
particular chains of socio-cultural interaction (Archer, 1995: 294). The questions that this phase should 
focus on are: How did Structural, Cultural and Agential Elaboration affect the DoH’s stance in the 
employment and recruitment of foreign doctors? 
According to Archer (1995), the interplays between human agency and social structure in the 
preceding stage have affected and changed both. Thus, post-structure and post-human agency are 
different from how they were before the discussion on the immigration policy. It is imperative to provide 
an account of the new forms of social structure and relations between human agents which emerged 
after the interplays. For instance, the interplay between human agency and social structure such as 
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high unemployment may have aggravated the objection to skilled immigration. Then it would be 
necessary to lay out the conditions upon which the aggravation takes place in order to understand how 
changes to the immigration policy shaped the DoH’s recruitment measures on foreign doctors.  
Archer’s theory and precepts inform this research dissertation and helps structure it.  In the last 
chapter, I listed the central research question and its sub-research questions. Drawing on Archer’s 
precepts which derive from critical realists’ stratified, emergent and transformative social reality, I have 
summarised these sub-research questions into their corresponding conceptual questions structured in 
Archer’s way.  
Empirical Question Morphogenetic Cycle 
Phase 
Conceptual Question 
What does academic literature say 
about skilled immigration in South 
Africa? 
Phase 1: Conditioning (T1-
T2) 
What were the structural and cultural conditions 
that constrain or enable agents prior to the event 
at T1? 
Who were the main stakeholders 
involved in the policy discussion 
and what were their interests and 
agendas in relation to skilled 
immigration? 
Who were those agents and what were their 
interests and concerns? 
How did those stakeholders 
involved respond to the contextual 
factors and what outcomes 
contained in the Immigration Act 
passed in 2002 and its subsequent 
amendment in 2004 and the Bill of 
2006 have pointed to the 
response(s)? 
Phase 2: Socio-Interaction 
(T2–T3) 
How did agents mediate those cultural and 
structural enablements or constraints in order to 
advance their interests? What was the outcome at 
T3? 
How did the changes introduced in 
the Immigration Bill impact the 
DoH’s recruitment policy on 
foreign doctors? 
Phase 3: Socio-Elaboration 
(T3-T4) 
How did the outcome at T3 affect the cultural, 
structural and agential conditions at T1? 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter discussed the two obstacles which resulted in the lack of a coherent and robust body of 
migration theory. Firstly, the two commonly used migration theories –macro-level and micro-level 
theories – fail to distinguish the independent status for structure and agency and to appreciate that 
each is irreducible to the other. Secondly, the impasse is because migration studies tend to use the 
neoclassical thinking which only examines the economic role of migration and thus neglects the roles of 
non-economic factors in migration. This chapter then discussed why Archer’s 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle could resolve this impasse to study migration and answer the 
research question. Finally, this chapter illustrated the three-staged process of the 
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morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle and discussed the application of Archer’s framework in approaching 
the research subject.  
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Chapter 3 Research methodology 
Overview 
This dissertation aims to understand how the national Department of Health’s (DoH) discouragement of 
the recruitment of foreign doctors was influenced by the immigration policy from 2000 to 2006. In order 
to understand South Africa’s immigration policy and the stakeholders involved as well as their various 
arguments for and against skilled immigration, it is critical to examine stakeholders’ deliberations about 
South Africa’s immigration policy. Through an understanding of the support for and objections to skilled 
immigration, this dissertation can answer how these various arguments to support or to object skilled 
immigration shaped the DoH’s restrictive policy towards the employment and recruitment of foreign 
health professionals.  
Archival records, recommended by scholars such as Scott (1990), Carter (2000) and Prior 
(2003) are a useful source of data for this study in order to understand the formation or emergence of 
social reality. The rich and useful information that researchers can get from documentary data 
motivates the use of parliamentary documents as a primary data resource for this study. The issue 
under investigation is the deliberation of stakeholders on South Africa’s immigration policy which is a 
complex deliberating process. The complexity which involves examining the roles that stakeholders as 
well as structural factors such as high unemployment, skills shortage and antagonism towards 
foreigners had played to the formation of the immigration policy needs research data to be able to 
demonstrate the evolvement of the immigration policy process. Because parliamentary documents can 
fulfil that purpose, they will be used as the primary data source for the purpose of this study (Carter, 
2000).  
Selection of the data time period 
Determined by the central research question, the time period for which I selected data is between the 
period of 2000 and 2006. The rationale for using this time period is related to the two events that took 
place in these two years. Firstly, the South African society started the discussion on immigration in the 
late 1990s and the Green Paper was developed and the subsequent White Paper was published for 
public comment in 1999. This signals the beginning of the country’s discussion and drafting process on 
South Africa’s first immigration policy since 1994. Secondly, the national Department of Health 
published its first formalised policy on the recruitment and employment of foreign health professionals 
in 2006. In 2010, the DoH revised its 2006 policy and this latest version has been in use up to date. 
This policy changed the ad hoc process which the DoH had used in the employment of foreign doctors 
prior to 2006 and stipulated stringent conditions and requirements on the employment of foreign health 
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professionals. Because the year in which the DoH drafted the recruitment policy was that when the 
development of South Africa’s immigration policy took place, it was important to know how the whole 
process of the development of South Africa’s immigration policy had influenced the DoH’s opposition to 
the recruitment of foreign doctors.  
Data collection: Archived parliamentary documents 
The research question asks how the deliberations about South Africa’s immigration policy influenced the 
DoH’s recruitment of foreign doctors. In order to answer the research question, this dissertation uses 
parliamentary documents to understand stakeholders’ views and opinions on skilled immigration.  
Documentary data in this study refers more specifically to parliamentary data as the collected 
data mainly comprise parliamentary documents. Documentary data is a form of social science research 
data that have been widely discussed and recommended by many scholars (Bailey, 1982; 1994; Treece 
& Treece ,1982; Webb et al., 1984; Scott, 1990; Polit  & Hungler ,1991, Silverman, 1993; Denscombe, 
1998: 163; Carter, 2000; Prior, 2003). Documentary data provides rich and useful information that reveals 
and captures authors’ thoughts and deliberations at the time when those documents are produced. 
Because of this unique function, documentary data could be a useful source of data to help social 
researchers understand the formation and the emergence of the social issues that researchers plan to 
study (Scott, 1990; Carter, 2000; Prior, 2003). Thus, by using parliamentary data to analyse stakeholders’ 
views on skilled immigration, I could re-visit and study  the history of the subject and what stakeholders 
were thinking of at the time of the drafting process of South Africa’s immigration policy which is nearly 
twenty years before the time that I write this dissertation. From understanding stakeholders’ views on 
skilled immigration and comparing those views to the actual policy changes, I can gain a deeper 
understanding on which stakeholders were more influential and had influenced the DoH on its reluctance 
to recruit foreign doctors.  
The study comprises of data from these sources:  
1) Parliamentary meeting minutes from the two Portfolio Committees –Health and Home Affairs 
from 2000 to 2006.  
2) Submissions from stakeholders on the White Paper on International Migration from 2000-2002. 
3) Submissions from stakeholders on the Immigration Bill 2002. 
4) Submissions from stakeholders on the Immigration Amendment Act in 2004 and the Immigration 
Amendment Bill in 2006.  
5) National media and newspaper reports from 2000 to 2006. 
The first section of data comprises archived parliamentary meeting minutes and can be 
obtained from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s website. The Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
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(PMG) is an organisation that provides detailed accounts of the proceedings of South African 
parliamentary committees to the public. The second to the fifth sections of the research data could be 
accessed from the Sabinet Legal Database and Sabinet Reference –SA media database. Sabinet 
Legal Database includes ministers’ speeches at parliamentary portfolio meetings, copies of 
stakeholders’ submission to parliament as well as correspondence between politicians and those 
stakeholders. The Sabinet Reference –SA Media Database is a database which stores all the South 
African national newspapers. I have attached the list of parliamentary documents that I have collected 
for the purpose of this dissertation in Appendix I. Below is a table to indicate the number of documents 
consulted in this dissertation. As the table below outlines, the dataset consists of 66 parliamentary 
meeting minutes that were obtained from the website of Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s (PMG), 32 
documents of policy related documents from the Sabinet Legal Database as well as 51 written 
submissions submitted to Parliament which were also obtained from the Sabinet Legal Database. 
About 20 documents were collected from newspaper and media via the Sabinet Reference Database. 
The least number of newspaper sources was probably because of the lack of attention that the topic of 
recruiting foreign doctors was received by the media. It shows the lack of attention and negative 
perception that the society at large places on the value and contribution of foreign skilled labour to a 
certain extent. The bulk of my analysis was based on the first three document sources with newspaper 
sources providing only supplementary information.  
Since the data collection method for this dissertation is desktop research via websites and 
various databases such as Sabinet Legal and Sabinet Reference –SA Media, the key searching terms 
which were used to find those data were: the Immigration Act 2002, the  Immigration Amendment Act 
2004, the Immigration Amendment Bill of  2006, skilled immigration, foreign doctors, etc. 
Data coding and analysis 
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data as 
well as interpreting various aspects of the research topic (Braun & Clarke, 2006). As Spencer, Ritchie 
Document Type Document Source Number of documents 
Parliamentary meeting minutes Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
(PMG) website 
66 
Policy, speeches, draft bills, 
regulations 
Sabinet Legal 32 
Submissions from stakeholders Sabinet Legal 51 
Newspapers Sabinet Reference –SA Media 20 
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and O’Connor (2003: 209) state, qualitative data in its raw form is unwieldy and tangled but also rich in 
descriptive detail and explanatory evidence. Its thematic analysis can reorganise the messiness of data 
and illuminate its richness into its conceptual categories that are instrumental in answering research 
questions. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest a six-step process for thematic analysis: 1) familiarise with 
data; 2) generalising initial codes; 3) search for patterns amongst codes; 4) review validity of themes; 5) 
define and name themes; 6) write up report. This six-step process of thematic analysis has been adjusted 
slightly to accommodate this study and is illustrated below.  
Step 1: Familiarise with data 
De Walt and De Walt (2011: 80) as well as Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014) recommend that 
familiarising with raw data could help build a brief understanding of data. Miles and Huberman (1994: 51) 
also point out that familiarising could also assist in developing a start-list of codes prior to fieldwork. It 
can not only reduce the chances of data overload, it could serve as a gradual step to begin with data 
selection process as Miles and Huberman argue that data coding process is a form of data selection 
process. Following their advice, I had spent two months from November 2018 to January 2018 to 
familiarise myself with the collected parliamentary documents which comprised of Home Affairs portfolio 
meeting minutes and stakeholders’ submissions on White Paper on International Migration of 1999, 
Immigration Act 2002 and its Amendment Act in 2004 and the Immigration Bill of 2006. In addition to that, 
any sporadic thoughts that had sprung up during the first round of data familiarisation were recorded in 
a written memo. Glaser (1978: 83-4) explains memo as a ‘write-up of ideas about codes and their 
relationships as they strike the analyst while coding’. As Miles and Huberman (1994: 75) describe, 
‘memos are designed to capture thoughts on the fly’, I found keeping a written memo particularly helpful 
for conducting regular reviews and double checks on my data.  
Step 2: Generalising initial codes 
At step 2, this is the process where researchers need to create codes. To begin with, Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 58) advise researchers to always begin with a provisional list of codes that are directly informed 
by research questions. The research questions that guided the provisional coding list were 
• Who were the stakeholders that had been involved in the drafting of the immigration policy and 
what stances they had towards skilled immigration? 
• How did those stakeholders deliberate on the contextual factors (high unemployment, skills 
shortage and antagonism towards foreign nationals) which led to their decisions to either support 
or oppose skilled immigration policy? 
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For example, the first sub-research question emphasises the role of stakeholders. Thus, the code 
stakeholders was created. Similarly, the second sub-research question points to stakeholders’ stances 
towards skilled immigration. Drawing on Reudin’s (2019:210) codebook on immigration policy, languages 
that are negative, nationalistic and monocultural discourse were coded as opposing immigration whereas 
progressive, cosmopolitan and multicultural discourse was coded and defined as supporting immigration. 
Thus, two stances from different stakeholders emerged and these stances can be expressed as either 
support or opposed skilled immigration policy. Furthermore, Strauss (1987) suggests coding for 
‘conditions’, ‘interactions among actors’, ‘strategies and tactics’ and ‘consequences’ as a provisional 
coding list to start with. I found Strauss’ (1987) provisional list very helpful as it also closely aligned with 
Margaret Archer’s three-phased approach on morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle. 
Many researchers adopt a two-step scheme in data coding. A more general etic coding to a more 
specific emic coding is recommended by qualitative researchers such as Miles and Huberman (1994: 61) 
and Adair and Pastori (2014: 36). Adair and Pastori (2014: 36) explain that when creating etic, codes 
developed can be more transferrable and applicable to multiple settings whilst at emic coding, codes 
have to be more content specific. 
Step 3: Search for pattern amongst codes 
Research method theorists suggest researchers should go beyond the analysis of codes and focus on 
the analysis at the broader scale such as the relations between codes, themes and different levels of 
themes (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 69; Braun & Clarke, 2006). Miles and Huberman (1994: 69) call it 
‘pattern coding’ which is a way of grouping summaries that are generated from the preceding step into a 
smaller number of sets, themes or constructs. As more data is coded, processed and classified, De Wet 
and Erasmus (2005: 33) argue that pattern coding can also help researchers to gain a deeper level of 
understanding through identifying patterns and relationships in the data to construct an argument that 
supports answering the research question. For instance, it was during the pattern coding that followed 
the first-level coding, that I discovered the conflict on skilled immigration between the private sector and 
organised labour. There was a pattern within the codes for trade unions that pointed to the trade unions’ 
objection to skilled immigration as well as their critical response to the business sector’s supporting skilled 
immigration. This pattern was then coded conflict with private sector which became an important element 
of my argument in this thesis that highlighted trade unions’ anti-skilled immigration stance. It was the 
trade unions’ stance towards immigration that directed this thesis to explore whether the DoH shared the 
same sentiment towards skilled immigration and whether the cause of the DoH’s discouraging stance 
towards recruiting foreign doctors was of the same cause as stakeholders that objected to skilled 
immigration.  
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Coding software has improved the actual process of entering data and applying codes 
dramatically since its inception. Management of the wealth of this massive amount of data was made 
possible with the aid of new generation Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
(CAQDAS). De Wet and Erasmus (2005: 5) also concur that CAQDAS provides researchers a way of 
expediting a systematic and more accurate data analysis. For this dissertation, I opted for NVivo software 
(QSR International 2011) as a tool with which to organize, code and analyse my collected documentary 
data. The experience of data coding made me agree that CAQDAS is a much more effective and efficient 
tool for researchers. All data sources were imported and saved on Nvivo software prior to coding and 
analysing.  
Step 4: Review validity of the pattern codes 
Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest researchers should review the validity of pattern codes and filter 
out those that are not widely supported by evidence. Within this process, some pattern codes may 
collapse into others while others may not be pattern codes relevant to the research question. For 
instance, first-level coding resulted in some irrelevant codes such as ‘medical permit’ which were 
repeatedly discussed during the White Paper and Immigration Act 2002 processes, but these 
codes were deemed irrelevant to the objective of this study and were thus filtered out. Also, some 
codes such as ‘giving international students/visiting scholars/relatives of South Africans certain 
work rights’ were collapsed and recategorized under the broader code ‘foreigners’ work rights’.  
Step 5: Narrating pattern codes 
The fifth step is to define and to name pattern codes. Braun and Clarke (2006) explain that this is 
the phase when researchers need to review and further refine the pattern codes that they will 
present for analysis. They suggest that pattern codes need to be organised into a coherent and 
internally consistent account, with an accompanying narrative.  
Since this study drew on parliamentary documents about and analyses of South Africa’s 
immigration policy, it was useful to use the Event Listing method which orders data by time and 
sequence, thus preserving the events chronology and illuminating the subsequent processes (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994: 110). Drawing on Miles and Huberman’s (1994: 110) guide on building the event 
listing display, the following table was drawn up. To effectively use the table below for analysis, these 
questions were helpful in filling it out.  
• Which year did the event take place?  
• What were the contributions or inputs from stakeholders in that year?  
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• How did stakeholders respond to the constraining or enabling cultural or structural factors 
(skills shortage, high unemployment, antagonism towards foreigners)?  
• Which courses of action were stakeholders pursuing?  
• What was the outcome? 
The use of the form below is described: 
A1 to A4: stakeholders who appeared in the dataset are filled into their corresponding block according 
to the time that their inputs were made; 
B1 to B4: how stakeholders responded to society’s antagonism towards foreigners 
C1 to C4: how stakeholders responded to skills shortage in the country 
D1 to D4: how stakeholders responded to domestic high unemployment amongst citizens 
  Time Period 




(2000 to 2002) 
Immigration 












Stakeholders A1 A2 A3 A4 
Social 
Structure 
Antagonism B1 B2 B3 B4 
Skills shortage C1 C2 C3 C4 
High 
unemployment 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle tracks changes in policy in order to determine which 
stakeholders played a more decisive role in the formation of the immigration policy. It is necessary, 
however, to establish  how the changes take place. The ‘how’ is conceptualised by Archer (1995) as how 
cultural, structural and agential factors shaped by the changes in the immigration policy affected the DoH 
in its decision-making and resulted in the policy on foreign doctors. In order to answer this question, the 
role that each sphere of factor (cultural, structural and agential) played in the formation of the Immigration 
policy needs to be analysed separately. The above table can display and fulfil this role to show the 
changes in the immigration policy more clearly. As Miles and Huberman (1994: 113) point out, event 
listing can not only ground researchers’ understanding of a complex flow of events, it also lays the basis 
for further causal analysis: what events led to what further events and what mechanisms underlay those 
associations.  
Step 6: Write up report 
The final step of thematic analysis is to write up the report. It is important to provide extracted data 
embedded within an analytic narrative in relation to the research question. Data display gradually 
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develops theoretical typologies based on data analysis and it determines the ways in which the 
dissertation can be structured (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
The typologies, namely, Archer’s theory on culture, structure and agency as well as the three- 
phased morphogenetic/morphostatic approach, structure the dissertation into three sections which 
became its findings chapters and the discussion chapter. The first part deals with the identification of 
agents that were involved in the drafting of the immigration policy as well as the attitudes of these 
individuals’ and organisations’ towards skilled immigration. Part 2 of the findings examines how 
stakeholders responded to South Africa’s antagonism towards foreign nationals. It further compares the 
changes in the immigration policy with the stakeholders’ positions on skilled immigration in order to 
determine which stakeholders were more influential and decisive in shaping South Africa’s immigration 
policy. Similarly, Part 3 of the findings continues with the modality of Part 2 and explains how stakeholders 
responded to the structural conditions –skills shortage and high unemployment. It also determines which 
stakeholders emerged to have played a more decisive role in shaping the immigration policy by 
comparing those stakeholders’ positions with the changes in the Immigration Bill. The answer to the 
research objective ‘to explain the effect of the changes in the immigration policy on the DoH’s restrictive 
recruitment measures on foreign doctors’ constitutes the last phase of Archer’s (1995) 
morphogenetic/morphostatic framework: elaboration.  
Research ethics 
The research ethics of this study strictly adhered to the requirements of the University of Cape Town 
Ethics Committee as well as my own understanding of them after I consulted Neuman’s (2006) Basics of 
Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative approaches. Neuman (2006: 48) defines ethics as 
‘concerns, dilemmas, and conflicts that arise over the proper way to conduct research’ It is important for 
social researchers to balance potential benefits such as advocating the understanding of social life, 
improving decision-making, or helping research participants deal with potential costs such as the loss of 
dignity, self-esteem, privacy or democratic freedom. As this study involved no human subject participation 
and all collected data are available to the public, the need to obtain informed consent was not applicable 
here.  
Limitations of methodology  
Wetherell, Taylor and Yates (2001) comment that since all research work is goal-oriented, so they cannot 
be completely impartial because the work carries value. It is inevitable that my research could in some 
respects show bias in the data analysis process and this needs to be acknowledged. Prinsloo (2015) 
agrees with them and further explains that she rejects the false belief that any research techniques or a 
deeper engagement with research materials would in any way absolve the hermeneutist from drawing on 
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the researcher’s own experience in the data analysis process. Hence, it is advised to acknowledge that 
all research projects, including this research dissertation, contain a research bias and that the only 
strategies that can be done is to mitigate but not eliminate the research bias (Prinsloo, 2015: 63). 
As a researcher conducting this study independently, I was mindful of the research bias that 
could be generated in the researching process and used the two methods suggested by Prinsloo (2015: 
63), namely, memos and praxis, to mitigate the inaccuracy that my findings could have. Archer’s (1995) 
morphogenetic cycle approach involves much guesswork over the deliberations of agents to analyse the 
relations between themselves and the structure. Questions like ‘why did agents do what they did’ often 
came up. Although documents themselves may allude to or suggest certain possibilities, it still depends 
on a researcher’s own reflexivity to interpret and construct an argument based on the codes and themes 
presented. It is in this process of reflexivity, Angen (2000: 383) argues, that bias may incur since it is not 
possible nor desirable to create objective distance when working in this perspective. Also, my social 
activism in immigration as well as the many traits that I share with the agents that supported skilled 
immigration – such as the belief in equality and rights – may make me become too one-sided in the data 
coding and analysis process. My effort in shedding light on the influence of the DHA’s immigration policy 
on the DoH’s foreign health professional recruitment policy inevitably included my own interpretation and 
views on skilled immigration and the recruitment of foreign doctors.  
Keeping a written memo which tracks and records the reflective thoughts on data periodically 
helped me to regularly reflect on my data coding schemes and regularly revise and update codes for 
improvement. Glaser (1978: 83-4) explains memoing in the most classical tone.  
[A memo is] the theorising write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike the 
analyst while coding…it can be a sentence, a paragraph or a few pages… it exhausts the analyst’s 
momentary ideation based on data with perhaps a little conceptual elaboration.  
Memos are thoughts of researchers on the fly and thus need to be dated and organised. Through constant 
comparison and scrutiny, some of the ideas may be related and linked and theories and arguments may 
be produced in this process. I found memo writing very helpful in cohering researcher’s thoughts and 
ideas and efficient in generating new arguments and findings. The other strategy that I used is called 
praxis. Prinsloo (2015: 63) explains that praxis allowed her to be mindful of her own perspective whilst 
distinguishing and respecting those of other people’s perspectives. For instance, in the coding process, 
one area that I constantly had to check and re-check was around the interpretation of words, what words 
and sentences should be coded as anti-immigration? Since the interpretation of codes and themes may 
differ because of different personal experience between me and other people, I would flag those parts of 
the data and ask my friends or colleagues to read data and inform me of their coding and compare the 
inconsistency.  
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By keeping handwritten memo, I was able to review my coding framework regularly and come 
up with new insights on the relations between codes and discover new findings. Using praxis, I can 
communicate with others such as my colleagues in the department to hear their views on my codes, 
research methodology and analysis so that I can be more informed of other perspectives. Although 
research bias cannot be eliminated, by regularly reflecting on my interpretations of coding framework and 
consulting with colleagues, it reduced research bias and thus the research findings will be more objective 
and closer to the truth.    
Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the selection of data, the thematic analysis method employed to analyse and to 
code data as well as the limitations of the research method. During the pattern coding and event listing 
steps of the thematic analysis, this chapter highlighted how Archer’s social theory  – a 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach – was used to provide a data coding framework that 
efficiently categorised data and assisted in seeing the links among data clusters and explained how the 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle was used to structure the rest of the thesis. 
This chapter also introduced the use of documentary data in social science studies. It showed 
and explained how documentary data obtained from parliamentary documents and meeting minutes 
could be useful to analyse policy changes, namely, South Africa’s immigration policy.   
The chapter concluded with a discussion of research ethics and the limitations of the research 
method. It argued that although research bias was inevitable, measures such as memos and praxis 
could help in its reduction. 
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Chapter 4 Literature review 
Overview 
This chapter draws on literature to discuss the government’s view on skilled immigration. It begins with a 
discussion of the history of South Africa’s immigration policy, revealing that throughout the history black 
African foreigners have always been seen as undesirable and thus denied the right to make legal and 
permanent settlement in South Africa.  Further, South Africa’s resistance to Africa’s regional integration 
is elucidated. The development of South Africa’s immigration policy and South Africa’s stance towards 
the movement of nationals from its neighbours have prompted people to ask what the rationale has been 
behind the government’s anti-immigrationist stance. This chapter then explains the roles that skills 
shortage in South Africa, high unemployment among citizens and its people’s antagonism towards 
foreigners have played in the government’s deliberations on South Africa’s immigration policy. More 
specifically, this chapter explains the weak political alliance promoting immigration and how the governing 
African National Congress’s (ANC) protectionist policy is used to preserve jobs for South Africans stalls 
progress and inhibits any attempt to reform the immigration system. Finally, the chapter explains how the 
restrictions imposed by national Department of Health (DoH) on the recruitment and employment of 
foreign doctors was caused by its objection to a skilled immigration policy and its agenda to preserve 
jobs for South Africans.   
History of South Africa’s immigration policy  
In the discussion of South Africa’s immigration policy, post-apartheid migration scholars usually analyse 
and describe the development of South Africa’s immigration policy into three time periods, namely,  its 
pre-1994 immigration policy, the immigration policy from 1994 to 1999 (when the government’s policy 
paper, the White Paper on International Migration was issued), and from 2000 onwards (Crush, Williams 
& Peberdy, 2005; Neocosmos, 2006; Peberdy, 2009; Segatti & Landau, 2011; Klotz, 2012; Boynton, 
2015; Van Lennep, 2019). Throughout the development of South Africa’s immigration policy, the 
government has consistently put measures in place to make legal immigration difficult for foreigners.  
Prior to 1994 
There is a long history of labour migration between South Africa and its many neighbouring countries, 
long before the current borders of South Africa were drawn (Crush, Williams & Peberdy, 2005). At least 
for the past 150 years, migrant workers came from Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, 
Swaziland, etc. to work on the Kimberly diamond mines and the Witwatersrand gold mines. The regulation 
of those mine workers was managed though the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). Besides mines, 
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commercial farms, factories, domestic service, transportation and construction sectors were also the 
main sectors for migrant labourers. It was estimated that at their peak, these sectors had attracted around 
600,000 migrant workers (Crush, Williams & Peberdy, 2005). Thus, legal labour migration to South Africa 
is a longstanding feature of the southern African labour market and this system is deeply entrenched in 
South Africa’s later economic development and is reflected in its immigration policy.  
Due to South Africa’s labour migration history, for most of the twentieth century, South Africa’s 
immigration system was operated on a ‘two-gate policy’ (Crush & McDonald, 2000; Neocosmos, 2006; 
Peberdy, 2009; Segatti, 2011; Boynton, 2015). The ‘two-gate policy’ operated as a dual system in the 
admission of foreigners. The front gate opened for foreigners who met the criteria of attractiveness as 
defined by the governing minority, whilst the back gate prevented unwanted foreigners from entering  but 
also allowed cheap foreign labour from neighbouring countries to enter South Africa for the purposes of 
contract labour (Segatti & Landau, 2011: 34). Peberdy (2009: 172) argues that immigration policy always 
reflects transitions ‘in the shape and form of the nation, and consequently the national building project 
and therefore the state’s national vision’. The ’two-gate policy’ admitted those foreigners who were seen 
as desirable, these mainly being white immigrants who were recipients of the state’s immigration incentive 
programmes because of the state’s vision to preserve the dominance of the country’s white population 
(Schwartzman & Taylor, 1999: 113; Peberdy, 2009; Segatti, 2011: 36; Klotz, 2013; Crush, 2014).4 Also, 
the ‘two-gate policy‘ excluded those, mainly black African nationals, who were seen as undesirable 
(Crush et al., 1992). Although black foreign nationals were allowed to work in the agricultural and mining 
sectors in South Africa,5 these workers were prohibited from bringing their families to make permanent 
settlement in South Africa (Boynton, 2015: 31). The ideal was for them to work in South Africa to supply 
its own labour shortage on mines and farms but they will return home when their work had been 
completed or their contracts had expired. 
It is evident that under the ‘two-gate policy ‘system, the state’s immigration policy was selective. 
White immigrants were favoured prior to 1994 and had been given financial incentives for settlement. 
Black African foreigners were denied their rights to make permanent settlement in South Africa but were 
still allowed to do contractual work for South Africa’s mining and agricultural industries. Hence, prior to 
1994, black foreign nationals, as a result of racial discrimination, were the primary targets of exclusion in 
South Africa’s immigration policy. The ’two-gate policy’ acted as an obstacle to their legal entry to South 
Africa. 
 
4 Between 1961 to 1991, several incentive programmes were implemented to make provisions for the settlement of thousands of 
European immigrants. This amount, according to Landau and Segatti (2011: 36), reached R3.6 million in 197–73 and went up to R8 
million in 1991. 
5 Of the 434,000 black foreigners working in South Africa in 1970, 81% were working in the mines, 9% in agriculture and 4% in 
manufacturing and construction (Budlender, 2013: 23). 
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Post-apartheid 1994 to 2000 
Although 1994 had witnessed South Africa’s first democratically elected government, the immigration 
policy in the country continued to exclude black African foreigners, albeit more implicitly. During this 
time period, two major events unfolded which had significant relevance to the course of South Africa’s 
immigration policy. The first major event was the passing of the Refugee Act in 1998 and the second 
was the Department of Home Affairs’ (DHA) drafting of green and white papers on international 
migration aiming to draft the first immigration bill in post-apartheid South Africa. Both of these had a 
significant influence on foreign nationals’ rights and situations in the country.  
The Refugee Act was passed in 1998 and implemented in 2000. It was hailed as a significant 
and progressive moment in South Africa’s immigration policy. The Refugee Act of 1998 formalised 
asylum procedures and policies and aligned South Africa’s national attitude towards refugees with its 
Constitution and international obligations. The Act also offered and formalised numerous protections for 
refugees which included their right to work, to travel and to access health and educational resources. 
In the meantime, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) also began its immigration policy 
drafting process from as far back as the end of 1997. An independent task team had been 
commissioned by the DHA to draft South Africa’s first immigration policy after apartheid and to make 
inputs to the DHA (DHA, 1997). The Green Paper recognised South Africa’s need for more skilled 
foreigners and recommended that the DHA facilitate and harness those skills which skilled foreigners 
possessed. In addition, the Green Paper also offered an immigration perspective which emphasises 
foreign nationals’ legal rights and rebuts the country’s past immigration policies which had been 
exclusively focused on excluding black foreign nationals. The Green Paper resulted in the finalisation of 
the White Paper on International Migration in 1999 which recognised South Africa’s urgent need to 
attract skilled foreigners (DHA,1999).                                                                                                                                                                                  
Despite of the momentum shown and the progress made by that those actions had made, 
there is evidence that points to black African nationals’ disappointment in being let down by  South 
Africa’s first democratically elected and black majority government in respect of its unchanged 
immigration policy and  lack of protection and promotion of black African foreign nationals’ rights 
(Landau & Segatti, 2011: 40; Boynton, 2015: 34). The newly-elected government followed its 
predecessor’s controlling approach to immigration which limited the number of black African foreigners 
in the country. Like its predecessor, the new government had no enthusiasm for welcoming black 
African nationals into South Africa. This lack of enthusiasm was in stark contrast to how the apartheid 
government had facilitated European immigrants’ arrival through various incentives. Whilst the Refugee 
Act must be recognised for its progressiveness and the government’s commitment to honour the 
democratic values of the Constitution of 1996, Boynton (2015: 37) argues that much  of the wording  in  
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the Act,  such as  ‘abusive application for asylum ‘, ‘fraudulent application for asylum’ and ’manifestly 
unfounded application’ do not deflect from the country’s negative discourse around and perception of 
foreign nationals and refugees. Klaaren (1998: 128) argues that the Refugee Act was unable to shift 
from a paradigm which is built on stringent immigration control and an outdated notion of national 
sovereignty. 
Boynton (2015) further points out that the huge discrepancies between the DHA’s green and 
white Papers on international migration show the government had reversed many foreigner-friendly 
suggestions which were initially made in its green paper of 1997. In most of the White Paper, what is 
discussed at length is the negative impact of illegal immigrants, immigration inspection and deportation 
systems and also perpetuates the narrative that only citizens, not foreigners, are entitled to protection 
under the Constitution. As a consequence, the White Paper was criticised by the country’s refugee 
organisations which expressed the uncertainty as to whether the new Immigration Act which was 
derived from the White Paper would supersede the Refugee Act and negatively diminish the rights of 
those refugees who lived in South Africa. 
The new government did not open up South Africa for foreign nationals, especially for African 
foreign nationals. It also failed to protect foreign nationals’ rights and dignity. South Africa’s immigration 
policy was argued by many scholars to be largely unchanged and not democratised (Neocosmos, 
2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Van Lennep, 2019). The continued approach which the new government 
adopted from its apartheid predecessor has drastic consequences on immigration and particularly on 
black African foreigners. As a result,  the permanent immigration of  those that have secured 
permanent residency permits in South Africa, dramatically decreased since 1994 whereas reports on 
human rights violations on foreign nationals drastically increased (CDE, 2000; 2010; Neocosmos, 2006; 
Segatti & Landau, 2011; Crush, 2014: 216; Boynton, 2015: 23; Van Lennep, 2019).6 In the meantime, 
irregular immigration arose as a result of the limited means for black African nationals to apply for an 
immigration status in South Africa7 (Crush & Williams, 2005). Because they were undocumented, black 
foreign nationals were even more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, thus worsening their 
predicament.  
Immigration Act 2002 and its amendments in 2004 and 2006 
The Immigration Act 13 of 2002 was the first Immigration Act that was passed by the new 
government in post-apartheid South Africa. The Act allows some flexibility for foreign nationals to work 
 
6 In early 1980s, on average, 30,000 foreigners per year became permanent residents. However, since 1994, the number of immigrants 
who received permanent residence has been around or below 5,000 per year and in 2012 only 1,000 permits were allotted (DHA Annual 
Reports 1994–2004; SSA, 2014: 36).  
7 Crush &Williams (2005) argue that partly due to the relative absence of legal mechanisms for entry and work in South Africa, there i s an 
increasing trend of irregular migration rom 1990s. The primary foreigners are nationals from Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe.  
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in South Africa. For example, the Act created provisions for foreign nationals to apply for permanent 
residency as well as a number of temporary permits that allowed them to work on a full-time basis in 
South Africa. The Act also made certain provisions to ensure that all immigration matters would be 
carried out in a manner which is in line with basic human rights. The Act outrightly rejects and 
condemns xenophobia and dedicates the department’s resource to combat xenophobia in the society. 
The Act’s later amendments in 2004 and a proposed draft Amendment Bill of 2006 further aimed to 
make the immigration policy more flexible in order to attract skilled foreign nationals.   
Despite all the advances, there were major pitfalls that fell short of attracting skilled foreigners 
in the Immigration Act. First, the Immigration Act passed in 2002 as well as its amendments in 2004 
and the draft bill of 2006 did not refrain from internal controls and its emphasis on the identification, 
detention and deportation of foreign nationals. The most authentic critic of this policy came from the 
DHA itself. When self-reflecting and commenting on its preceding White Paper, the DHA’s White Paper 
on International Migration of 2017 acknowledged that its 1999 White Paper and its later Immigration Act 
are largely focused on national-sovereignty driven control and the containment of foreigners (DHA, 
2017). Numerous sections in the Act are focused on the identification of undocumented immigrants 
which were considered as controversial by human rights activists and organisations. For instance, the 
Act makes it compulsory for everyone in South Africa to report any suspicious illegal foreigners. The 
Act also holds business accommodation owners liable for registering their guests’ nationalities and 
checking their visa statuses. These irregular clauses were evidence that point to the control approach 
of the Immigration Act and were in contravention of the ‘innocent till proven guilty’ judiciary principle 
(South African Human Rights Commission’s submission, 2000). Secondly, both Boynton (2015) and 
Bernstein (2014) criticised the approach in the Act adopted on the recruitment of foreign skilled workers 
as it does not facilitate the admission into the country of skilled foreign workers. Instead, the 
bureaucratic and lengthy and complex administrative procedures made the employment of foreign 
nationals difficult. Two mechanisms in the immigration policy, the labour impact assessment test and 
the quota system, are particular aspects which underline the protectionism of South Africa’s 
immigration policy.  
In terms of  the Immigration Act, an employer is  able to hire a foreigner under a general work 
permit once she/he has completed a ‘diligent search’ and was consequently  ‘unable to employ a 
person in the Republic with qualifications equivalent to those of the applicant’ (Immigration Act, 2002: 
s34). This is known as the labour impact assessment to ensure that citizens’ employment opportunities 
are not undermined by the employment of foreigners. 
The Immigration Bill in 2002 created a quota visa. This was the suggestion from the White 
Paper which stated that in order to determine which types of foreign nationals are needed for the 
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country, the DHA would need to determine quotas for foreign skills needed for each skills category after 
the consultation with the Department of Labour and the Department of Trade and Industries (DHA, 
1999). Bernstein (2014: 35) argues that this quota system decreases the flexibility of the job market and 
confines the volatile economy entirely to central planning. Not only is this notion logically problematic as 
it is impossible to predict the demand for various kinds of employees more than two or three years in 
advance (CDE, 2010: 14), there is also evidence to support the view that  there is a lack of coordination 
in the calculation of skills and quotas at the inter-departmental level as well as huge discrepancies 
between official figures of quotas and quotas calculated and estimated by independent agencies 
(Breier, 2009; CDE, 2010: 15-22; Segatti & Landau, 2011: 75). Thus, the accuracy and credibility of the 
quotas and skills provided that the National Master Scarce Skills List and Work Permit Quota List needs 
to be questioned. Although there is  an expansion  of work permits in the Act  catering for foreign 
workers, the government’s emphasis on detecting and deporting foreign nationals as well as its 
protectionism towards national workers’ employment opportunities increased bureaucracy 
unnecessarily and undermined the efficacy in attracting skilled foreigners. The policy’s focus on 
securing national sovereignty to detect and deport illegal foreigners resulted in numerous incidents of 
human rights violations against foreigners. Further, its protectionism towards national workers which led 
to administrative burden for them further deterred skilled foreigners’ from coming to South Africa. 
Hence, it is accurate to say that post-apartheid South Africa’s immigration policy fails to use 
immigration to capitalise skilled foreigners’ movements and continues  using it as a tool to exclude 
‘undesired populations’ in order to preserve resources such as jobs for nationals.   
South Africa versus regional organisations in Africa 
The member states agree to adopt, individually, at bilateral or regional levels, the necessary measures, in order to 
achieve progressively the free movement of persons, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and the 
right of establishment by their nationals within the Community. For this purpose, member states agree to conclude 
a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment. Abuja Treaty, 
establishing the African Economic Community, Chapter VI, Article 43. 
The quotation above indicates many African states’ aspiration to establish a free-movement zone 
similar to the modality of the European Union (EU) with greater movements of their nationals across 
borders for work, trade, and education. But South Africa’s migration policy towards the movements of 
nationals of its continental neighbouring countries is also marked by its refusal to participate in regional 
organisations’ call for lesser restrictions and more integration in movements.  
Regional integration by gradually lifting border restrictions in the region was the shared 
consensus among regional organisations. The African Union (AU) and the eight regional organisations 
that constituted the African Economic Community (AEC) established in the 1991 Abuja Treaty, Arab 
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Maghreb Union (AMU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African 
Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(CENSAD), all aspire to see regional integration on immigration by gradually breaking down national 
barriers in movements of persons, goods, services, and capital and the right of residence and 
establishment (Oucho & Crush, 2001; Mudungwe, 2014; DHA, 2017: 14). AU’s NEPAF Programme 
encourages members states to address the inevitable challenges brought by immigration on the 
continent through collaborative work and cooperation (Mudungwe, 2014: 27).  
Calling for greater levels of regional integration not only benefits member states economically, 
it was also proposed as a collaborative strategy to address brain drain impact on the African continent. 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAF) programme and Strategic Plan for 2004 to 
2007 both suggest that all African countries need to work collaboratively together by building and 
retaining the critical human resources and skills within the continent as well as utilising skills gained by 
Africans in the diaspora in order to turn the  brain drain into a brain gain (AU, 2004: 7). In addition, there 
is whole body of treaties, ratifications, declarations from organisations on the African continent,  such 
as the Treaty of Lagos of 1975, the Abuja Treaty of 1991,the  ECOWAS Treaty in 1993, the OAU 
African Economic Community, the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States of 
1991,  that demonstrate the aspiration for more integration across borders (Oucho & Crush, 2001). All 
these treaties, ratifications and organisations have expressed their hope in the gradual removal of 
borders.  
Within the SADC region, although it does not have an explicit immigration framework, it is 
nevertheless implied in the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights which is aligned with African 
Union’s NEPAD Programme and African Union’s Strategic Plan for 2004-2007 for regional integration 
and the aspiration to gradual removal of borders in trade, goods, services, capital as well as 
movements of persons and their right of residence and establishment (Klavert, 2011; Mudungwe, 2014: 
27). One of the key objectives of the SADC’s Charter of Fundamental Social Rights is ‘to promote 
labour policies, practices and measures which facilitate labour mobility’. Similarly to that within the 
continent, treaties and frameworks in the SADC region also call for aim to eventually result in a 
framework that is similar to that of the European Union in which citizens of member states will be 
allowed to work within the region with less visa restrictions. 
In the 1990s, as one of the economic hubs and the largest economies on the African continent, 
South Africa’s exceptionalism made it  reject any attempt by regional bodies to make movements easier 
for African nationals in the region (Nyamnjoh, 2006). The South African government displayed a very 
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reluctant and oppositional approach to resist  more freedom of movement within the region in response 
to those calls for regional and continental integration on immigration (Oucho & Crush, 2001; Nshimbi & 
Fioramonti, 2014; Van Lennep, 2019). Oucho and Crush (2001) argue that the South African 
government had successfully thwarted an attempt in 1995 initiated by the SADC region, known as 1995 
Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in SADC, to gradually develop the region into a free 
movement zone which resembles the one that operated in the EU. Together with the help of Botswana 
and Namibia, this initiative was replaced with an alternative version of the South African Draft Protocol 
on the Facilitation of Movement in 1997 which completely changed the content of its original 1995 
protocol which emphasised free movement amongst their citizens. Contrary to the modality of member 
states in the EU which surrender member states’ domestic immigration matters to supranational 
institutions, the new alternative proposal put forward by South Africa emphasises the absolute priority 
of the national sovereignty of SADC member states on the management of migration issue and the 
member states’ flexible and voluntary acceptance of the agreement (Crush & Oucho, 2001: 149; 
Nshimbi & Fioramonto, 2013: 84). It even offered an exit route for member states who did not feel 
committed to the regional integration cause. South African government’s lack of commitment and 
enthusiasm is vividly displayed in the process, it also shows that the government’s strong grip on its 
immigration laws is to ‘keep criminals out’ or to  ‘expel undesirable elements from the country’ (Nshimbi 
& Fioramonti, 2013: 84).The South African government’s attitude towards skilled immigration has been 
negative, as can be seen from the development of South Africa’s immigration policy as well as the 
country’s refusal to agree to regional integration. The negative perception around immigration inevitably 
influenced policymakers and people’s perspective on skilled immigration. Foreigners in South Africa are 
bearing the consequences of citizens’ and policy makers’ hostility which is translated into immigration 
policy restrictions which make their admission to the country more difficult.  
Why did the government oppose skilled immigration 
There is a substantive body of academic literature that speaks to the challenges that are inhibiting 
South Africa’s progress towards implementing a skills-driven immigration policy (Crush, 2008; 2014; 
Breier & Erasmus, 2009; CDE, 2000; 2010; Segatti & Landau, 2011; Amit, 2011; Klotz, 2012; Konanami 
& Odeku, 2013; Bernstein, 2014; Rasool & Botha, 2014; Kahn, 2015). During the late 1990s to the early 
2000s, which is the time period under investigation in this thesis, these studies explain how the 
characteristics of its society (skills shortage, high unemployment and antagonism towards foreigners) 
constituted the main factors in the deliberation of South Africa’s immigration policy. Furthermore, these 
studies emphasise how the government‘s and the governing party’s  weak political willingness and its 
protectionist stance towards immigration inhibit South Africa’s  implementation of a robust skills-driven 
immigration policy that could benefit South Africa’s economic development. As a result of this 
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protectionist approach, the progress of skilled immigration is limited and does not yield to any 
significant outcome that meaningfully changed the skills crisis in South Africa. 
Skills shortage 
The South African labour force is characterised by its oversupply of unskilled workers and post-
apartheid South Africa shortage of skilled workers at the end of 1990s leading up to the discussion of the 
immigration policy (Barker, 2007: 205; CDE, 2010; Crush, 2014: 212-3). The low level of apartheid 
education for majority of the population, the low number of Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics (STEM) university enrolment and graduation rates as well as the large number of South 
African skilled professionals’ emigration left a huge skills deficit for the country. (Barker, 2007; CDE, 
2005; Barker, 2007: 214-218; Kahn, 2015: 375). A number surveys show that many high-end skills 
demand vacancies were not being filled because of a skills shortage8 (Lewis, 2002: 748; Bhorat & Lundall, 
2004: 1048, as quoted by Barker, 2007: 224). Skills shortage was, as a result, a major factor that 
stakeholders and policy makers had to deliberate on in relation to skilled immigration. Kingdon and Knight 
(2005) suggest that the 1994 new government’s economic policy favoured a neoliberal approach which 
intended to bring South Africa’s industries on par with global powers. However, this economic policy failed 
its original objective to reduce poverty and unemployment amongst South African citizens because of a 
poorly educated and under-skilled working age population (Segatti & Landau, 2011: 68; Crush 2014: 212-
3). Skills shortage continued to be one of the key structural challenges that stalled the economic growth 
of South Africa. The government had hoped that the new immigration policy could be a means for South 
Africa to bring in more skilled foreigners to address skills shortage for economic development (DHA, 
1999).  
Despite government’s initiative to address skills shortage via a more enabling immigration policy, 
academics such as Crush (2014), Segatti (2011), Kahn (2015) and many others observe that South 
Africa’s immigration policy since its inception in 2002 had been configured in a way that only envisaged  
immigration as a short-term relief to the skills shortage in the country (CDE], 2010; Klotz, 2012; Bernstein, 
2014; Rasool & Botha, 2014; Mateus, Allen-lle & Iwu, 2014). The overall sentiment in the government 
was that immigration, regardless of foreigners’ skills, was undesirable. The sentiment was also shared 
by citizens. Southern African Migration Project (SAMP)’s surveys show that citizens’ view on foreigners 
bringing skills to South Africa has been on a decline since 1999. The proportion who felt that migrants 
bring skills needed by South Africa plummeted from 58 per cent in 1999 to 34 per cent in 2010 (Crush, 
 
8 A survey conducted by the World Bank in 1999 discovered that 80% of the 325 large firms within the Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan area had experienced some levels of difficulty ranging from moderate to extreme in finding 
managerial and professionals staff; 70% of the firms reported to have experienced extreme to moderate levels of difficulty in 
finding service and craft skills (Lewis, 2002: 748; Bhorat & Lundall, 2004: 1048, as quoted by Barker, 2007: 224). Even for 
semi-skilled workers, 40% of the firms reported experiencing difficulty in finding “operators” (Barker, 2007: 224). Only in the 
category of non-skilled labourers did the country not have difficulty in finding suitable workers. 
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2014: 8). Segatti and Landau (2011: 73) argue that having in place an aggressive immigration recruitment 
system to reverse to the impact of brain drain has never been the government’s position. Instead, it has 
adopted measures to ensure that no foreigner overstays a moment longer than is needed. In addressing 
the skills shortage, the government believes that its role is to ensure skills needs are met by increasing 
the local production of skills, not through acquiring skills from skilled foreigners.  
High unemployment 
There is consensus among scholars that unemployment rate in South Africa had increased since the 
end of apartheid (Fallon & de Silva, 1994; [DoL], 1998; May & Govender, 1998; Klasen & Woolards, 
1999; Kingdon & Knight, 2007; Barker, 2007; Von Holdt, 2010). The Department of Labour (DoL) (1998: 
12) stated in its policy document that South Africa’s unemployment rate in 1998  was at 20 per cent if 
the ’narrow‘ definition of unemployment  were used, and 29 per cent if using the ‘broad‘ definition of 
international standards. This unemployment rate was high compared to most first-world countries. 
Black South Africans were particularly vulnerable and had the highest percentage among the 
unemployment population in South Africa.9 Unemployment amongst South African citizens was 
compounded by rising poverty. As more people became unemployed and more people reaching 
working age were unable to find employment, the poverty rate grew. Black and Coloured South 
Africans made up nearly 90 per cent of South Africa’s unemployed population (May & Govender, 1998: 
2).10   
The deliberation on South Africa’s immigration policy inevitably involved weighing the pros and 
cons of the presence of foreigners’ in the South African labour market. At the heart of post-apartheid 
South Africa’s approach to immigration is the belief that every job occupied by a non-South African 
deprives a South African of a job (DHA, 1997: 14; Crush, 2014: 212).11 Given the extremely high 
unemployment rate amongst local citizens, government believed that there was no need for any 
employer to hire a non-South African except in the most specialised and skilled positions. Under the 
 
9 Klasen and Woolards’s (1998) study shows that Black South Africans had the highest percentages of unemployment rates 
in 1993, 1994 and 1995. See Appendix III 
10 The Poverty and Inequality Report, commissioned by government in October 1995, describes 
About 18 million people live in the poorest 40% of households and are thus classified as poor, and 10 million 
people live in the poorest 20% of households and are thus classified as ultra-poor. Most of the poor live in 
rural areas: 45% of the population is rural, but the rural areas contain 72% of those members of the total 
population who are poor. The poverty rate (the proportion of people falling below the poverty line) for rural 
areas is 71%. Poverty is not confined to any one race group, but is concentrated among blacks, particularly 
Africans: 61% of Africans and 38% of Coloureds are poor, compared with 5% of Indians and 1% of Whites 
(May and Govender, 1998: 2).  
11 The Green Paper on International Migration ([DHA], 1997: 14) states that ‘current policy assumes that every job occupied 
by a non-South African means one job less for a South African; in other words, that the labour market is zero-sum. At all 
levels of the labour market, from the least to the most highly skilled, foreigners are being denied temporary work permits or 
are meeting with obstructions on the basis of the unproven assumption that in every case their mere presence would 
disadvantage South Africans’.  
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circumstances, politicians were not enthusiastic at the prospect of supporting immigration for fear of 
alienating and agonising their constituencies and voters (Kahn, 2015: 385). Segatti and Landau (2011: 
67) assert that South Africa opposed immigration from 1994 to 2002. The political atmosphere was 
more concerned with reversing the historical discrimination against Black, Coloured and Indian South 
Africans through its employment equity policy under the rubric of Black Economic Empowerment and its 
subsequent Broad Band Black Economic Empowerment than promoting skilled immigration (Barker, 
2007; Brier & Erasmus, 2009). Hence, there was a strong oppositional influence towards skilled 
immigration in the deliberation of the immigration policy.  
Antagonism towards foreign nationals 
If we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, 
we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme. – Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the then Minister of 
Home Affairs to the House Assembly 9 August 1994 (Parliament, House Assembly, 1994). 
A huge number of scholars assert that there is a pervasive influence of antagonism towards foreign 
nationals in post-apartheid South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006: 2; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Trimikliniotis , Gordon 
& Zondo,  2008; Crush, 2004; 2008; 2014; Peberdy, 2009; Standing, 2012; Facchini, Mayda & 
Mendola, 2013; Kahn, 2015; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016). The Southern African Migration 
Programme (SAMP) has regularly used survey methods to quantitatively document anti-immigration 
sentiment in South Africa since 1996 (Crush et al., 2008). Its analysis of successive national attitudinal 
surveys since 1996 shows that since the end of apartheid, antagonism towards foreign national is on a 
rise due to underlying economic hostility towards foreigners12 (Crush, 2014: 7).  
A number of studies reveal that a lack of commitment in the condemnation and punishment for 
xenophobia is a result of the pervasive influence of this antagonism. The antagonism to immigration 
dominates the political arena which has  shaped people’s ideological perception on immigration (Amit, 
2011; Konanani & Odeku, 2013; Vahed & Desai, 2013). In an SAMP 2005 survey, many South Africans 
indicated that they did not want foreign nationals to have rights to legal protection, police protection, 
and access to social services such as education, housing, health care, etc. (Crush, 2008: 28). This 
sentiment was actively perpetuated and echoed by influential politicians and public servants. Some 
politicians even deny xenophobia in the society or justify it as citizens’ defensive mechanism (BL 
Masetlha, Home Affair’s Director-General, Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, 15 
April 2000; Vahed & Desai, 2013: 152; Crush, 2014). Crush (2014: 25) argues that it is almost 
customary that South African politicians would spring up and label xenophobic attacks as ‘opportunistic 
 
12 Southern African Migration Project’s (SAMP) periodic surveys show that between 1999 and 2010, the proportion of South 
Africans who agreed that migrants use up resources increased from 59% to 63%. Those agreeing that foreigners deprive 
South Africans of jobs remain at around 60%.  (Crush, 2014: 7). 
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crimes’ committed by  ‘criminal elements’ Under the political reality and climate, government did not 
actively participate in stemming the tide against antagonism. This resulted in citizens  – and even 
government officials – who either directly or indirectly were involved in xenophobic attacks –  getting 
away with impunity because they feel that they are not strictly bound by the law, have few disincentives 
for violation and are largely unaccountable for their legal violations (Amit, 2011; Konanani & Odeku, 
2013; Vahed & Desai, 2013: 160).  
The magnitude of South African citizens’ and politicians’ antagonism towards foreigners 
described above is deeply rooted (Segatti & Landau, 2011). In Crush’s (2014: 26-7) SAMP report, he 
lists quite a few number of prominent politicians who have made anti-immigrant remarks in the past. 
Those names included a senior official at the DHA, the then National Police Commissioner Bheki Cele, 
former Deputy DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) Minister Elizabeth Thabethe, ANC Secretary-
General Gwede Mantashe, as well as Minister Rob Davies. In the deliberation of the immigration policy, 
this antagonism as well as its wide support invariably affected the course of South Africa’s immigration 
policy.  
Shaping of the immigration policy 
Under the circumstances discussed above, the lack of political support to drive immigration reform and 
the ANC’s protectionism  are frequently being discussed among migration scholars (Polzer, 2005; 
2008; Neocosmos, 2006; Amit, 2011; Ellis & Segatti, 2011; Klotz, 2012; Konanani & Odeku, 2013; 
Vahed & Desai, 2013; Crush, 2014; Bernstein, 2014; Reudin, 2019). South Africa’s immigration policy 
not only features the government’s and people’s strong antagonistic attitude towards foreigners, it has 
also failed to address the skills shortage crisis and the challenges of high unemployment plaguing the 
country and its citizens. Furthermore, the predominant antagonism towards foreigners led to the 
absence of vision in the South African political arena on immigration and resulted in the governing 
party’s protectionist view on immigration. Thus, the lack of political support and the ANC’s protectionism 
are inhibiting South Africa from having a skills-driven immigration policy to recruit skilled foreigners.  
Scholars such as Neocosmos (2006), Amit (2011), Klotz (2012) and Konanani and Odeku 
(2013) describe South African immigration politics as ‘strong rights and weak allies; they argue that 
South Africa’s stance on immigration is a paradox. On the one hand, human rights advocates and 
organisations’ victories helped produce a progressive regime on paper and on the other side these 
protections and policies stand in stark contrast to police, policy makers, and the population as a whole. 
Despite the progressive rights guaranteed in the Constitution, the absence of consequence 
management and appropriate law enforcement to stem the tide against the anti-immigration sentiment 
give people a sense of impunity (Amit, 2011; Vahed & Desai, 2013: 160). This impunity results in the 
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rising xenophobic attacks in post-apartheid South Africa (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014: 13). Also, it 
resulted in politicians’ lack of duly attention given to the important issue of skilled immigration. Reudin 
(2019: 211) discovers that prior to 2004 none of the political parties had made any reference in their 
party manifestos to immigration. Although the Democratic Alliance had made reference to immigration 
in one sentence, comprehensive and robust immigration policy in electoral party manifestos were 
absent among all political parties. As a result of the immigration vacuum in politics, officials and citizens 
alike felt that they were not bound by the law and could act against foreign nationals because they 
could get away with it. Despite the strong rights guaranteed in the Constitution, Segatti and Landau 
(2011: 55) describe that foreign nationals in their dealings with Home Affairs are still particularly 
vulnerable to the DHA officials’ coercive and abusive practices. Because of the lack of political 
willingness and a  drive to treat foreigners with dignity and respect as well as to recognise foreign 
nationals’ value to the host society, it is unlikely that any meaningful immigration reform that facilitate 
the movements of skilled professionals will take place..   
Although strong rights are guaranteed in the Constitution, South Africa’s immigration affairs are 
characterised by the almost unchecked power of the state and very little power wielded by foreigners 
and those organisations that protect foreigners’ legal rights (Neocosmos, 2006; Van Lennep, 2019). On 
the issue of immigration, the government has had a significant decisive role in the shaping of the 
immigration policy whereas the power and influence of the non-governmental sector is more 
insignificant in comparison. Vahed and Desai (2013) as well as Konanani and Odeku (2013) argue that 
the weak political allies for foreign nationals in South Africa have resulted in a predicament, in that the 
organisations that have defended them are not sufficiently powerful to enforce the strong rights 
stipulated in the Constitution. Although courts have often sided with immigrants on matters of disputes, 
the antagonism and attacks carried out against foreign nationals have not reduced significantly (Amit, 
2011). In order to push forward a more rights-based skilled immigration policy, Klotz (2012) suggests 
that supporters for immigration needed stronger political allies.  
Further, the ANC’s protectionism and lack of vision about the long-term benefits of skilled 
immigration impeded the government’s progress in implementing a skills-driven immigration system 
(Segatti & Landau, 2011). Protectionism denotes the view that jobs should be preserved for South 
Africans only given their scarcity. As South Africa has an extremely high unemployment rate and a 
large number of poorly educated and unskilled working-age adults, employing local nationals should be 
the priority and foreigners should only be hired under strict conditions such as in the most specialised 
and skilled fields where there is absolutely no chance of finding South African candidates. Nshimbi and 
Fioramonti (2013: 84) point that this notion is demonstrated in the immigration policy that non-citizens 
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are only allowed to work in South Africa in areas where there is an insufficient number of nationals 
working.  
The ANC’s protectionist view on skilled foreigners and skilled immigration is also consistent 
with the views of its constituencies which reflected the more predominant and internalised ideology 
among South Africans (Segatti & Landau, 2011). Despite the urgent necessity for South Africa to get 
more skilled professionals into the labour market, there was the constant fear that the presence of 
foreigners’ in South Africa would destabilise the country, increase criminal activity and deprive more 
South Africans of jobs. As Crush and Williams (2005) argue, there is a surge of irregular foreigners 
entering South Africa through clandestine means since the end of apartheid, many of whom  are 
unskilled, this, compounded by South Africans’ negative perception of foreigners, has further triggered 
the fear of the government and its major constituents that citizens’ jobs and livelihoods were under 
threat. Because, as said above, immigration is seen as a zero-sum game by the government and that 
every job occupied by a non-South African means one fewer job for a South African. The goal of the 
government is to ensure that South Africa’s future skills needs are met by increasing the local 
production of skills, not acquiring them from abroad (Crush, 2014: 212). Segatti (2011: 45-6) rightly 
argues that this form of security and sovereignty-centred agenda favoured by the majority in the ANC 
and by departments’ bureaucratic strata made it almost impossible to shift the immigration paradigm 
beyond conversations about  the loss of low-skilled jobs caused by foreigners in South Africa (Fauvelle-
Aymar, 2015; Niyimbanira & Madzivhandila, 2016; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016).The outcome of the 
lack of support in the political arena to push forward skilled immigration policy and the government’s 
protectionism on the matter led to the government’s Immigration Act 13 of 2002. Bernstein (2014: 35) 
describes that the preceding bill did not escape the predominantly exclusionary notion towards foreign 
nationals and is bureaucratic and rigid, making the employment of foreign nationals very difficult. As a 
result, it fails to attract skilled foreigners and the actual number of work and business permits issued do 
not compensate for the skills deficit lost in the country (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2013: 64). In some 
scenarios, foreigners could not maximise their skills to work in South Africa because of the legal 
challenges imposed by the DHA’s immigration policy. There is substantial evidence to indicate that a 
great number of qualified African nationals are working as waiters, newspaper sellers and parking 
attendants in South Africa (Crush, 2001: 33; Ellis & Segatti, 2011). Hence, it is important to build 
coalition in the political arena and to dismantle protectionism as a political ideology in the governing 
party in order to reform the immigration policy if the goal is to harness skilled foreigners’ skills and to 
make them contribute to South Africa’s economic development.  
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Skilled immigration and doctors’ shortage in South Africa 
The ANC’s protectionist stance towards skilled foreigners and the weak political alliance to push 
forward a robust skills-driven immigration policy had a pervasive influence on the government. The 
National Department of Health (DoH) exemplifies the government’s protectionism and the weak political 
influence of skilled immigration. In the healthcare sector in South Africa, the DoH’s attitude towards the 
recruitment and employment of medical doctors against a massive doctors’ shortage in the country 
reflects the government’s stance towards skilled immigration in spite of the DoH’s claim of its support 
for ethical recruitment. Studies suggest that government’s priority to preserve jobs for South Africans 
was the cause behind the DoH’s not adopting a proactive measure to recruit and employ foreign 
doctors,  despite of its ethical recruitment claim (Breier, 2008; [CDE], 2010; Bateman, 2013; Crush, 
2014; Segatti, 2014).  
Policy on the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors 
The DoH has a policy regulating the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors. Its policy is 
presented in its Recruitment and Employment of Foreign Health Professionals in the Republic of South 
Africa, first implemented in 2006 and revised in 2010. Although the policy had changed the ad hoc 
recruitment mechanism which the DoH had used prior to 2006 in  respect of recruitment, the formalised 
procedure was nevertheless more restrictive on the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors and 
had a negative impact on many foreign doctors who wanted to work in South Africa (Segatti, 2014: 38). 
The policy makes the recruitment and employment process lengthy and bureaucratic and further 
prohibits the recruitment of foreign health professionals from up to 110 countries, all of which are 
developing countries (Segatti, 2014: 46). With such a policy in place, less and less foreign doctors are 
eligible to work and become less enthusiastic at the prospect of working in South Africa.  
Scholars point out that loss of South African health professionals by emigration, limited training 
capacity of South Africa’s medical schools, staff moratorium and the restrictions on the employment of 
foreign health professionals, in particular the prohibition of foreign health professionals from developing 
countries, are all contributory causes towards the shortage of doctors in the country (DoH, 2006; DoH] 
2010; CDE, 2010; Pepper & Slabbert, 2011; Eagar, 2013; Rondganger, 2013; Crush et al., 2014; 
Segatti, 2014; ECONEX, 2015; Rural Health Advocacy Project, 2017; Pillay, 2018; Crush & Chikanda, 
2018; Hoosen, 2018; Matlala, 2019). In response to and targeting at these causes, the DoH proposed 
and developed two intervention strategies 1) to retain South African health professionals and 2) to 
increase South Africa’s training capacity in order to increase the number of doctors in the health sector 
(Crush et al., 2015; ECONEX, 2015 Van Dyk, 2017; Zuzile, 2019). The effectiveness of these 
interventions is argued to be insufficient to make a meaningful difference caused by the doctors’ 
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shortage in the short-term (Bateman, 2013; Bloom, 2015; Crush et al., 2015; ECONEX, 2015; Kahn, 
2018; Wessels, 2018). What is absent in the government’s intervention strategies is the lack of a 
mention of the recruitment of foreign doctors. Although recruiting foreign doctors is a viable option, the 
DoH continued the governing party’s protectionist approach and restricted the recruitment of foreign 
health professionals including foreign doctors from 2006. The DoH announced in 2006 that it would 
contain the number of foreign health professionals in the workforce to under 5 per cent. Although the 
recruitment of foreign doctors could be a viable strategy to alleviate doctors’ shortage in the sector, the 
DoH overlooks it. 
Currently, there are two types of recruitment processes allowing foreign doctors to work in 
South Africa. The first option is the government-to-government agreements and the DoH uses this 
option to recruit foreign doctors from countries such as Cuba and Tunisia in order to serve the rural 
population in South Africa. The other option is for individual foreign doctors to apply to work in South 
Africa in his/her own capacity (Segatti, 2014: 38). It is the latter type of recruitment that is burdened with 
cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures for foreign doctors of which the main aim is to control and 
reduce the number of foreigners employed in the health sector.  As shown in the policy, tit gives the 
right to work in the health sector to only a small fraction of qualified doctors from developed countries. 
With the exception of foreign doctors who are already permanent resident permit holders by the time 
they apply for registration at the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), the majority of 
foreign doctors from South Africa’s neighbouring countries are ineligible to work in South Africa ([DoH], 
2006: s4.7; 2010, 4; Segatti, 2014: 46). Since many foreign health professionals who are willing to 
come to South Africa are from these developing countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe, by disqualifying them on the merit of their nationalities, significantly 
reduces the pool of foreign doctors who can work in South Africa and further exacerbates the shortage 
crisis in the health system (Kassiem, 2006). The restrictions on the employment of foreign doctors from 
those countries whose doctors are most likely to work in South Africa display the DoH’s intention to 
discourage the recruitment of foreign doctors and reveal its own discouraging stance towards skilled 
immigration.  
Furthermore, in terms of work conditions, the policy imposes numerous restrictions on foreign 
doctors such as on the conditions of service, the place of work, as well as the number of total foreign 
doctors allowed in the health system as measures to make the work environment more difficult for 
foreign doctors to disincentivise them from working in South Africa. These restrictions open up gaps 
which could cause foreign doctors to unfair division of labour, precarity and exploitation (Segatti, 2014: 
66). The national DoH’s policy states that foreign health professionals can only be employed on fixed-
term contracts and the duration of the employment period cannot exceed a maximum period of three 
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years that cannot be extended (DoH, 2006, 14.1; DoH 2010: 14.1). The DoH further restricts foreign 
health professionals’ right to workplaces. Under this clause, they do not have the right to work at any 
healthcare facilities other than the one that is stipulated in the original endorsement letter (DoH, 2006, 
14.1; DoH, 2010: 14.1). The discretionary powers retained by health employers to change quotas and 
conditions of foreign health professionals’ service subject them to exploitation and uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the DoH’s The Strategic Framework for Human Resource released in 2006 aims to limit 
the number of foreign health workforce to under 5 per cent of the total health workforce in South Africa 
(Monare, 2006). The imposition of these various restrictions on foreign doctors is an indication of the 
government’s protectionism and that foreign doctors are not welcomed in South Africa which thus 
explains the double standards in their employment conditions.  
The DoH’s restrictive recruitment policy on foreign health professionals makes the registration 
of these professionals more difficult. The difficulty for foreign doctors to legally practise medicine leads 
to a decline in the number of foreign medical doctors coming to South Africa (Segatti, 2014). Data 
between the years of 2014 to 2017 shows a decline in the number of critical skills visas issued to 
foreign health professionals. In 2014, 2,000 critical skilled visas had been issued to foreign health 
professionals, while the figure declined to less than 700 in 2017 (Hoosen, 2018). Because of DoH’s 
restrictive policy, fewer foreign health professionals are willing to work in South Africa which further 
results in doctors’ shortage.  
Foreign doctors’ situation in South Africa 
The decreasing number of visas issued to foreign doctors is the result of the tighter control of the DoH 
on the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors. It also is an indication that illustrates how the 
anti-skilled immigration narrative within the government had been played out and how that has affected 
the recruitment of foreign doctors. As a result of the DoH’s strict control of the recruitment of foreign 
doctors, there is very limited space for foreign doctors to legally work in South Africa. As a result, those 
foreign doctors who are rejected by the DoH to grant them legal a work right in South Africa are settling 
and working in developed countries. This is a loss of medical resources to Africa. However, for those 
others who do not have the opportunities to work in those developed countries, the highly-restrictive 
DoH’s policy only made them work in South Africa through clandestine means, Segatti’s (2014) study 
reveals that some foreign doctors have either quit trying South Africa as a destination country in which 
to work and have entered the health markets in developed nations, or they are working in South Africa 
illegally due to the restrictions and limited legal means for them to work.  
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Due to ethical recruitment,13 South Africa is obliged not to proactively recruit medical professionals 
from developing countries to avoid draining those countries’ health human resources, more commonly 
known as the ‘brain drain effect’. As a result of the protocol, foreign doctors from 110 countries are 
ineligible to work in South Africa (Segatti, 2014: 46). The DoH also explicitly states in its policy that it will 
not endorse any foreign doctors from developing countries to work in South Africa. As a result of these 
restrictions, foreign doctors have very limited legal grounds of entry to work legally in South Africa. Hence, 
some studies have shown that foreign health professionals who are turned away by the South African 
health system would seek  employment beyond the African continent and set their eyes in OECD 
countries (Crush, 2002: 148; Clemens & Pettersson, 2008; Segatti, 2014). When they are offered jobs in 
those countries, it is nevertheless a loss to not only the country from which they come, but also to the 
African continent. 
Approximately 65,000 African-born physicians and 70,000 African-born professional nurses were working 
overseas in a developed country in the year 2000. This represents about one fifth of African-born physicians 
in the world, and about one tenth of African-born professional nurses. The fraction of health professionals 
abroad varies enormously across African countries, from 1% to over 70% according to the occupation and 
country (Clemens & Pettersson, 2008). 
So it [administrative challenges with the HPCSA and the DHA] chases you away and I might be leaving 
actually. I reached a certain stage when I thought like: Is this going to be my life onwards? I have been patient 
for like almost 10 years. Now how long more can you be patient before... I got the experience, I got the 
qualifications, why can’t I just go and work in the UK? Now on Friday I am traveling to finalize my registration. 
So this chases you away, so really that’s the thing that frustrates one, which is one of the reasons I am leaving 
(Segatti, 2014: 79). 
In preventing foreign doctors from developing nations from working in South Africa, has not, in fact, solved 
the problem of the brain drain in those developing countries. International and regional organisations, 
when commenting on the brain drain effect, often advise countries to  build regional capacity such as in 
the recommendations of the WHO’s 2010 Code of Practice as well as of the SADC and AU in order to 
alleviate the effect of doctors’ shortage (Klavert, 2011; Mudungwe, 2014: 27; Segatti, 2014: 39). The 
selective approach which the DoH took, adopting the non-recruitment part of those international and 
regional organisations’ advice but neglecting the collaborative work part of it, is the tip of the iceberg that 
points to the driving force behind the DoH’s restriction on the employment of foreign medical personnel. 
It shows that it was only its determination to preserve jobs for South Africans rather than ethical 
recruitment that made the DoH adopt such a position.  
    As Segatti’s (2014) study reveals, the DoH’s determined stance to preserve jobs for South 
Africans has made the working conditions of foreign doctors from developing countries who are working 
in South Africa very precarious. Many foreign doctors are clandestinely functioning as locum tenens or 
 
13 A form of cooperation in which  a country agrees not to actively recruit health professionals from countries that have shortages . The 
policies of World Health Organization’s 2010 Code of Practice, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Treaty 1992, Protocol 
on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons signed in 2005 and African Union’s (AU) recommendations all discourage countries to  engage  
actively in the recruitment of health professionals from other developing countries to prevent the brain drain effect (World Health 
Organisation [WHO], 2010; Tjadens, Weilandt & Eckert, 2013). 
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using asylum permits to work in the health system with the secret approval of the DoH. 14. Whilst locum 
tenens is allowed, many foreign doctors who are engaged in this form of work are not registered with 
HPCSA and thus this makes their work illegal. An asylum permit is another loophole that some foreign 
doctors are using to circumvent the DoH’s ban on their countries of origin. They firstly apply for asylum 
in order to get their applications endorsed by the Department of Health. Then they proceed to apply for 
formal refugee status. Once the refugee status is recognised, they may apply to work in the health sector 
as provisions are made for refugees in terms of the Immigration Act and Refugee Act. 
It is clear that, the scenarios under which foreign doctors are working in South Africa are highly 
exploitative. Foreign doctors are likely to be underpaid, overworked and exploited (Segatti, 2014: 
12&39&57). Segatti (2014: 82) describes that the differential treatments meted out to foreign and South 
African doctors show ‘a sense of a system based on double standards: South African doctors for the 
better off and the urban, African foreign doctors and Cubans for the rural poor’. The differential 
treatments of local versus foreign doctors imply that for the DoH, the presence of foreign health 
professionals is tolerated and the DoH could also overlook their activities that are in contravention of 
the law as long as theirpresence does not pose a threat to local health professionals. In doing so, the 
DoH allows for the exploitation of foreign health professionals to continue. 
The DoH’s deliberate obliviousness to those illegal activities practised by foreign health 
professionals who are working in South Africa indicates that the DoH’s official explanation for its 
recruitment ban is a ruse to hide its real intention. The  DoH’s attitude in practice to foreign African doctors 
who work in South Africa seems to be one of acceptance as long as these foreign doctors do not pose 
as any risk to South African doctors and  whether or not they are working in the health sector seems to 
be irrelevant. Since South African doctor would not be interested in working in those highly exploitative 
work environments, those foreign doctors’ activities are not likely to deprive of South African doctors of 
work opportunities. So the real intention of the DoH’s attitude towards foreign doctors, as some argue, is 
its concern that  foreign health professionals could complete with South African health professionals for 
jobs and the purpose of its  policy is to preserve jobs for South African health professionals (Brier, 2009; 
Bateman, 2013; Crush 2014; Segatti, 2014; ECONEX, 2015 Segatti’s study (2014: 41) reveals that a 
senior official in the national Department of Health was hostile to the idea of employing foreign doctors.   
[t]he department has worked hard to improve salaries in the public health sector and must allow time 
for South Africans to fill these posts. No self-respecting country in the world prioritises foreigners 
over its own.  
 
14 Locum tenens is a standard practise regulated by the Health Professions Act. It is the process of hiring the temporary services of a 
medical practitioner as a replacement: a registered medical practitioner hires a replacement for a period of time not exceeding six months 
while he or she is prevented from working (maternity leave, increase in workload between different practices, etc.) (Segatti,  2014: 68). 
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Antagonism towards foreigners is prevalent at health facilities in South Africa and in the DoH. The 
department’s intransigence regarding the recruitment of foreign medical doctors has resulted in their 
placing greater priority on preserving jobs for South Africans than addressing the concern of a doctors’ 
shortage crisis. Segatti (2014: 40) reveals that the antagonistic attitude at health facilities was so 
influential that it overrode hospital managers’ concern to find sufficient health personnel to deliver quality 
healthcare service to patients. Almost all of Segatti’s research respondents claimed to have experienced 
hostility from government officials because of their non-citizen status. The restrictions on foreign doctors’ 
employment and recruitment, the highly-exploitative working conditions of foreign doctors as well as the 
loss to the continent of more African doctors point to the fact that the DoH’s reluctance to  employ  foreign 
doctors  is because of its anti-immigrationism the resultant  restriction on foreign doctors needs to be 
understood within  the context South Africa’s immigration environment.  
The DoH’s stance: Institutional xenophobia and anti-skilled immigration 
Although South Africa is bound by ethical recruitment protocol to not proactively recruit foreign doctors 
from developing countries, the government’s prohibitionist stance to not recruit them contradicts the very 
same protocol’s emphasis on building regional capacity in order to solve doctors’ shortage in Africa 
(Crush, 2002; Bateman, 2013; Brier, 2009; Crush et. al, 2014; Segatti, 2014; ECONEX, 2015). Segatti 
(2014: 10) points out that the selective approach the DoH adopts to exclude foreign doctors from 
developing countries is not aligned with international and regional policies and negates the very 
collaborative element in these treaties. The collaborative approach in those treaties emphasises the 
importance of countries to use an international or regional approach to build regional capacity in order to 
solve the doctor shortage crisis. As studies by Clemens & Pettersson (2008) and Segatti (2014) both 
show, foreign doctors who are rejected by the South African government are welcomed by developed 
countries and are quickly absorbed into their health systems. The overall outcome of rejecting African 
foreign doctors is the loss of more doctors to the African continent.  
Institutional xenophobia, as Schnek (2010: 109-10) explains, refers to the nationalist rhetoric 
which the state employs to describe and demonise foreign nationals with the supposed purpose of 
protecting national security. The presence of foreigners is deemed as a threat and this perception has 
been institutionalised in South Africa (Lettinga & Van Troost, 2016: 102). Vanyoro and Ncube (2018: 78) 
argue that institutional xenophobia in South Africa manifests itself most clearly through ‘the exclusion and 
discrimination of foreigners in various institutions like banks, hospitals, the Department of Home Affairs, 
police, and social service providers’. This exclusion had a rippling effect, as argued by Vanyord and 
Ncube (2018), that xenophobia became institutionalised in practises of policy makers since 1994 because 
of the perceived threat that foreigners pose to South Africans. Government officials, although bound by 
obligations and the Constitution, are not allowed to directly endorse xenophobic activities or express 
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xenophobic sentiments, they are nevertheless human beings living in the xenophobic environment 
(Neocosmos, 2008: 589). As a result of that, Vigneswaran (2011: 150-1) argued that officials may tacitly 
endorse acts of xenophobic exclusion or renege on their duties to protect South African citizens, both of 
which had shaped institutional xenophobia at the governmental level. The DoH, as a governmental 
department, invariably saw the recruitment of foreign doctors as a threat rather than necessary 
assistance that would deprive South African doctors their own employment opportunities.  
Hence, because of the institutional xenophobia, the DoH undoubtedly repressed the option of 
recruiting and employing foreign doctors despite the shortage of doctors’ in South Africa. Despite 
government and officials having never condoned violence against foreign nationals and indeed having 
regularly condemned xenophobic attacks, the political slogans without any advocacy in ensuring foreign 
nationals’ rights created the anti-skilled immigration environment which inevitably led to the exclusion of 
foreign doctors in South Africa’s labour market. In fact, many of the interventions followed by the various 
xenophobic attacks in post-apartheid South Africa were of humanitarian nature, very few ventured into 
the realm of advocacy or political contestation attempting to address the underlying causal issues for the 
exclusion of foreigners, particularly the exclusion of skilled foreigners (Peberdy & Jara, 2011; Pugh, 2014: 
228). These interventions did not provide a long-term sustainable solution for foreign nationals in the 
country. As a result, foreign doctors, in the absence of the government’s support, faced severe exclusion 
in their employment. Since 2006, there had been a series of the DoH’s directives and policies aiming to 
contain and discourage the number of foreign doctors working in South Africa (Kassiem, 2006). These 
policies include limiting the total number of the foreign workforce to under 5 per cent and subject foreign 
health workers including doctors to a maximum of three-year, non-renewable work contracts. All the 
restrictions imposed on foreign doctors invariably mirror the DoH’s objection towards the recruitment and 
employment of foreign doctors. The DoH drafted its policy on the recruitment and employment of foreign 
health professionals in 2006. This happened against the background of the enactment of the Immigration 
Act four years earlier. It led to the research question: how did the whole deliberation on the Immigration 
Bill affect the DoH’s decision not to recruit foreign doctors?  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined the discussion in academic literature around South Africa’s development of a 
skilled immigration policy and its connection to the DoH’s discouraging stance towards the recruitment of 
foreign doctors. The development of South Africa’s immigration policy and its position on greater freedom 
of movements on the African continent illuminate the South African government’s anti-immigration 
sentiment.  
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Any progress to develop a skills-driven immigration policy has stalled because of policy makers’ 
concern for immigration’s impact on high unemployment domestically and people’s antagonism towards 
foreigners. At the same time, the lack of skills in South Africa has made the need for skilled foreigners 
more pressing than ever. It has been argued in the chapter that any attempt to advance a skills-driven 
immigration policy is impeded by the lack of political alliance and the ANC’s protectionist resolve to 
preserve jobs for citizens.  
 Finally, this chapter explained that the DoH’s Policy: Recruitment and Employment of Foreign 
Health Professionals in the Republic of South Africa was a clear indication of its objection to skilled 
immigration. The DoH shared with the government its protectionism. It leads into to the research question 
which will be explored in the following chapters, namely: How did the deliberation on the immigration 
policy affect the DoH’s decision to discourage the recruitment of foreign doctors? 
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Chapter 5 Finding I: Stakeholders and their attitudes towards skilled 
immigration 
Overview 
This chapter aims to answer the second sub-research question: Who were the main stakeholders 
involved in the policy discussion and what were their positions on skilled immigration? This chapter 
maps out the political landscape of the people and organisations that were involved in the deliberations 
on the immigration policy during the period of 2000 to 2006. It also summarises and categorises the 
views of stakeholders on skilled immigration.  
The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the stakeholders who had made 
submissions and who had appeared in parliament to influence government’s immigration policy. The 
second section provides an account of these stakeholders’ positions on skilled immigration and  
whether they supported or opposed it. It offers a brief overview of the stakeholders before it moves to  a 
more in-depth analysis in the following two chapters which  explain how these stakeholders, having 
different positions on skilled immigration, responded to the skills crisis, high unemployment and 
opposition within the immigration context.  
Who were the main stakeholders? 
The 2002 Immigration Act was the product of the government’s urgency to replace the Aliens Control 
Act, one of the last pieces of apartheid legislation remaining in the statute book. Its legislative process 
followed a period of long and wide consultation process.  The Aliens Control Act’s strong symbolic 
association with apartheid regime was the motivation for the new government ‘to replace it with a new 
immigration law. In line with democratic South Africa’s Constitution, the drafting process of the bill  
which preceded the passage of the Act involved a wide range of stakeholders from every sector of 
South African society (Trimikliniotis, Gordon & Zondo, 2008; Segatti & Landau, 2011; Klotz, 2012; 
Gordon, 2015). The outcome of the bill was indicative of a careful calibration of the interests of those 
stakeholders and the government. Data collected from the Sabinet Legal Database and the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) shows that the following stakeholders were involved in the 
deliberation and drafting process of the immigration policy.  
The first and foremost are those who were directly involved in policy making, such as 
government officials and ministers in the executive and members of parliament in the legislature. 
Collectively, the people who worked in those two branches of government are referred to as 
“politicians” in this dissertation as they have the power and authority to directly influence and pass 
legislation on immigration. The predominant pattern among the politicians in my dataset were their 
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objections to skilled immigration. These came largely from the African National Congress (ANC) and 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). This seems to agree with the argument of Segatti and Landau (2011: 3) 
that the governing party has a very anti-immigrationist stance, with the exception of a few prominent 
ANC politicians who had fairly liberal views on immigration and supported immigration reform.1516  The 
concerns of the majority of those politicians that objected to skilled immigration were that  
• South African workers’ training opportunities would be compromised should employers find that 
tapping into the foreign labour market for skilled foreigners was an easy option; 
• This trend of employing skilled foreigners would not benefit the high unemployment rate of 
South African workers and would further widen the skills shortage gap 
So among politicians, the tightening of the regulations and restricting immigrations, including the 
granting of employment opportunities to skilled foreigners had enjoyed wide support among the majority 
of them.  
In addition to those within the government, stakeholders from the non-governmental sector also 
played an important part in the shaping of the immigration policy. These stakeholders included 
organised labour, the private sector, the higher education and research sector, human rights 
organisations and many ordinary citizens. Their views on immigration generally, and on skilled 
immigration in particular also varied. Their different views also subsequently shaped the different 
courses of action they took to either support or to oppose skilled immigration (Archer, 1995). 
Nevertheless, stakeholders can be categorised into those that supported immigration and those that 
opposed immigration.  
Those who supported skilled immigration were drawn from the private sector, higher education and 
research sector, human rights organisations as well as some politicians.  
• Academic institutions and research organisations  that participated were the Centre for 
Development and Enterprise (CDE), individual academics from the Universities of Venda and 
the Witwatersrand, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), the International Education 
Association of South Africa (IEASA), the South African Universities Vice Chancellor’s 
Association (SAUVCA) and the Committee of Technikon Principals (CTP).  
• Private sector participants in the process were Business South Africa (BSA), 
PowerhousewaterCoopers (PwC), the American Chamber of Commerce, the World Bank and 
 
15 Robert Davies criticized the DHA’s immigration policy in 1995. He highlighted the prominent role that immigration played 
in the history of South Africa.  
16 Penuell Maduna, the then ANC Deputy Minister for Home Affairs, expressed these views in 1995:  
• legal immigration is a source of income for South Africa;  
• undocumented migrants’ constitutional rights need to be respected (Segatti, 2011: 51-2) 
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Business Unity South Africa (BUSA). Members of this group are made up of business leaders, 
senior managers and employers.  
• Human rights organisations represented another group of agents. In this dissertation, the term 
used to =describe rights advocacy groups that defend human rights, refugee organisations and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This group consisted of the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC), Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and  the National Consortium 
of Refugees, the Association of Immigration Practitioners of South Africa (AIPSA), the Law 
Society of the Northern Provinces (LSNP law firm  Sonnenberg Hoffmann and Galombik and 
some refugee representatives from Congo and Zimbabwe.   
The individuals and organisations mentioned above supported the inclusion of skilled immigration in the 
immigration policy. Academic institutions, research organisations and private sector supported skilled 
immigration because of their belief that immigration could help address the skills crisis shortage.  
The World Bank’s submission, for example, illuminated the important link between the bringing of skills 
to South Africa via migration and economic development. 
In many respects the new system of migration control which the South African Parliament is 
expected to pass on May 8, 2002 will represent an advanced status of that “progressively higher 
level of liberalization” referred to in Article XIX of the GATS. In fact, South Africa realized that in 
order to capture its full potential for economic growth it must increase its available level of skills 
and reach a critical mass of skilled and productive people and consumers (World Bank’s 
submission to Parliament on Immigration Bill, dated 15 April 2002, Source: Sabinet Legal 
Database). 
The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) also argued in its 2000 submission that skills 
obtained through immigration would be invaluable to South Africa. 
• The entry of skills will increase the capacity of the South African economy to expand 
and provide more job opportunities for all residents; 
• The entry of skills is necessary to expand the capacity of the country to train and 
educate all its citizens to world class standards… (CDE’s submission to Parliament on  
the White Paper on International Migration, dated February 2000, Source: Sabinet 
Legal Database) 
Human rights organisations supported immigration on the grounds that South Africa has a humanitarian 
duty to not only uphold human rights but also to assist refugees from its neighbouring countries. The 
South African Human Rights Commission, as seen in the quotation below, suggested that South Africa 
should adopt a human rights approach to managing migration.  
A more effective approach would be to adopt a humane management-orientated approach to 
migration policy which recognises both our moral and historical ties to the region. This could be 
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achieved by ensuring that our development policies take into account our regional obligations… A 
further solution would be the implementation of bilateral agreements between South Africa 
(SAHRC’s submission to Parliament on White Paper on International Migration, dated 11 January 
2000, Source: Sabinet Legal Database). 
Human rights organisation Black Sash also endorsed the view that migration should be managed in 
accordance with human rights. Most rights that are guaranteed in South African Constitution should be 
applicable to foreigners and refugees.  
It is essential for legislators to keep in ]mind that most of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights in 
our Constitution are extended to people who will be considered as foreign under the Immigration 
Bill, given that most of the rights are bestowed on everyone (Black Sash’s submission to 
Parliament on Immigration Bill 2002. Dated April 2002, Source: Sabinet Legal Database).  
Opponent stakeholders supported stricter immigration control and emphasised the need to prioritise 
employment opportunities and opportunities for South African workers. For example, two members of 
parliament, as shown below, expressed the view that South Africa should focus on training but not 
immigration to get skills 
Ms Maggie Maunye (ANC) asked why the CDE not recommends to businesses that they train 
South Africans, rather than inviting skilled people from outside of the country. 
Mr Chikane (ANC) remarked that the country should focus on training, rather than immigration. Mr 
Chikane (ANC) reminded Committee Members of their responsibility to the electorate and to the 
process of building now to develop assets for the future (Portfolio Committee Hearing on White 
Paper on International Migration, dated 16 May 2000, Source: PMG). 
 
Among the stakeholders that objected to skilled immigration were organised labour or trade union 
organisations, African National Congress members of parliament, public servants and South African 
citizens from previously disadvantaged backgrounds. Within trade union organisations,  the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), the 
Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA), and the National Trade Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 
had made submissions to the government regarding the immigration policy.  
Parliamentary records did not show any form of engagement between medical professionals’ 
associations in the dataset such as the Health Professional Council of South Africa (HPCSA), 
Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA) and South African Medical Association 
(SAMA) and the Department of Home Affairs. As members of these associations are the people who 
are directly affected by a skills shortage in the health sector, they are more likely to be affected by 
overwork which could result in catastrophic consequences such as medical malpractices (Pepper & 
Slabbert, 2011; Segatti, 2014). Submissions from those medical organisations such as HPCSA would 
have offered a more nuanced and objective understanding of the pros and cons of recruiting foreign 
doctors and would have provided a deeper understanding as to whether South Africa needed foreign 
65 | P a g e  
 
doctors. However, there is no data from these medical associations in the Sabinet Legal Database. Nor 
could any data related to these organisations be found on PMG’s meeting database.  
What were those stakeholders’ attitudes towards skilled immigration? 
This section outlines stakeholders’ positions on skilled immigration from the dataset. Stakeholders that 
appeared in the dataset are from academic and research institutions, business groups from the private 
sector, human rights organisations, organised labour and trade unions, private South African individuals 
and politicians. Although stakeholders are not homogenised groups uniformly sharing the same attitude 
or position on skilled immigration, putting them into a collective group for analysis in this dissertation 
follows Archer’s (1995: 185& 260) concept on corporate agents. Archer (1995: 185 & 260) defines 
primary agents as passive and aggregated groups or individuals who are inarticulate in their demands 
and unorganised in their pursuit of a goal. On the contrary and depending jointly on conditional 
influences and how these mesh with social factors influencing the cohesion within collectivities, primary 
agents can transform into corporate agents. Archer defines corporate agents as agents who have the 
emergent powers to promotive organisation and articulate interests. For example, private sector groups 
and individuals share the same interests in promoting their business interests, placing them in the same 
group makes the analysis easier. These stakeholders’ positions towards skilled immigration shaped 
their proposed immigration strategies to either devise an immigration policy to facilitate foreigners’ 
movements or to make immigration more restrictive by adding more bureaucratic measures.  
In terms of their positions on skilled immigration, stakeholders could be categorised as those 
that supported and those that opposed immigration. Ruedin’s (2019: 210) sentence-to-sentence 
codebook provided detailed definitions on what constituted support or objection of skilled immigration. 
Ruedin (2019: 210) asserts that when reading a sentence, if the topic is about immigration restriction 
and  characterised by a pro-nationalist and monocultural discourse it should be coded as anti-
immigration, whereas if the sentence is about immigration integration characterised by progressive, 
cosmopolitan and multicultural discourse, then it should be coded as pro-immigration. In the dataset, 
those that objected to skilled immigration tended to favour the addition of more regulations in the 
immigration policy in order to protect what was thought to be in the best interest of South African 
workers. Conversely, stakeholders that supported skilled immigration tended to endorse fewer 
regulations for skilled foreigners in order to expedite the immigration process and get skilled foreigners 
in South Africa as quickly as possible.  
A thematic analysis  that draws upon  Ruedin’s (2019: 210) codebook shows that supporters of 
skilled immigration consisted of academic and research organisations, the private sector and human 
rights organisations whereas opponents of skilled immigration were drawn from  organised labour, 
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some individual South Africans as well as a large number of politicians. Although among the South 
African population and politicians, there were people such as Mr Mike Waters and Mr Skohasana who 
supported skilled immigration, arguing that an immigration system to facilitate the movement of skilled 
foreigners  very much in the minority The predominant sentiment among them was an objection to 
skilled immigration. This analysis is consistent with migration studies’ findings which assert that the 
South African population’s xenophobic attitude and  politicians’ role perpetuate an anti-immigration 
narrative (Neocosmos, 2006: 2; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Trimikliniotis, Gordon & Zondo, 2008;Crush, 2004; 
2008; 2014; Peberdy, 2009; Du Toit& Kotze ́, 2011; Standing, 2012; Facchini, Mayda & Mendola, 2013; 
Kahn, 2015; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016). Vahed and Desai (2013: 162) point out that many officials 
at the DHA are antagonistic towards foreigners themselves. Hence, politicians and individual South 
Africans will be categorised as anti-immigrationist in this study.  
Academic and research organisations were of the view that a strategic management of 
immigration was in South Africa’s national interest. South Africa, as explained earlier, has been plagued 
by a ‘brain drain’. As most individuals from this sector are involved in high-end research or professional 
skills, they are the most credible source for they possess first-hand data regarding the skills shortage. 
This sector supports the use of skilled immigration as a strategy to address the challenges of skills 
shortage and high unemployment faced by the country.  
The University of Venda is restricted by some aspects of the White Paper. The current policy is 
discriminatory in the sense that it is impossible for the University to keep its foreign scholars for 
long periods of time. Scholars are given only 12 month permits that are renewable annually… The 
homeland education did not produce many highly skilled people and the few that there were have 
preferred to move away due to lucrative job offers and other reasons. The result is that the 
university has to attract skills from other countries (Prof Nkondo, Vice-Chancellor of the University 
of Venda, 2 August 2000, Parliament Hearing on White Paper on International Migration, Source: 
PMG). 
In many instances South African universities lack skills, and need the services of foreign 
academics for short periods of time (up to three months). Such academics also need multiple entry 
visas, but current policy states that a person cannot work when granted with a short-term visiting 
permit. South African higher education institutions need to appoint foreign academics in many 
research areas as the necessary skills are lacking in South Africa. The problem is that it takes very 
long for the needed permits to be granted (Dr. Kishun, Director: International Office at the 
University of Natal, 4 August 2000, Parliament Hearing on White Paper on International Migration, 
Source: PMG). 
The private sector directly participates in the economy and possessed first-hand experience and data 
on the negative economic impact of the skills shortage. This sector was facing stagnation in business 
growth due to many scarce skills which were unable to be sourced in South Africa. Enabling skilled 
immigration thus became the main focus that the private sector advocated.  
South African is not producing enough skilled people, while a high level of skilled people are 
needed to stimulate economic growth. The entry of skills is necessary to produce growth and 
increase the expansion of the economy in South Africa. 4000 people emigrate per annum from 
South Africa. In future, HIV and AIDS will have a major impact on skilled people in South Africa. 
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Every week, 3 to 4 teachers die of AIDS in Swaziland (Ann Bernstein, 16 May 2000, Parliament 
hearing on White Paper on International Migration, Source: PMG).  
The mining industry need assurance that the present legal migration will continue. The market 
grows as you introduce skills. BSA does not advocate the total free movement of skills but it must 
be remembered that South Africa is not a very desirable place for foreign skilled labour. America 
would have been backward if no foreign skills were introduced. Skilled immigrants create jobs. In 
South Africa, within 10 years, 50% of jobs as we know them would have disappeared. This is true 
especially for the service sector. South Africa is presently in urgent need to import skills and it is 
not possible to train the needed skills internally in order to satisfy the need. South Africa must use 
the built up skills of other countries to drive the economy (Mr V Esselaar, Chairperson of Task 
Group on Migration: Business South Africa, 17 May 2000, Parliament Hearing on White Paper on 
International Migration, Source: PMG).  
Human rights organisations’ focus was on’ justice and the violation of human rights. The humanitarian 
nature of these organisations determine that their concern is that a restrictive immigration policy might 
result in the lack of rights for non-citizens in South Africa. They supported immigration because of their 
shared belief that the Bill of Rights should apply to everyone regardless of citizenship. The South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in its submission to the White Paper on International 
Migration of 2000 shows how human rights organisations supported immigration and were against the 
opposition to foreigners.  
In terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, immigrants and migrants are afforded the 
protections as pledged by the member states. The pledge includes the intention to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Under international law, according to Article 2 of The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 13 of The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, once a state has admitted aliens into its territory 
(documented immigrants), it must treat them according to internationally determined standards. 
International human rights law gives many rights to lawful aliens (SAHRC’s submission to 
Parliament on White Paper on International Migration, 11 January 2000, Source: Sabinet Legal 
Database).  
Some politicians were supportive of skilled immigration. These included the Democratic Party’s 17 Mike 
Waters and the ANC’s Mr Skohasana.  
Mr Waters stated that South Africa is participating in a global economy and must compete. He 
argued that South Africa cannot isolate itself. He agreed that the unemployment rate is high but 
submitted that attracting foreign skilled people would create jobs (Mr Mike Water, Member of 
Parliament, White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, Source: PMG Database, 16 May 
2000). 
Mr Skhosana urged people to see skilled foreigners as assets that could contribute to South Africa’s 
economic development and not the other way around.  
Mr Skhosana (ANC) commented that whereas South Africans feel threatened by skilled foreigners, 
it should be the other way around and South Africans should see that the foreigners are helping 
the country on its path to development (Mr Skhosana, Member of Parliament, White Paper on 
International Migration: Hearing, Source: PMG Database, 16 May 2000). 
 
17 Democratic Party was succeeded by the current Democratic Alliance.  
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Organised labour is shown to be one of the most vocal opponents of skilled immigration. As organised 
labour represented workers’ rights and their interests, prioritising workers’ employment opportunities 
has the implication that they would oppose immigration. For instance, COSATU’s joint submission with 
NACTU and FEDUSA shows that trade unions believed that if immigration were made easier for skilled 
foreigners, national workers would be sacrificed and would not receive the upskilling and training that 
they otherwise would if immigration were difficult. Thus, they objected to skilled immigration, calling it 
an ‘overemphasis’ which they fear would jeopardise the training of local South African workers.  
We are concerned about the impact that the overemphasis on highly skilled workers will have on 
national programmes prioritising the development of local skills. Although we welcome provisions 
requiring that corporates provide training programmes for South Africans, this in itself is not 
sufficient. Strategies must be developed both to retain and develop local skills in areas of 
shortage. Failure to do so will only further entrench dependence on foreign skills and will 
discourage local skills development (COSATU] [NACTU, FEDUSA, 2001: 4). 
Trade union members were also found to have a pattern of using negative language to describe 
foreigners.  
There is no proper screening of persons with academic qualifications who enter SA. Many people 
with false CV's enter South Africa. Truckloads of unlawful goods come in through border posts and 
are sold illegally. The selling of illegal goods is killing the South African industry (Mr A Nebe, 
Chairperson of COSATU North West, White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, PMG, 1 
Aug 2000). 
Not all stakeholders attend public hearings and therefore the White Paper should follow the Nedlac 
route. Farm workers in the North-West are being replaced by foreigners for lower wages. 
Government has no control over the informal sector of street sellers. The country's tax laws are not 
respected by migrants. They do not fill in tax returns and there is no control over those who sell 
their goods in the street and they are evading the by-laws of the municipality. Asylum seekers with 
section 41 permits are also tax evaders (Mr S Mokoena, Secretary of COSATU in the North West 
Province, White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, [PMG], 1 Aug 2000). 
At last, opposition to immigration enjoyed steady support among economically excluded South Africans 
and ANC politicians. Factors that compelled them to resent foreigners include both xenophobic 
sentiments and their fear for losing resource to foreign nationals. Even the White Paper itself contains 
language that negatively depicts foreign nationals as a collective burden who were draining the 
country’s resources.  
I do not believe that we have a serious problem of xenophobia in the RSA. We have several ethnic 
or cultural groups of Whites in this country. On top of that we have even more ethnic and cultural-
groups of people of colour… (Director-General Mr BL Masetlha, Presentation to the Portfolio 
Committee of Home Affairs, 15 April 2002, Source: Sabinet Legal Database).  
It has been noted that illegal aliens have the following negative impact on the provision of services 
and on our society: 
 they compete for scarce resources with millions of South Africans living in poverty and 
below the breadline; 
 they compete for scarce public services, such as schools and medical care, 
infrastructures and land, housing and informal trading opportunities; 
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 they compete wiili1 residents and citizens for our insufficient job opportunities, and offer 
their labour at conditions below those prescribed by law or the applicable collective 
bargaining agreements 
 a considerable percentage of illegal aliens has been involved in criminal activities; and 
 they weaken the state and its institutions by corrupting officials, fraudulently acquiring 
documents and undeserved rights and tarnishing our image locally and abroad (DHA’s 
White Paper on International Migration, 1999: 18). 
Bishop Tolo (ANC) said he was aware that illegal immigrants are selling goods outside shops. They 
do not pay rent, their goods are sold much cheaper and they do not pay tax. Shop owners are closing 
their shops and opening spazas so that they can also avoid paying tax. Road-side trading is also a 
contributory factor to urban decay. He asked what is the solution to this problem. 
The Chair, Mr D Mokoena (ANC), added that the illegal traders also sell fake goods and this is 
undermining legitimate entrepreneurs (White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, 18 May 
2000, PMG). 
Knowing who those stakeholders were and what views   they held on skilled immigration could 
facilitate the process before moving to the next stage of data coding –to track how those 
stakeholders who held different positions on skilled immigration used the immigration policy to 
address skills shortage, high unemployment and antagonism towards foreigners in the country.  
Chapter summary 
This chapter answered sub-research question 2: Who were the main stakeholders involved in the policy 
discussion and what were their interests and agendas in relation to skilled immigration? Through the 
examination of data, it showed that the drafting process of the White Paper in 1999 and the Immigration 
Bill in 2002 involved a wide range of stakeholders from outside the governmental sphere. These 
stakeholders all had different interests and views around skilled immigration and expressed their 
opinions on supporting or opposing immigration.  
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Chapter 6 Finding II: Stakeholders’ responses and the Immigration 
Act: Antagonism towards foreigners  
Overview 
This chapter and the next are guided by and speak to sub-research question 3, namely  how did 
stakeholders involved in the drafting process of the Immigration Act respond to the contextual factors 
(skills shortage, high unemployment and antagonism towards foreigners) and what outcomes contained 
in the Immigration Act and its subsequent Amendment Act of 2004 and the Bill of 2006 pointed to those 
response(s)? In order to answer this sub-research question, this and the following chapters will firstly 
provide an account of each stakeholder’s proposed strategies on skilled immigration. What follows will 
be the tracking of the changes which took place in the Immigration Act from 2000 to 2006. Finally, this 
chapter will attempt to analyse and determine which stakeholders, whether pro-immigration or anti-
immigration, played a more decisive role in the shaping of the immigration policy.  
It needs to be noted that the general sentiment towards foreigners with which stakeholders were 
confronted during the process was the one of antagonism.  A thematic analysis shows that they 
responded to this antagonism in two distinct ways –either using it to push for stricter immigration control 
or resisting it by pushing for a humanitarian approach in the handling of the immigration issue. Both can 
be seen in their participation records in Parliament as well as the written submissions made to 
Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs. Drawing on stakeholders’ records and submissions, 
this chapter explains how stakeholders responded towards society’s antagonistic attitude towards 
foreigners to either support foreigners’ integration and manage immigration in accordance with human 
rights standard or to push government to enforce stricter immigration control. A series of amendments 
made to the 2002 Immigration Act in 2004, as shown in this chapter, indicate that the DHA and the 
stakeholders that pushed for stricter immigration control gained the upper hand. From 2000 to 2006 
South increasingly rigid immigration controls despite frequent calls to respect foreigners’ human rights. 
This heightened antagonism came especially from some citizens, politicians and organised labour. This 
heightening antagonism is instrumental in exploring the DoH’s discouraging stance towards the 
recruitment of foreign doctors because it was in this ideational environment that the DoH drafted its 
policy on the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors.  
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What were stakeholders’ responses and their proposed strategies towards skilled 
immigration?  
Since antagonism is a cultural condition  borne out of  stakeholders’ ideological belief (Archer, 1995; 
Carter, 2000), negative, nationalistic and monocultural discourse were coded and defined as opposing 
immigration whereas progressive, cosmopolitan and multicultural discourse was coded and defined as 
supporting immigration (Reudin, 2019: 210).  
There are two processes through which those non-governmental organisations could influence 
the direction of the government’s immigration policy. One is for these non-governmental stakeholders to 
use Parliament’s hearings, invitations for comments on Green and White Papers, as well as various 
other methods to communicate with politicians and express their views to them in order to influence the 
immigration policy. This is the process guaranteed in the Constitution which requires governmental 
departments to consult members of the public (Tremikliniotos, Gordon & Zondo, 2008; Segatti, & 
Landau, 2011). The other is for non-governmental organisations and activists to challenge via the 
judicial system on immigration decisions that are considered in contravention of the country’s 
Constitution. A number of studies (Crush, 2001; Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh & Singh, 2005; Landau, 
2006; Neocosmos, 2006; Amit, 2011; Kapindu, 2011; Haile, 2012; Odeku, 2013; Rapatsa, 2015; Van 
Lennep, 2019) assert that South Africa’s judicial system has been proactive in defending foreigners’ 
rights. What is shown below falls under the first process -- the stakeholders’ engagements with 
Parliament’s members through attending portfolio meetings and making written submissions to 
Parliament on the immigration policy from the period 2000 to 2006.  
Below is a detailed account of the key quotes from the dataset. It will first provide a series of 
quotations from stakeholders that supported immigration, then it provides key quotations from 
stakeholders that objected to immigration. Finally, this section ends with government’s proposed 
strategy on immigration. The purpose of outlining these quotes is to compare and help understand 
stakeholders’ and government’s different proposed strategies on immigration.  
Stakeholders that supported immigration 
Stakeholders that supported immigration resisted the predominant nationals’ antagonistic attitude 
towards foreigners. These stakeholders consisted mainly of human rights organisations such as the 
Black Sash, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and Lawyers for Human Rights. 
Confronted by a predominantly antagonistic culture against foreigners, these organisations resisted 
antagonism by arguing it was morally and legally wrong since it was in contravention of South Africa’s 
Constitution and its values in upholding human rights (Immigration Bill: Hearing, 22 April 2002, PMG). 
They supported a humanitarian approach to managing immigration affairs by fast-tracking and 
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admitting certain categories of  foreigners, by acknowledging foreigners’ rights in South Africa,  and 
utilising foreign human resources and giving foreign nationals’ more flexibility such as the right to 
conduct limited work in the case of foreign students’ (Prof Martin West, International Education 
Association of South Africa (IEASA) with members of parliament, Immigration Bill: Hearing, 22 April 
2002, PMG). 
The South African Human Right Commission pointed out that antagonism towards foreigners 
was almost directed towards foreign African nationals in post-apartheid South Africa. SAHRC’s 
Commissioner remarked that it was very rare that foreigners of Asian and Eastern European origins 
were ever picked up from off the street and be detained. Hence, SAHRC supported an immigration 
system that would clearly stipulate what rights in the Bill of Rights are applicable for foreigners. In the 
below quote, the SAHRC’s Commissioner, Ms Majodina, emphasised the importance for the 
government to respect foreign nationals’ human rights in the regulation of immigration.  
[I]n the submission there was a look at the history of immigration legislation. The Aliens Control Act 
gave permanent residence or citizenship if the person can be assimilated into the white population. 
The law was deeply rooted in racism. Today the undocumented migrants are mainly from African 
countries. The migrants do not only come from nearby countries but from far so they are clearly 
visible on the basis of their physical features and the clothes they wear. In many instances people 
are physically manhandled and abused. The SAHRC feels that the Bill does not do enough to 
combat this behaviour by the officials and the public. There are many Asians and Eastern 
Europeans who are illegals but they are not picked up from off the street and cannot be found in 
the detention centres. She added that the Bill of rights is for all the people in the country. The only 
rights that are excluded are the civic rights. SAHRC has nothing against managing the movement 
of people in a fair and just way (Ms Majodina, SAHRC Commissioner, SAHRC with Members of 
Parliament, Immigration Bill: Hearing, 22 April 2002, Source: PMG database). 
As quoted below, the United Nation’s Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) made submissions 
expressing its concern about the position of refugees since there was an impression that the 2002 
Immigration Act could overrule the provisions the Refugee Act of 1998. enacted to protect refugees It 
flagged the issue to draw the government’s attention in an effort to protect refugees’ rights in South 
Africa.  
Clause 55(1) calls for a restructuring of the Department. UNHCR is concerned that in the new 
structure refugee protection will fall under the general framework of migration control and 
administration. The UNHCR suggests that Clause 55 be reworked to ensure that the Refugee Act 
is not undermined (Ms Bemma Donkoh, a United Nation’s representative at the UNHRC branch in 
Pretoria, UNHRC with Members of Parliament, Immigration Bill: Hearing, 22 April 2002, Source: 
PMG database). 
The Western Cape Immigration Practitioners Forum (WCIPF) raised the concern that the 
experience of foreign nationals and those who worked closely with foreign nationals such as 
immigration practitioners were ignored.  
Immigration legislation in this country has a long history of being a square peg for a round hole. 
We believe that the public, the foreigners, the "consumers" of the services of the Department of 
Home Affairs, should have the opportunity to provide their input in improving this situation. Without 
73 | P a g e  
 
the benefit of the experiences and perspective of the foreigner it will be naive to believe that a 
dispensation can be developed which to the foreigner is reasonable, consistent and 
efficient…([WCIPF]’s submission to Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs  
on Immigration Amendment Act 2004, 22 July 2004, Source: Sabinet Legal Database). 
 
It further suggested having stakeholders’ consultations that included foreigners and listened to their 
interests and views on immigration policy. 
A database is developed by the Immigration Advisory Board, in terms of which interested parties 
are registered, and are offered the opportunity to make representations on proposed Regulations 
and Policy prior to their consideration by the Board and the Board presenting its advise to the 
Minister (Apart from Immigration practitioners, it is envisages that this database should also 
include interested foreigners, schools, language schools, associations of the model agencies, film 
and photographic industries, universities, medical institutions and multinationals that are always 
directly affected by these Regulations and Policies)… (WCIPF’s submission to Portfolio Committee 
on Home Affairs on Immigration Amendment Act 2004, 22 July 2004, Source: Sabinet Legal 
Database).   
The International Education Association of South Africa lobbied for more flexibility for foreign 
students to undertake some forms of limited part-time work. In the quotation below, IEASA cited that 
allowing holders of student permits to undertake limited part-time work was not only in line with 
international practice, it also could help students, the majority of whom from other African countries, to 
cover some of their living expenses. Here, the IEASA advocated for foreign students to be given more 
flexibility in the Immigration Bill to be able to work.  
That holders of student permits should be allowed to undertake limited part-time work, to be 
prescribed by regulation. This is again in line with best international practice where foreign 
students can undertake limited work. This is important for many foreign students from developing 
countries, notably from Africa, who sometimes struggle to meet incidental living expenses (Prof 
Martin West, International Education Association of South Africa (IEASA) with Members of 
Parliament, Immigration Bill: Hearing, 22 April 2002, Source: PMG database). 
It is evident that human rights organisations, academic research institutions and the private 
sector all spoke out against society’s antagonism and lobbied for government to recognise and protect 
foreigners’ rights. The concerning issues that these stakeholders raised were the unfair xenophobic and 
racist attacks that were particularly directed at black African foreigners, the legal status of Refugee Act 
No. 130 of 1998, limited part-time work rights for foreign students and the lack of foreigners’ 
participation in immigration policy discussion. These concerns led to those stakeholders’ demands to 
ask the government to recognise and protect foreigners’ legal rights. Below is a summary that illustrates 
the stakeholder, the stakeholder’s response towards this antagonism as well as the stakeholder’s 
proposed immigration strategy.  
 
Sector Stakeholder(s) Constraint/enablement Proposed Immigration 
Strategy 




South African Human 
Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) 
Resisted the antagonistic 
sentiment towards foreigners 
and upheld human rights 
Managing immigration 
within the confines of 
human rights; stipulating 
the rights that are 
applicable to foreigners 
in the Bill of Rights. 
Human rights 
organisations 
United Nation’s Human 
Rights Commission 
(UNHRC) 
Resisted the antagonistic 
sentiment towards foreigners 
and upheld human rights 







Resisted the antagonistic 
sentiment towards foreigners 
and upheld human rights 
Putting foreigners and 
immigration practitioners 
on the Immigration 
Advisory Board (IAB); 
Listening to foreigners’ 
and immigration 
practitioners’ views on 
immigration policy. 
Higher education International Education 
Association of South 
Africa (IEASA) 
Resisted the antagonistic 
sentiment towards foreigners 
and upheld human rights 
International students 
should be allowed to 
undertake part-time work 
to make ends meet. 
 
Stakeholders who opposed immigration 
Objection to skilled immigration came from trade unions sector, high-profile African National Congress 
politicians, public servants and some individual citizens from the previously disadvantaged groups such 
as the black South African population (Mr Mthuthuzeli Khaye, a business person White Paper on 
International Migration: Hearing, PMG, 16 May 2000; Mr Matshiane, an ordinary South African, White 
Paper on International Migration: penultimate report, PMG, 31 Oct 2000; Dr Sehlare Makgetlaneng, a 
senior research specialist at the Africa Institute of South Africa, Immigration Bill: Hearing, PMG, 22 Apr 
2002; Mr S Mokoena, Secretary of COSATU in the North West Province, White Paper on International 
Migration: Hearing, PMG, 1 Aug 2000; White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, 18 May 2000, 
[PMG]; BL Masetlha, Home Affair’s Director-General, Presentation to the Portfolio Committee of Home 
Affairs, 15 April 2002). These stakeholders used society’s antagonism towards foreigners to lobby for 
government to impose more immigration restrictions on foreigners. The above stakeholders, all groups 
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and individuals opposed to immigration, believed that foreigners do not have rights under the South 
African Constitution due to their non-citizen status. For instance, below are two quotations extracted 
from the dataset that point to the views of the stakeholders who opposed skilled immigration. One was 
the then Home Affairs’ Director-General’s introductory speech to Parliament, the other is the remark 
made by a high-profiled politician in a parliamentary hearing meeting.  
The Department was of the view that this was in line with the Constitution’ as the Constitution 
determines in Section 21(3) that Citizens have the right to enter, remain and stay anywhere in the 
RSA, Furthermore, Section 22 gives the right to exercise one’s profession to citizens only. There 
are several rights, which are given only to citizens. The Constitution itself therefore discriminates 
or differentiates between citizens and non-citizens (BL Masetlha, Home Affair’s Director-General, 
Presentation to the Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs, 15 April 2002). 
The Committee Chair, Mr Mokoena (ANC), pointed out to the Foreign Marriage Family Protection 
Association's representative, Mr William Chapman, that aliens have no right to remain in South 
Africa and that the government has no constitutional obligation to issue visas to them. In short, the 
Constitution of South Africa does not guarantee any rights for aliens (White Paper on International 
Migration: Hearing, [PMG], 5 May 2000).  
In the first quotation provided above, the Director-General of Home Affairs stated that it was the 
Constitution that discriminated against foreigners and people on the ground were merely following the 
Constitution. This view was shared by the Chairperson of the Parliament’s Home Affairs Committee 
who stated, as shown in the second quotation above, that foreigners do not have a right to remain in 
South Africa even if that person is married to a South African citizen. This notion of a ‘non-existent right’ 
for foreigners, as shown above, provided justification for transgressions and human rights violations 
against foreigners. Desai and Walsh (2010) assert the dominant form of narrative produced by the 
dominant and influential class such as politicians and high-profiled public servants such as the Director-
General excludes migrant and refugee voices. On the one hand the emphasis on citizenship, legality 
and human rights perpetuated by the government creates and reinforces a nationalistic discourse which 
positions citizens as the only bearers of rights (Walsh & Desai, 2010). While on the other the attacks on 
those who are not citizens are justified. This belief that foreigners do not have rights created a hierarchy 
in which nationals had the sense of superiority to assert their domination status over foreigners.  
Because of this sense of superiority or South African exceptionalism as astutely pointed out by 
Nyamnjoh (2006), there was a sentiment that South African citizens’ rights, particularly black South 
Africans’ rights, must be prioritised whereas foreign nationals’ legal rights did not matter. The 
quotations below illustrate stakeholders’ antagonism towards foreigners and how these stakeholders 
used this antagonism to pursue a restrictive immigration policy. For instance, Mr Khaye, a South 
African citizen, opposed immigration because immigrants have deprived of South African citizens’ their 
job opportunities in the security, hotel and catering industries (Mr Mthuthuzeli Khaye, a businessperson, 
: White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, PMG, 16 May 2000). He blamed the liberal human 
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rights organisations and their advocacy in upholding human rights for indigenous South Africans’ 
deprivation of resources such as employment opportunities. In his view, the advocacy for human rights 
was deliberately misused to protect foreigners’ interests which caused South African citizens’, 
especially black South Africans’ poverty and joblessness. The quote below illustrates Mr Khaye’s 
antagonism towards immigration and particularly his concern that more immigration would hamper the 
interests of black South African citizens.  
South Africa's policy has been very liberal and many immigrants have been allowed in, probably 
because of pressure from human rights organisations. He said that the impact on the indigenous 
population has been denied. He argued that there are many unemployed people for whom no one 
speaks…[t]he SA security industry, hotel and catering industries are full of immigrants there are 
many cases of refugees who are arrested for having committed crimes a few months after entering 
the country. These immigrants work as hawkers and take the space that should rightly be occupied 
by indigenous people…(Mr Mthuthuzeli Khaye, a business person White Paper on International 
Migration: Hearing, [PMG], 16 May 2000). 
Mr Khaye believed that the government should be placing restrictions on the employment of foreign 
nationals, in the security, hotel and catering industries at least. Immigrants employed in these sectors 
are taking jobs away from South Africans and adding to the high unemployment crisis in South Africa.  
Mr Matshiane, who also described himself an ordinary South African, suggested that South 
Africa’s high crime rates was caused by the high presence of foreigners (Mr Matshiane, an ordinary 
South African, White Paper on International Migration: penultimate report, [PMG], 31 Oct 2000). He 
remarked that ‘illegals [undocumented immigrants] kill our people [South Africans]’.  
Illegals kill our people. The Immigration System must be implemented at local level and will 
provide employment opportunity for people. Communities should be educated in looking for illegals 
and what immigrants’ papers and documents should look like (Mr Matshiane, an ordinary South 
African, White Paper on International Migration: penultimate report, [PMG], 31 Oct 2000). 
Mr Matshiane supported an immigration system that would focus on detecting suspicious foreigners at 
the community level.  
Dr Makgetlaneng believed that it was because of wealthy foreigners’ entry that caused the 
poverty for black South Africans.  
If wealthy people are allowed to enter the country, the skewed economic reality inherited from 
apartheid would be more disparate that leads to where wealthy foreigners buy more land and thus 
monopolise land in South Africa. It would negatively impact on the land accessibility of poor 
Africans in South Africa (Dr Sehlare Makgetlaneng, a senior research specialist at the Africa 
Institute of South Africa, Immigration Bill: Hearing, [PMG], 22 Apr 2002). 
Dr Makgetlaneng’s case needs to be flagged for its uniqueness. It differs from the usual anti-
immigrationists’ narrative in which the primary objection towards immigration was centred around the 
potential negative impact on foreign workers with low-end skills and little capital such as views given 
above by Mr Khaye and Mr Matshiane. Dr Makgetlaneng objected to the immigration of high-end, 
wealthy foreigners because the wealthy foreigners monopolise the market thus repressing black South 
Africans which would further deprive them of opportunities to grow and be self-sufficient. Although the 
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academic and research sector are usually considered to be supporters of immigration, Dr 
Makgetlaneng’s remark is an exceptional case. It needs to be understood in the context of the 
exclusion of black South Africans in the labour market as studies affirm that black South Africans were 
bearing the brunt of unemployment and shared a disproportionately high unemployment percentage in 
relation other population (May & Govender, 1998: 2; Klasen & Woolards, 1999: 12).   
Mr S Mokoena, a trade unionist from COSATU in the North West province, expressed his 
displeasure at foreign nationals’ depriving South African citizens of their employment opportunities. He 
described that foreign workers’ presence in South Africa had compromised and undermined the 
existing wage and working conditions for local workers. In the North West, workers in the agricultural 
sector were being replaced by foreigners for lower wages. As shown in the quotation below, it seems 
that Mr Mokoena suggested that there was needs to control the foreign population in the agricultural 
sector and to monitor their activities in the informal sector. Mr Mokoena said that ‘[f]arm workers in the 
North West are being replaced by foreigners for lower wages’ and that foreigners were exploiting the 
country’s ‘tax law loopholes in the informal sector’ as well as fraudulently obtaining fake asylum permits 
(Mr S Mokoena, Secretary of COSATU in the North West, White Paper on International Migration: 
Hearing, PMG, 1 Aug 2000). 
There was a view which was shared by some politicians such as members of parliament. The 
quotations provided below are the remarks made by two ANC politicians that depicted foreigners in a 
negative way.  
Bishop Tolo (ANC) said he was aware that illegal immigrants are selling goods outside shops. 
They do not pay rent, their goods are sold much cheaper and they do not pay tax. Shop owners 
are closing their shops and opening spazas so that they can also avoid paying tax. Road-side 
trading is also a contributory factor to urban decay. He asked what is the solution to this problem? 
The Chair, Mr D Mokoena (ANC), added that the illegal traders also sell fake goods and this is 
undermining legitimate entrepreneurs (White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, 18 May 
2000, PMG).  
 
Both Bishop Tolo and Mr Mokoena suggested the government to strictly monitor informal traders who 
are not citizens. They both believed that foreigners gained an unfair disadvantage over local traders in 
the informal sector by not paying rent and tax. They also believed that foreign traders in the informal 
sector are profiting themselves illegally by selling illegal or fake goods.  
A uniform theme is seen in these quotations: stakeholders that are opposed to immigration had 
negative perceptions of foreigners and believed and actively perpetuated this narrative that foreign 
national are engaging in criminal activities and depriving South Africans of their resources. To 
summarise the above quotations of the stakeholders that opposed immigration, the table below shows 
the sectors to which stakeholders belong, the stakeholders that tried to influence immigration policy, the 
constraint or enabling factors as well as their proposed immigration strategies.  
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Sector Stakeholder(s) Constraint/enablement Proposed Immigration Strategy 
Private 
individual 
Mr Khaye (South African 




restrictions on the employment of 
foreign nationals in the security, hotel 
and catering industries 
Private 
individual 
Mr Matshiane (private 
South African individual) 
Antagonism towards 
foreigners 






Dr Sehlare Makgetlaneng 
(Senior research specialist 




Reject wealthy foreigners’ immigration 
Organised 
labour 
Mr S Mokoena (trade 
unionist from COSATU in 
the North West province) 
Antagonism towards 
foreigners 
Control the foreign population in the 
agricultural sector and monitor their 
activities in the informal sector 




Strictly monitoring informal traders 
who are not citizens 
Politician Mr D Mokoena (ANC, 
Chairperson of Home 




Strictly monitoring informal traders 
who are not citizens 
Government’s approach on skilled immigration 
Government’s approach to immigration is displayed by its antagonism which can be seen in three ways. 
The first is that government raised the entry requirement in the immigration policy to preclude more 
foreigners eligible to migrate to South Africa. Processes such as charging exorbitant amounts of money 
to apply for visas, results in more foreigners becoming undocumented for the lack the financial means 
to apply for a legal immigration status. For a person to have been eligible to apply for a retired person’s 
permit in the  early 2000s, Regulation 29 of the Immigration Regulations required the person to have a 
minimum monthly pension of R20,000 or a net worth should be no less than R 12 million providing an 
income of no less than R15,000 per month (Immigration Act, No 12 of 2002, reg. 2003: 29). Meanwhile 
in the same year (2003, the mean and the median salary for an average South African citizen were only 
R5517 and R3,187 respectively (equivalent to R 66,204 and R38, 244 per annum respectively)(Isaacs, 
2016). The huge contrast between the average earning of a South African citizen and the requirement 
in the immigration policy for a foreigner to obtain a retired person’s  permit is evidence of government’s 
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intention to preclude more foreigners from coming to South Africa.  The Cape Town Regional Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry and PriceWaterhouseCoopers both made the following comments,  
restriction is being introduced through the regulations which would suggest that only the rich are 
welcome to stay in South Africa. It will certainly discourage foreign nationals from settling in South 
Africa and drive out many thousands of people who have settled here but do not have an income 
of R25 000 per month or able to demonstrate a net worth of R15 million (Deputy Director of Cape 
Town Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry to Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, 21 
February 2003, Source: Sabinet Legal Database) 
Even by international standards, R15 million (over US$1,5 million and GBP 1 million) is a large 
amount of net assets, and therefore only millionaires may apply. Very few individuals will be able 
to satisfy the condition, thereby precluding many bona fide foreign nationals from retiring in South 
Africa (PwC’s submission to Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, 20 February 2003, Source: 
Sabinet Legal Database).  
When Parliament was questioned by the Foreign Marriage and Family Protection Association (FMFPA), 
an organisation to protect foreign spouses’ rights in South Africa, about the exorbitant  fees charged for 
foreigners, the responses from members of parliament reveal that there was a uniform sentiment in the 
political arena that immigration should be made more difficult. If the entry standard had been dropped, 
South Africa would face a catastrophe by being overwhelmed by foreigners. Hence, Mr Sikakane and 
Mr Sikhosana, both ANC MPs, suggested that FMFPA’s questioning was suggesting immigration to 
South Africa was an easy for all. The below quotes show that both MPs questioned FMFPA whether or 
not immigration should be free and insisted that there was a need to keep the bar high in order to 
control the number of foreigners that have the resource to enter South Africa.  
Mr Sikakane (ANC) agreed that the fee of over R10 000 to immigrate into South Africa was 
exorbitant, but went on to ask how the flow of people in and out of the country would be controlled. 
Would it not be a "free for all"?  
Mr Sikhosana (ANC) remarked that a system such as the one the Foreign Marriage Family 
Protection Association is advocating could be seen as an "easy road" to South Africa for foreigners 
(White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, 15 May 2000, PMG). 
Furthermore, the government also had the intention to contain and possibly reject the 
admission of refugees into South Africa. Black Sash is a human rights organisation in South Africa 
which, among others, advocates for refugees’ rights. During the parliamentary discussion, the 
organisation’s representative, Ms Isobel Frye, was lambasted by members of parliament for the 
organisation’s  defence of  refugees’ rights to enter South Africa (Black Sash with members of 
parliament, Immigration Bill: Hearing, 22 April 2002, PMG). The below meeting minutes record shows 
that MPs expressed concern at the huge number of foreigners in the country and the lack of the DHA’s 
mechanism to correctly identify true refugees in response to a humanitarian crisis. MPs believed that 
the country’s refugee system could not withstand the test from disingenuous and opportunist refugees 
who strove to sneak into South Africa. All MPs did not accept that refugees should be allowed into the 
country without screening and agreed that South Africa should not let refugees in as easily as the Black 
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Sash had suggested. Narratives advanced by IFP member of parliament Mr Smith reveals the 
government’s anxiety of being overwhelmed by foreigners.  
Ms Mars (IFP) commented that SA would have to deal with many more asylum seekers and the 
process would be formidable. People will just say that they are seeking asylum and then they will 
have to be allowed entry. The matter needed some thought. 
Mr Smith (IFP) said that he understood that 4 million illegals were in the country. If the 
recommendation is accepted, then there would be 4 million people saying that they want to be 
processed as asylum seekers. After 14 days these people will not be seen again. It is certainly 
easier than crawling under a fence. 
An ANC member said that she had a problem with the recommendation of Black Sash as it would 
be a problem for the country. 
Ms Frye reiterated that SA has an obligation in terms of international law. Even if persons do not 
qualify for asylum they will still enter. 
The Chairperson asked for international examples of how refugees are dealt with. 
Ms Frye said that she could only speak of the UK. 
The Chairperson asked what happened to an asylum seeker at a port of entry in the UK. Ms Frye 
replied that she did not know. 
The Chairperson said that the Members did not want SA to be used as an experiment. He thought 
the presenter could back up what she was saying but she does not know. 
Ms Frye explained that Regulation 2(2) of the Refugee Act allows asylum seekers 14 days to apply 
for asylum. She just wanted the right clarified in the immigration bill. 
Mr Lekgoro (ANC) said that the presenter raises valid questions but that the solution was a 
problem (Black Sash with Members of Parliament, Immigration Bill: Hearing, 22 April 2002, PMG). 
Despite the fact that South Africa was obligated by domestic and international treaties to take in 
refugees, there was a strong indication from politicians that the system which governed and admitted 
refugees into the country needed to be reviewed (Refugee Act, No 130 of 1998, 1998: s3). The purpose 
of doing that was to contain the number of refugees in the country as the minutes have shown that all 
Members were concerned about the overwhelming presence of refugees in South Africa.  
Thirdly, government also exhibited hostility towards human rights organisations and activists for 
their role in defending foreign nationals’ rights. In the government’s view, the interference of these 
organisations and activists were hampering government’s responsibilities to manage immigration. 
Below are the comments of the then Director-General of Home Affairs, Dr Mbatha about immigrants 
using attorneys to defend their rights. The connotation expressed in the following quotation reaffirms a 
prevalent belief among the government officials that foreigners do not have rights and thus should not 
be able to hire attorneys to defend their rights.  
The work of the Department is tampered with when some illegal immigrants via their attorneys and 
via some Government officials claim that during their arrests their rights were abused and 
therefore demand an extended stay in the Republic (Director-General Dr Mbatha, Committee 
meeting on White Paper on International Migration, 25 Oct 1999, Source: PMG Database).  
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It was confirmed by an official from the DHA, Mr Schravesande, that the SAHRC and the Public 
Protector often interfered in the Department’s process to deport foreigners. Below was the conversation 
recorded at a Committee Hearing meeting between an MP and a Home Affairs official on human rights 
activists and organisations’ roles in ‘hampering’ the process of the DHA from regulating migration.  
Mr K Meshoe (ACDP): Is there a perception that the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) and the Public Protector are interfering with the process of the Department when an 
application has been refused. Secondly, if the Department has discovered the problem of bribery 
by casual workers in the airports, why can't they train full time people?  
Response (Mr Schravesande from the Department of Home Affairs): Yes the SAHRC and the 
Public Protector hamper our processes. The problem is that when all the paperwork is in order, we 
then have to stop the removal process. I must also say their co-operation with us is good but it 
stops the removal of persons every time. And yet I am not aware of any case where they have 
overturned us. On the issue of casual workers, we use them because of the restriction on funds. It 
is far cheaper to employ them than employing permanent workers. We simply do not have the 
funds (Committee Meeting on White Paper on International Migration, 25 Oct 1999, Source: PMG 
Database). 
It clear that the government’s proposed immigration strategies were aimed at raising the entry 
requirement for foreigners and placing restrictions and strictly screening refugees. Government also 
expressed its frustration over human rights organisations’ role in defending foreigners’ rights.  
Outcomes: What were the changes in the immigration policy from 2002 to 2006 
The amendments made to the Immigration Act in 2004 and the draft bill Immigration Amendment Bill of 
2006 are the outcomes of the deliberations of stakeholders and government on South Africa’s 
immigration policy. Since Archer’s objective at this phase is to determine which stakeholders were more 
decisive in shaping the final outcomes, it was important to review and track the changes to the 
immigration policy in order to determine which stakeholders played a more decisive role in the 
formulation of the immigration policy (personal communication 2019, 28 March). These changes show 
that the antagonism towards foreigners has played a decisive role in shaping South Africa’s immigration 
policy. Thematic analysis shows that there are three major amendments made to the Immigration Act 
from 2002 to 2006 which point to the DHA’s and the government’s intention to further restrict 
immigration and undermining foreigners’ legal rights. These amendments were: 
• the removal of public inputs in policy formulation in Preamble (c) and the changes made to s 
4(k) on the composition of the Immigration Advisory Board (IAB) and their responsibilities;  
• the removal of the DHA’s responsibility to combat xenophobia as per Preamble (m); and 
• changes to restrict and undermine foreigners’ rights in s1(xvii) in terms of the definition of 
foreigners, s 8 which granted immigration officers the power to arrest foreigners without a 
warrant, and s 40 which implemented community enforcement approach to identify foreigners.  
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These changes in the immigration policy unanimously show how antagonism towards 
foreigners had dominated the narrative in the shaping of the immigration policy and the notion of 
equality and human rights advanced by stakeholders such as human rights organisations were 
overshadowed and diminished by this pervasive narrative of antagonism. Thus, stakeholders who held 
antagonistic attitudes towards foreigners had played a more decisive role in the shaping of the 
immigration policy. All these changes outlined above which took place during the 2004 Immigration 
Amendment Bill process and was later enacted had the effect of exposing foreigners to greater 
vulnerability and precariousness and weakening their political position through various immigration 
control restrictions. This antagonism also indicated the tendency in the government to make 
immigration more restrictive for foreigners. Such whittling down of foreign nationals’ rights would 
simultaneously affect governmental departments such as the DoH whose recruiting policy on foreign 
doctors were affected. The three changes illustrated below explain how they result in non-citizens’ lack 
of rights and are pertinent to foreigners’ precarious situation. Foreigners’ precarious situation, being 
brought about by those changes in the immigration policy, shows the government’s antagonism 
towards foreign nationals and the DoH’s reluctant and discouraging stance to recruit foreign doctors.  
Change 1: Preamble (c) and s 4(k) 
Since a large number of stakeholders in the non-governmental sector such as the private sector, higher 
education sector, and human rights organisations all supported immigration and called for more  
recognition and respect for foreigners’ legal rights, the undermining of foreigners’ position came about 
during the 2004 amendment process. The amendments made to Immigration Act 13 of 2002 in 2004 
removed the DHA’s obligation to respond to public stakeholders’ inputs and comments on 
government’s policy in Preamble (c). Secondly, the amendment of s4(k) also reduced the number of 
civil society members sitting on the Immigration Advisory Board (IAB) and the IAB’s power in 
adjudication and review procedures. Both changes are indications that the non-governmental sector’s 
influence was diminishing.  
Preamble (c), Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002 Preamble, Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, as 
amended, 2004 
Interdepartmental coordination constantly 
enriches the functions of immigration 
control and that a constant flow of public 
inputs is present in further stages of 
policy formulation, including regulation 
making. 
Interdepartmental coordination constantly enriches the 
functions of immigration control. 
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First, as shown above, the DHA removed the Department’s responsibility to respond to ‘public inputs’ 
from Preamble (c). The then Home Affairs Minister explained that the amendment to Preamble (c) was 
motivated by delay of almost two years for the Immigration Bill to be passed into law in the National 
Assembly. Furthermore, the then Director-General justified it by stating that the public consultation 
process had been built into the legislation-making process via public hearings thus there was no need 
for the DHA to respond to public inputs (Director-General responding to a Member of Parliament from 
Democratic Alliance Mr Swart, PMG, 2 August 2004). 
Secondly, as seen below, the amendment 2004 reduced the power of the Immigration Advisory 
Board (IAB) and reduced the number of civil society members sitting on the Board. Section 4(k) of the 
2002 Immigration Act states the composition of the Immigration Advisory Board consists of five 
members from the civil society. The Board’s functions were prescribed in s 5.  
Section 4: Immigration Advisory 
Board in 2002 Immigration Bill 
Amendment of s 4 of Act 13 of 2002  
… 
(k) up to five persons from civil society, 
including one representing organised 
labour and one representing organised 
business, appointed by the Minister 
after the Minister has given notice in 
the Gazette soliciting public 
nominations of such persons… 
Section 5: Functions of Board 
prescribed that  
The Board shall advise the Minister 
in respect of— 
(a) the contents of regulations made 
in terms of this Act; 
(b) the formulation of policy 
pertaining to immigration matters; 
(c) the implementation of 
immigration policy by the 
Department; 
(d) the reviewing of a decision of the 
Department in terms of section 8 if 
and when requested by Minister; 
(e) such other matters relating to 
this Act on which the Minister may 
request advice (Immigration Act, No. 
13 of 2002, 2002, ss4&5).  
5. Section 4 of the principal Act is 
hereby amended— 
… 
(iv) a person representing organised 
business; 
(v) a person representing organised 
labour… 
Substitution of section 5 of Act 13 of 
2002 
6. The following section is hereby 
substituted for section 5 of the principal 
Act: 
Functions of Board 
The Board shall— 
(a) advise the Minister in respect of— 
(i) the contents of regulations that may 
be made in terms of the Act; 
(ii) the formulation of policy pertaining 
to immigration matters and 
(iii) any other matter relating to this Act 
on which the Minister may request 
advice; and 
(b) serve as the interdepartmental 
cooperation forum for all immigration 
matters (Immigration Act, No. 13 of 
2002, as amended, 2004: ss4&5).  
In the amendments the number of members of the IAB from civil society was reduced from five to only 
two members., namely, one person from organised labour and one from organised business. In 
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addition, the amendment also relieved the IAB of its power to review immigration decisions that were 
related to s 8, the adjudication and review procedures.   
These changes in the amendment illustrate the extent to which the position of foreigners was 
weakened, as was those of the non-governmental sector which had for long been the supporter of a 
more relaxed immigration policy.  The ‘non-governmental sector’ in this dissertation refers to 
stakeholders who are not government officials or politicians such as Members of Parliament. A pattern 
in the Immigration Bill which is illustrative of the way in which the power of the non-governmental sector 
was being undermined and neglected and that of the Minister consolidated. The reduction of the 
number of civil society representatives on  Immigration Advisory Board meant  that their influence  on 
the government’s immigration policy was reduced, thus severing the link between government and the 
non-governmental sector and undermined the interests of the non-governmental sector.  
There is a wealth of evidence in the dataset that shows non-governmental sector’s willingness to 
participate in the immigration discussion as immigration matters are closely related to and inevitably 
affect their own sectors. For instance, the Vice-Chancellor and Dean of Science and Technology at the 
University of Venda flagged during the White Paper discussion period that higher education sector had 
not been adequately consulted on immigration.  
In the era of globalisation, it is good that the White Paper provides an opportunity of movement 
especially for highly skilled people… The White Paper does however not fully appreciate the 
exodus of skills from South Africa and this problem is extremely big. The White Paper does not 
properly appreciate the impact that HIV and AIDS will have on the human resources of South 
Africa. Some restrictions imposed on foreign students may be discriminatory. The White Paper 
promote the impact of economic growth and unfortunately the White Paper make no mention of the 
role of higher education in the development of human resources (Professor M Nkondo, Vice 
Chancellor and Dean of Science and Technology: University of Venda, Hearing on White Paper on 
International Migration, 2 August 2000). 
 
Human rights organisations such as the Association of Immigration Practitioners of South Africa 
(AIPSA) even suggested that consultations on immigration take place between foreigners and the DHA. 
The quotation that follows shows that some immigration activist groups were not happy with the 
absence of foreigners in the drafting process of an immigration policy pertinent to their daily lives.  
Immigration legislation in this country has a long history of being a square peg for a round hole. 
We believe that the public, the foreigners, the "consumers" of the services of the Department of 
Home Affairs, should have the opportunity to provide their input in improving this situation. Without 
the benefit of the experiences and perspective of the foreigner it will be naive to believe that a 
dispensation can be developed which, to the foreigner, is reasonable, consistent and efficient 
(AIPSA’s submission on Immigration Amendment Act 2004, 6 August 2004).  
In addition,  stakeholders representing business interests of the non-governmental sector such as the 
American and British Chambers of Business and one of the Big Four global auditing companies,  
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC),  felt that the business sector had not been consulted adequately 
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during the deliberations around  the immigration policy given the sector’s close interest and frequency 
in managing skills transfer and professionals’ relocation across borders.  The two business chambers 
and PwC articulated that the issues raised by it remained unresolved.  
The Department of Home Affairs has studiously avoided over the last three years the continuous 
representations by American Chamber and for that matter other foreign chambers including the 
British Chamber of Business, both to this Parliamentary Committee and to the Acting Director of 
Home Affairs regarding the inclusion of a tax of 2% on the annual salaries of skilled ex-patriate 
employees who are granted permits by Home Affairs (McLaughlin from British and American 
Chambers of Business, 2003). 
We previously provided suggestions and recommendations on the draft Immigration Act during the 
public hearings held in April 2002. A number of these matters remain unresolved and therefore 
these are included again in addition to our comments on the proposed amendments 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers [PwC]’s submission on Immigration Amendment Act 2004, 13 July 
2004). 
As the non-governmental sector expressed the feeling that their input into the country’s immigration 
policy was ignored, they also felt that the DHA’s involvement in immigration seemed to have expanded. 
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) even raised objection to the amendment’s implication which would 
see an increase in the DHA’s power over this matter. The quote below shows BUSA’s scepticism over 
the DHA’s greater discretionary power in the 2004 Amendment Bill.  
The department has, unfortunately, over the years lost much of its credibility. It needs a long time 
and a lot of work to regain it. That is why we cannot support an emphasis on greater administrative 
discretion. The department cannot point to its record and say you can trust us. That is also not 
what the rule of law requires…The main complaint is that a detailed transparent process of appeal 
has been removed from the Act regarding matters of status carrying formidable consequences for 
any individual's life, resources and well being. It applies to work permits, visitor's permits, medical 
permits, retired person's permits, permanent residence, declaration as being undesirable or 
prohibited, production of documents and all other cases where the Department exercises an 
almost unfettered discretion (Business Unity South Africa’s submission to Immigration Amendment 
Bill 2004, 2 August 2004). 
Trade unions such as those represented by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) also objected to the amendment which reduced the 
number of Immigration Advisory Board members from civil society. In the quote below, it shows that 
COSATU and NUM shared the sentiment with all other stakeholders outside the government over the 
more centralised approach in the immigration decision-making process of the DHA.  
We believe that the wording authorising the Director General to cancel temporary residence 
permits does not lay down qualifications on the exercise of this power.  Accordingly, we are calling 
for the insertion of an amendment making this subject “good cause” as reflected below in the 
agreement reached at NEDLAC: 
Labour expressed concern at the extent of the discretion of the Director-General to cancel 
temporary residence permits and it was therefore agreed to include the words “For good cause,” at 
the beginning of section 10(9). (COSATU & NUM’s submission on Immigration Amendment Bill, 5 
August 2004).  
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Despite the fact that stakeholders from outside the government asked to have greater roles in 
the formulation of the immigration policy, these requests were ignored. The amendment adopted in 
2004 removed responding to public inputs as part of the DHA’s responsibilities. The amendment means 
that the influence of the non-governmental sector was weakened as was its negotiation strength with 
governmenton immigration policy. Meanwhile, the diminishing influence of the non-governmental sector 
was accompanied by the increasingly consolidated power of the state as represented by the DHA. The 
Minister and the Director-General of the DHA were given more discretionary power in the decision-
making process. The relation on the roles of immigration affairs between the non-governmental sector 
and the government resembled what Neocosmos (2006) describes a ‘strong, authoritarian state and 
weak civil society’. In such a society, civil society is powerless to hold the government to account. The 
implication of such a society is that transgressions on foreigners’ rights committed or perpetuated by 
government officials, as argued by Vahed and Desai (2013: 161), are also likely to be dealt with 
negligently or overlooked with impunity (Amit, 2011; Vahed & Desai, 2013; Konanani & Odeku, 2013). 
The position of foreigners thus became more precarious and vulnerable. Government would have a 
greater and more influential role in deciding and shaping policies that would affect foreign nationals.  
Change 2: Removal of ‘combating xenophobia’ in Preamble (m)  
Although systemic xenophobia was deeply rooted in South African society as argued by many scholars, 
the removal of its responsibility to combat xenophobia from Preamble (m) in 2004 is an indication of the 
DHA’s lack of determination and dedication to combat xenophobia (Neocosmos, 2006: 2; Nyamnjoh, 
2006; Trimikliniotis et al., 2008; Crush, 2004; 2008; 2014; Peberdy, 2009; Du Toit & Kotze ́, 2011; 
Standing, 2012; Facchini, Mayda & Mendola, 2013; Kahn, 2015; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016).  
Section 2(1) (e) of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 reads that the DHA has the responsibility of 
‘preventing and deterring xenophobia within the Department, any sphere of government or organ of 
State and at community level’. This section was deleted in the 2004 Amendment Act.  
In response to the public’s probing, the Minister said that,  
xenophobia must be combated at all levels of society, and while the Department would be keen to 
play a role, the concern was expressed that if this were included in legislation the Department 
would then be made responsible for combating xenophobia in society as a whole. This would 
create difficulties and possibly even lead to legal situations (Director-General of DHA, Presentation 
of Immigration Amendment Act 2004, [PMG], 1 August 2004). 
 
The Minister’s explanation may have had its merits, but the removal of its role in combating xenophobia 
from a legislative bill had its consequences. Whether the department itself had intended to or not, as a 
result of the DHA’s indication, xenophobia was reported more frequently by migrants and refugee 
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individuals and organisations. Many foreigners reported frequent incidents of police brutality. Ms 
Burchmans, a representative from the Refugee Forum of Congo, described the gruesome treatments 
that black African foreigners often received at the hands of South African police.  
On 24 January 2004, the Cape Times reported on an incident in which eight elements of the SAPS 
viciously kicked three Congolese refugees in Nyanga and called them makwerekwere. In other 
incidents, police failed to respond to calls made by refugees and said refugees should sort out 
their problems themselves. Refugees are being killed in cold blood or at gunpoint, beaten in their 
residences, specifically in townships and other areas such as Salt River and Woodstock in the 
Western Cape, Berea, Soweto, Hillbrow, Yeoville in Gauteng and other areas around the country 
for merely being makwerekwere (Burchmans from Refugee Forum of Congo, Parliament, 26 Aug 
2005). 
A rampant increase in xenophobic behaviour in society was documented in subsequent years 
(Crush & Ramachandran, 2014: 13). According to Crush and Ramachandran (2014: 13), there has 
been at least 250 documented xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals and refugee businesses in 
different locations around South Africa from 1994 to August 2014. Because of the inadequacy of  
SAMP’s data access, this number could be even higher given that some xenophobic attacks may not 
have received adequate attention by the public and not have been covered in the media, so the actual 
tally could be even higher.  
Furthermore, the DHA itself was characterised by its systemic xenophobia and was actively 
perpetuating antagonistic feelings towards foreign nationals, both as a government department and 
among its employees. Evidence points directly towards the amoral and discriminatory behaviour and 
conduct of DHA employees and officials (Burchmans from Refugee Forum of Congo, Parliament, 26 
Aug 2005). The below quote shows that refugee women are subjected to sexually predatory behaviour 
and conduct from Home Affairs employees. 
Last week, I heard of a lady who was denied a refugee status because she could not give to the 
request of a Home Affairs officer at Cape Town Reception office, who asked for sex so that the 
unfortunate woman could qualify for a status (Burchmans, Parliament, 26 Aug 2005). 
The removal of ‘combating xenophobia’ shows the DHA’s own institutional xenophobic attitude 
towards foreign nationals. This was not about the DHA’s lack of resource to enforce the law as it 
claimed, but it was about the DHA’s refusal to cooperate anti-xenophobic movements. Murray (2003: 
453) argues that the DHA is known for ‘dragging its feet [about their treatment of foreign nationals and 
immigrants] partly because of the political sensitivity around the rights of foreigners’. Vahed and Desai 
(2013: 162) describe that the department itself is actively perpetuating and reinforcing the view that 
immigration is overwhelming South Africa and thus denies local South Africans a better life. Barbali’s 
(2009: 132) research also supports the view that there is institutional racism that permeates in the DHA 
amongst its officials.  The DHA’s removal of its responsibility to combat xenophobia should not be 
excused by the Minister’s explanation that addressing xenophobia should not be the DHA’s work alone. 
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It should rather be seen as the DHA’s own antagonistic attitude towards foreigners which prompted the 
department to withdraw its responsibility from combating xenophobia in the 2004 Amendment Bill .The 
amendment shows that the antagonism towards foreigners had again prevailed and the influence of it 
more prevalent than South Africa’s support for equality and its Bill of Rights and Constitution.  
Change 3: Section 1(xvii), s 8, s 34 and s 40 which imposed stricter conditions on 
foreigners 
Migration scholars assert there is a lack of rights secured for foreigners in South Africa’s immigration 
policy (Pieterse, 2000; Kapindu, 2011; Segatti & Landau, 2011; Klotz, 2012; Gordon, 2015). Machinya 
(2016) further argues that restrictive immigration enforcement brought about by restrictive immigration 
policy negatively affect migrant workers and gives legal legitimacy over the control of unfree foreigners 
and deprives them of their legal rights. This deprivation of rights severely undermines foreign nationals’ 
position and security in South Africa, exposes them to more vulnerable situations and leaves them 
unable to defend themselves. The amendments made to sections 1(xvii), 8, 34 and 40 of the 
Immigration Bill during the 2004 amendment process are such changes that have had negative 
implications to the legal rights foreign nationals of non-South African residents in and exposed foreign 
nationals to greater uncertainty and vulnerability. These amendments included: 
• section 1(xvii) including permanent residents into the category of foreigners; 
• section 8 reduced time for foreigners to prepare and appeal adverse immigration decisions 
which may affect them; 
• section 34 granting law enforcement agencies the right to arrest foreigners without a warrant; 
• section 40 community enforcement approach on accommodation premises;  
The adoption of the amendments is an indication of the role that the prevailing influence of antagonism 
played in the shaping of the Immigration Bill. These amendments further contributed to the lacking of 
rights of foreigners in South Africa.  
• Section 1(xvii): Permanent residents as foreigners 
The amendment made to s 1(xvii) subjected permanent residency holders to uncertainty and possibly 
to the kind of treatment meted out to foreign nationals. In the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, s1 (xvii) 
defines a foreigner as ‘an individual who is neither a citizen nor a resident, but is not an illegal foreigner’ 
(Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, 2002: s1(xvii)). In 2004, the amendment changed it to ‘an individual 
who is not a citizen’ (Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, as amended, 2004: s 1(xvii)). It consequentially 
placed permanent residents within the same category as other types of temporary residents who were 
subjected to various immigration restrictions. 
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This amendment was not supported by human rights organisations such as Law Society of the 
Northern Provinces (LSNP). The LSNP explained the amendment’s negative implications for 
Permanent Residency holders. LSNP argued that s 25(1) of the Immigration Bill clearly distinguishes 
the distinction between foreigners and permanent residents and has granted permanent residents 
privileges that ordinary foreign nationals do not enjoy. These rights were affirmed by Constitutional 
Court decisions such as Khosa V Minister of Social Development Cct 18/03 (Handed Down on 4 March 
2004) and Larbi-Odam V MEC for Education (North West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) @ para 24  
and expressed in the following quotation  
It may be reasonable to exclude from the legislative scheme workers who are citizens of other 
countries, visitors and illegal residents, who have only a tenuous link with this country. The position 
of permanent residents is however quite different to that of temporary or illegal residents .... Like 
citizens, they have made South Africa their home (LSNP’s submission on Immigration Amendment 
Act, 2 August 2004).  
 Thus s 25(1) of the Immigration Act and Constitutional Court’s decision both affirm that permanent 
residency holders should not be treated as other categories of foreigners with temporary permits. 
However, the amendment to the definition of foreign nationals states the opposite. LSNP outlined some 
examples of how the amendments may negatively affect permanent residents. 
Examples of where permanent residents and temporary residents have been treated alike, 
are found in 
(a) Clause 10 re section 9 (4) which would require a permanent resident to have a passport valid 
for 30 days before he or she can return home. 
 (b) Clause 11 re section 10A (1) which would require a permanent resident to have to produce a 
visa to be allowed to enter the RSA 
(c) Clause 30 amending Section 29 (1) (a) which appears to have the consequence of rendering 
permanent residents illegal foreigners should they contract a prescribed infection, disease or virus. 
(d) Section 38 (4) would, in the light of such an amendment, require an employer to report the 
termination of a permanent resident's employment to the Department and that a failure to do so 
would expose the employer to criminal sanctions in terms of Clause 45 amending section 49 (6) of 
the Act (LSNP’s submission on Immigration Amendment Act, 2 August 2004). 
In light of that, the LSNP questioned whether the DHA’s intention was to ‘water down the rights of 
permanent residents’. The intention to include permanent residents in the foreign nationals’ category 
indicates the role of antagonism in shaping the Immigration Bill because it further restricted more 
categories of non-citizen in the population. By not integrating permanent residents as part of South 
Africa’s population, the amendment aimed to alienate and exclude more foreigners and thus contain 
them. Therefore, the amendment to s1(xvii) shows that antagonism had played a more decisive role in 
the shaping of the Immigration Bill.  
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• Section 8: Reducing the number of days given to foreigners to appeal adverse rulings 
The DHA’s amendment to s8 of the 2002 Immigration Bill which was drafted to provide foreigners 
sufficient time to prepare for appeal has undermined foreigners’ rights to a just and fair trial and is 
against the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. The amendment reduced the number of 
days for foreigners to appeal adverse immigration decisions against them from the original 20 days to 3 
days. In the original Immigration Act 13 of 2002 s 8 sets out clear adjudication and review procedures 
for foreigners who are affected by an adverse immigration decision (Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, 
2002: s8). 
Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, 2002: s8 Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, as amended, 
2004: s8 
Adjudication and review procedures 
8. (1) Before making a determination adversely 
affecting a person, the Department shall notify 
the contemplated decision and related motivation 
to such affected person and give such person at 
least 10 calendar days to make representations, 
after which the Department shall notify such 
person that either such decision has been 
withdrawn or modified, or that it shall become 
effective, subject to subsection (2). 
(2) Within 20 calendar days of its notification, the 
person aggrieved by an effective decision of the 
Department may appeal against it— 
(a) to the Director-General, who may reverse or 
modify it within 10 calendar days, failing which 
the decision shall be deemed to have been 
confirmed; or 
(b) within 20 calendar days of modification or 
confirmation by the Director- General, if any, to 
the Minister, who may reverse or modify it within 
20 calendar days, failing which the decision shall 
be deemed to have been confirmed, and be final, 
provided that in exceptional circumstances or 
when such person stands to be deported as a 
consequence of such decision— 
Substitution of section 8 of Act 13 of 2002 
9. The following section is hereby substituted for 
section 8 of the principal Act: 
"Representations to Director-General 
8. (1) An immigration officer who refuses entry to any 
person or finds any person to be an illegal foreigner 
shall inform that person on the prescribed form that 
he or she may in writing request the Director-General 
to review that decision and— 
(a) if he or she arrived by means of a conveyance 
which is on the point of departing and is not to call at 
any other port of entry in the Republic, that request 
shall without delay be submitted to the Director 
General; or 
(b) in any other case than the one provided for in 
paragraph (a), that request shall be submitted to the 
Director-General within three days after that decision. 
(2) A person who was refused entry or was found to 
be an illegal foreigner and who has requested a 
review of such a decision— 
(a) in a case contemplated in subsection (l)(a), and 
who has not received an answer to his or her request 
by the time the relevant conveyance departs, shall 
depart on that conveyance and shall await the 
outcome of the review outside the Republic; or 
(b) in a case contemplated in subsection (1)(b), shall 
not be removed from the Republic before the 
Director-General has confirmed the relevant 
decision." (Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, as 
amended, 2004: s8). 
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This original section 8 of  the 2002 Immigration Bill provided a foreigner who was affected by an 
adverse immigration decision with a ten calendar-day period to make representation and a 20-calendar 
day period to prepare to appeal against the adverse decision. The rationale behind this section was to 
ensure that foreigners would have adequate time to prepare for appeal. In contrast, the amendments 
2004 substituted s 8. The 10–calendar days provided in the 2002 bill was reduced to 3 days (s8 of the 
Immigration Act, 13 of 2002, as amended, 2004:). The Amendment Act further required foreign 
nationals who are adversely affected by a decision to wait for the outcome of the review outside the 
country.  
The Immigration Practitioners Association of South Africa (AIPSA) said that this shortened time 
period provided foreigners with no other mechanism in the Immigration Bill to repeal against an adverse 
immigration ruling.  
If a person is seeking to enter or apply for a status, Section 8 of the Act allows the applicant to be 
informed of a potentially adverse decision and to make representations, i.e. to supplement his/her 
application or to correct any misunderstandings regarding the application. In terms of Section 8 of 
the Bill this procedure is no longer available and there are no other provisions for this situation 
(AIPSA, 2004: 3e). 
Furthermore, the Western Cape Immigration Practitioners Forum (WCIPF) also viewed the amendment 
to section 8 countering Administrative Justice and human rights.  
Another major change in this Bill is the deletion of Section 8 of the Act. It is always tricky to 
balance the need for efficiency in Immigration Control and Administrative Justice and Human 
rights, especially when one has to legislate the movement of people, it is however an issue that, in 
this Bill, remains obscure and draconian and certainly falls short of the Preamble of the Bill states 
"immigration control is performed with the highest applicable standards of human rights protection" 
([WCIPF}’s submission to the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs on Immigration Amendment 
Act 2002, 22 July, 2004).  
Human rights organisations raised the concern that the amendment which replaced the original 
s8 of the 2002 Immigration Bill not only eliminated foreigners’ rights to be informed and make 
representations on an adverse immigration decision, it also falls short of regulating immigration control 
with the highest standards of human rights protection. The government’s decision to go ahead and 
replace s8 severely undermined foreign nationals’ rights and is a display of the government’s 
antagonism towards foreigners.  
• Section 34: Arresting foreigners without a warrant 
Section 34 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 allows immigration officers to arrest any illegal foreigners 
in the country without a warrant. It also made it the obligation of all citizens’ to identify themselves as 
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either a citizen, a permanent resident or a foreigner when requested by an immigration or police officer 
(Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, 2002: s34).  
Section 34 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 Section 34 in 2004 Amendment Act 
Without need for a warrant, an immigration officer 
may arrest an illegal foreigner or cause him or 
her to be arrested, and shall, irrespective of 
whether such foreigner is arrested, deport him or 
her or cause him or her to be deported and may, 
pending his or her deportation, detain him or her 
or cause him or her to be detained in a manner 
and at the place under the control or 
administration of the Department determined by 
the Director-General 
Without the need for a warrant, an immigration officer 
may arrest an illegal foreigner or cause him or her to 
be arrested, and shall, irrespective of whether such 
foreigner is arrested, deport him or her or cause him 
or her to be deported and may, pending his or her 
deportation, detain him or her or cause him or her to 
be detained in a manner and at a place determined 
by the Director-General (Immigration Act, No. 13 of 
2002, as amended, 2004: s34). 
It is evident that the DHA’s is firm in its stance to grant law enforcement officers the power to arrest 
foreigners without a warrant’ despite illegality around the matter. According to s 34, any person could 
be picked off from the street and be arrested. Nyamnjoh (2006) and Crush (2008) both note that black 
African foreigners are bearing the most negative effect of this type of arrest. Vahed and Desai (2010) 
also note that a number of cases have indicated that some South Africans were mistakenly wrongfully 
arrested.  
Compared to s 34 of the 2002Bill, Director-General’s increased. The 2004 amendment to s 34 
granted the Director-General the sole power to determine the place and manner in which 
undocumented foreigners could be detained.  
Foreign nationals faced with ‘an obscure and draconian procedure that certainly falls short of 
the Preamble of the Bill which states ”immigration control is performed with the highest applicable 
standards of human rights protection“(Association of Immigration Practitioners of South Africa AISPA, 
2004:3). 
AIPSA was of the opinion that foreign nationals should be afforded the same privileges as 
citizens in terms of bail conditions when they are found to have committed certain low-level criminal 
activities. Arresting foreigners without a warrant or denying foreigners bail on the basis of nationalities 
is discriminatory. In the quote below, AIPSA suggested for foreigners having found to have committed 
lesser crimes be given the option of bails just as citizens did.  
We believe that any foreigner that is suspected of a contravention of the Act must at the very least 
be treated equally to a suspected low level criminal offender and the Immigration Officer must be 
entitled to require an "Immigration Bail" for an illegal foreigner. If any foreigner has a status, but is 
suspected of being in contravention thereof, and he/she or she is able to pay a fixed security 
deposit (or provide a written indemnity by a South African citizen) and provide proof of residence at 
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a physical address (equivalent of bail) he/she or she should be granted an Immigration Bail, 
subject to any other necessary conditions such as regular reporting at an office of the Department, 
and thereby have the opportunity to appeal the decision, or make representations to the Director 
General, without being threatened with detention. We submit that this approach would be 
consistent with Judge Pagan's recent report on our prisons, that our prisons and detention facilities 
are overcrowded, and that it is prudent to consider alternative means to detention whenever 
possible. We .also believe that a person, who then wants to pursue his remedies in terms of the 
review procedures, would have to timeously pursue his review, and strictly comply with the 
conditions of his bail, failing which the bail will be forfeited and he/she will then be deported. We 
believe that this will be an appropriate procedure that will generate a lot of income for the 
Department and will discipline applicants in a suitable way to maintain the validity of their 
residence in the Republic (Association of Immigration Practitioners of South Africa [AIPSA]’s 
submission to the DHA on Immigration Amendment Bill, 2004).  
 
In its submission, the Western Cape Immigration Practitioners Forum (WCIPF) drew attention 
to the motivation for not renewing one’s visa in a timeous manner. It could be possible that a foreign 
national who was so busy with work and making a contribution to South Africa and forgot to renew visa. 
It could also be someone which defrauded the DHA officers when entering the country. WCIPF 
believed that the government needed to make a distinction between them.  
Different considerations and procedures should apply in each situation. It can hardly be 
appropriate that a father or four who has had an own business temporary residence permit for four 
years in respect of an IT company, who is found helping his/her neighbour building a wall, or who 
simply forgot to renew his permit timeously, should be subject to the same risk of arrest, detention 
and review procedures as a person seeking to enter a port of entry with a counterfeit passport 
(Western Cape Immigration Practitioners Forum [WCIPF]’s submission to Portfolio Committee on 
Home Affairs on Immigration Amendment Act 2004, 22 July 2004). 
 
Both quotations shown above reiterate what migration scholars have described as the lack of 
rights secured for foreign nationals in South Africa (Pieterse, 2000; Kapindu, 2011; Landau & Segatti, 
2011; Klotz, 2012; Gordon, 2015). Foreigners are treated differently to South African citizens after they 
are found to have committed crimes. Whereas the arrest of foreigners without a warrant is 
unconceivable for South Africans as it would be regarded as a violation of the South African’s 
constitutional rights, the Immigration Act permits foreigners to be arrested without a warrant. The 
government’s refusal to heed the advice of stakeholders such as WCIPF and AIPSA indicates  that 
antagonism towards foreigners had outweighed the respect for equality and Constitution and this 
section means that, unlike citizens, when foreign nationals are found to have committed a crime, they 
are subjected to a different set of standards which are in contravention to what equality and the 
Constitution stand and discriminatory. 
• Community enforcement approach  
A community enforcement approach aims to detect and report suspicious foreigners to law enforcement 
agencies. , There was an attempt by senior officials within the Department, as part of the DHA’s internal 
migration control policy, to advance a community enforcement approach as a method to control and 
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regulate migration in South Africa from 1998 to 2004 (Vigneswaran, 2008: 784). The method aims to 
shift the DHA’s administrative and policy focus from ‘border control to community and workplace 
inspection’. The provision is  articulated in s40 of the Act.  It makes it compulsory for all accommodation 
businesses to keep a register on their guests’ nationalities and to record the type of visa they have 
(Immigration Act. 13 of 2002 s40). By requiring all guests to indicate their nationalities and for 
accommodation establishments to keep a register, this section effectively turns these business and 
accommodation establishments into de facto immigration agents. Furthermore, section 40 also contains 
a penalty charge holding business owners responsible should any illegal foreigners were found on their 
premises. Hence, it hypothetically presumed that all business owners were privy to foreigners’ visa 
information and consequently shall be responsible for any illegal alien on the premises. premises. 
Although the DHA’s rationale behind the community enforcement approach was due to its limited  
resources and was thus   unable  to patrol South Africa’s porous borders effectively, section 40 is 
nevertheless a drastic measure for accommodation owners (DHA] 1999; Vigneswaran, 2008: 784).  
The amendment made to Section 40 of the Immigration Bill in 2004 took the community 
enforcement measure one step further. It added more detailed prescribed punishment to owners 
providing accommodation whose premises were found to have undocumented foreign nationals, 
effectively turning accommodation establishments into sharing the role of an immigration officer. 
Section 40 of the Immigration Bill in 2002 stated that 
Accommodation 
40. (1) Any business offering overnight accommodation shall make a good faith effort to identify its 
customers as citizens or status holders and shall report in the prescribed form to the Department 
any failure to effect such identification. 
(2) When subsection (1) is not complied with and an illegal foreigner is found on any premises 
referred to in that subsection, it shall be presumed that such illegal foreigner was harboured by the 
person who has control over such premises, unless prima facie evidence to the contrary is 
adduced. 
The 2004 amendment substituted the above, specifically adding that business owners would be liable 
for any undocumented foreigners found on their premises. This addition forced all accommodation 
owners to check their tenants and residents’ nationalities and visas.  
Substitution of section 40 of Act 13 of 2002 
39. The following section is hereby substituted for section 40 of the principal Act:  
"Keeping of registers of lodgers by certain persons 
40. (1) The occupier of any premises, whether furnished or unfurnished where lodging or sleeping 
accommodation is provided for payment or reward shall, if those premises fall within a prescribed 
class, in the prescribed manner keep a register of all persons who are provided with : lodging or 
sleeping accommodation thereon, and every such person shall sign the register and furnish therein 
the prescribed particulars regarding himself or herself. 
(2) Every occupier of premises referred to in subsection (1) shall, when required to do so by an 
immigration officer or police officer, produce the register referred to in that subsection for 
inspection. 
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(3) Any person who— 
(a) contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of subsection (1) or (2); 
(b) gives false or incorrect particulars for the purposes of subsection (1); or 
(c) hinders any officer referred to in subsection (2) in the performance of his or her functions shall 
be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 12 months. 
Opponents of the community enforcement approach, such as those in the quotations below, 
argued that the policy would create a police state in which human rights would be violated. It would also 
exacerbate the xenophobia endured by foreign African nationals. The consequence of such a policy 
would mostly be borne by black South Africans and black African migrants, given the large number of 
migrant workers from neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe. As most citizens 
are not trained immigration officers, the mechanisms that they would use to identify foreigners would 
incite unnecessary fear amongst people and resulted in racial profiling on the basis of physical 
attributes such as skin colour,  vaccination marks, style of dress, , accent, etc. It is highly likely that 
such methods of identification could result in mistakes. Furthermore, foreigners may pose health risks 
to the South African population for concealing their medical history to avoid being victims of  community 
enforcement  (submission to  the DHA on  the White Paper on International Migration, [SAHRC], 11 
January 2000; submission to the DHA on Immigration Bill, Lawyers for Human Rights [LHR], 2002; Mr 
Esselaar from Business Unity South Africa, Immigration Amendment Bill: Hearing, [PMG], 3 August 
2004). 
This policy is firmly based on the apartheid policy where people were constantly harassed to 
assert their right to be in South Africa. Because of the nature of xenophobia in South Africa, as 
practised by both citizens and authorities, the largest number of people falling foul of this 
enforcement policy will be black South Africans. In particular, people who are darker skinned will 
more often be accused of being Illegal immigrants and therefore subject to institutionalised 
harassment. To enact legislation which institutionalises this policy will fall foul of the Constitution 
and be open to Constitutional challenge (Submission to DHA on White Paper on International 
Migration, [SAHRC], 11 January 2000).  
We also note with concern that the Department of Home Affairs wants to create “a climate of 
cooperation with other organs of the state...to encourage them to take responsibility” in the 
implementation of the Bill and further “create a climate of cooperation with community organs of 
civil society...to encourage them to cooperate with the Department”. I am here referring to the 
objectives as set out in section 29 of the Bill. These intentions, we argue could only reflect the 
Departments vision to encourage communities and organs of the state to become “informers” by 
detecting and reporting on suspected illegal foreigners, The provisions also risk, as highlighted by 
the Johannesburg Child Welfare, to turn all government structures, including the children’s court 
and those responsible for justice, welfare and education into “snitch” organisations (Submission to 
DHA on Immigration Bill, Lawyers for Human Rights [LHR], 2002). 
Despite the objections from human rights activists and organisations, s 40 was implemented. 
The implementation of the clause in the immigration Bill again reiterates the lack of rights for foreigners 
in South Africa as foreigners are deprived of their human rights and thus subjected to surveillance in 
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the communities in which they live (Pieterse, 2000; Kapindu, 2011; Landau & Segatti, 2011; Klotz, 
2012; Gordon, 2015).  
Stakeholders’ positions on antagonism vis-à-vis immigration policy changes 
The policy changes discussed above are clear evidence of the government’s antagonism to foreigners, 
thus further reducing their rights and increasing the precariousness of their lives. The government’s 
antagonism towards foreigners, regardless of foreigners’ skills level, was a factor that impacted the 
immigration policy. It was this antagonism that pervaded the government and shaped the ideational 
environment which Archer (1995) refers to as ‘cultural elaboration’ and in which the DoH found itself 
when the recruitment policy on foreign doctors was drafted.   
These policy changes had implications for foreigners in South Africa. Firs, the removal of public 
inputs as stated in the Preamble (c) and the changes made to the composition of the Immigration 
Advisory Board (IAB) show that there was a deliberate effort by the government to weaken the 
influence of the non-governmental sector and to undermine foreigners’ rights collectively A number of 
sectors, namely, the private sector, human rights organisations, higher education and research sectors 
supported immigration but, despite this this government  became less accountable as it pursued its 
strategy for the government to push forward a more restrictive and national sovereignty oriented 
immigration policy.  
Secondly, with the removal of the Department of Home Affair’s obligation to combat 
xenophobia in its 2004 Amendment Bill, this opened up more loopholes for xenophobic attacks to take 
place. Crush and Ramachandra (2014) note that attacks on foreign nationals appear to be on the 
increase since 2005. Ms Burchmans from the Refugee Forum of Congo presented anecdotal evidence 
given by refugees on how they were abused by the South African law enforcement agencies and that a 
Home Affairs employee had asked a female refugee to trade sex for refugee status (Burchmans from 
the Refugee Forum of Congo Parliament, 26 Aug 2005). It thus could be well appreciated that systemic 
xenophobia was prevalent among law enforcement and government employees. The removal 
exacerbated the systemic xenophobia that foreigners bore the brunt of the injustice and discrimination.  
 Finally, the various amendments that restrict foreigners’ rights have undermined their position. 
The removal of the DHA’s responsibility to respond to public inputs and the reduction of the number of 
members from civil society to serve on the Immigration Advisory Board undermined foreigners’ rights 
collectively. The restrictions that subject permanent residents to foreign visa rules; reduction of the 
period in which r foreigners may appeal an immigration decision; the justification for arresting foreigners 
without a warrant; and the requirement of the community to point out foreigners, all  undermined the 
rights of the individual foreigner. Foreigners were henceforth subjected to more restrictions in their daily 
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lives. These policy changes show that in the formulation of South Africa’s immigration policy, the 
greater influence was wielded by those that opposed immigration. Although there were some that 
advocated for immigration and a more humane treatment of foreign nationals, they were not powerful 
and influential enough to make a meaningful difference to the immigration policy. Without support and 
empowerment, the conditions for foreigners such as their right to work and to be employed remained 
highly restrictive.  Of all the stakeholders, the most important and the most decisive role was 
determined by the government and  Through the examination of those amendments mentioned above, 
it becomes clear that immigration policy became more restrictive and the lack of rights for foreigners 
more evident. Government’s approach to immigration, as described above, shows that the DHA itself 
was antagonistic towards foreigners and was proactively taking steps to reduce the chances of having 
more foreigners in the country. The antagonism towards foreigners shared by both the government and 
opponent stakeholders implied that the creation of  facilitating immigration system for skilled foreigners 
such as foreign doctors had to overcome the ideational antagonism as negative perceptions about 
foreigners were still the predominant narrative shaping  South Africa’s immigration policy. In order to 
attract skilled foreigners, the lack of rights for foreigners in South Africa must be addressed and the 
management of foreign nationals must be done within the confines of human rights (Pieterse, 2000; 
Kapindu, 2011; Landau & Segatti, 2011; Klotz, 2012; Gordon, 2015).  
Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the findings on stakeholders’ attitudes and positions on immigration and how 
stakeholders responded to society’s antagonism towards foreigners. Also, this chapter presented 
notable changes in the immigration policy. By showing stakeholders’ attitudes on skilled immigration 
and the notable changes, it sought to illuminate the powerful influence of antagonism towards 
foreigners that predominated South Africa’s immigration policy as well as government’s role in 
perpetuating that antagonism.  
The findings showed that there were two contrasting types of responses from stakeholders in 
response to society’s antagonism towards foreigners. The first category of stakeholders rejected 
society’s antagonistic attitude towards foreigners and immigration. Those stakeholders included 
academic and research organisations, the private sector, human rights organisations as well as a small 
number of politicians. The other category of stakeholders used society’s antagonism towards foreigners 
to push for stricter immigration control. These stakeholders included organised labour, some individual 
South African citizens as well as a number of ANC and IFP politicians and some high-profiled public 
servants.    
98 | P a g e  
 
Notable changes in the findings showed that a heightened level of antagonism towards 
foreigners from the government occurred during the deliberations about the 2004 Amendment Bill as 
immigration policy became more restrictive from 2002 to the Amendment Act in 2004. This chapter 
analysed and summarised three changes in the immigration policy which had the effect of undermining 
foreigners’ rights in South Africa. These indicate that the DHA and the government’s restrictive 
approach to immigration. When comparing the changes in the immigration policy in relation to 
stakeholders’ positions on immigration, it becomes evident that the predominant society value –
antagonism towards foreign nationals, had a more decisive role in shaping the Immigration Bill from 
2000 to 2006. The ideational environment, the strong antagonism towards foreigners and the rejection 
of their being in South Africa, was shared by those stakeholders that wanted stricter immigration control 
and the government. It provided the ideational environment in which the DoH drafted its policy in 2006 
which discouraged the recruitment and employment of foreign doctors.  
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Chapter 7 Finding III: Stakeholders’ responses and the Immigration 
Act: Skills shortage and unemployment 
Overview 
Following the previous chapter, this chapter continues to speak to sub-research question 3. It aims to 
describe and outline how stakeholders involved in the drafting process of the immigration policy 
responded to two structural conditions, namely, the skills shortage and high unemployment, in order to 
pursue or to object to skilled immigration in the immigration policy during the period of 2000 to 2006. 
This chapter first present a detailed report of different stakeholders’ positions and responses to address 
the society’s structural conditions –skills shortage and high unemployment, then it outlines those 
stakeholders’ immigration solutions to tackle the challenges. Thereafter, this chapter compares those 
stakeholders’ immigration solutions with the policy changes in order to determine which stakeholders 
had a more decisive role in the shaping of the final policy. By means of the stakeholders’ responses, 
this chapter discovers amendments which were made to the Immigration Act such as the quota work 
permit, the extension of s 19 (5)’s intra-company permit, the removal of a yearly limit to the issuance of 
a permanent residency permit as per s 27 were indications that showed the government’s dilemma in 
supporting a skilled immigration policy whilst assuring the pervasive opponents of skilled immigration 
that national workers’ interest would not be affected. Furthermore, the labour certification process and 
the Training Permit Fee were both protectionist measures to ensure that national workers’ job 
opportunities were prioritised. Through the findings, this chapter shows that although the government 
was engaging in a skilled immigration policy, its effort was constrained by forces such as organised 
labour and high-profiled ANC politicians who objected to skilled immigration. Thus, it was difficult for the 
DHA to implement a purely skills-driven immigration policy that only taking into account the pursuit of 
economic interest.  
What were stakeholders’ responses and their proposed strategies towards skilled 
immigration?  
This section analyses how stakeholders’ attitudes towards skilled immigration were reflected in their 
interaction and responses towards the two structural conditions in society –high unemployment and 
skills shortage. The evidence presented below show stakeholders’ engagements with government 
through Parliament’s hearings and written submissions to Parliament as well as government officials’ 
approaches to skilled immigration as shown by Members of Parliament’s comments and remarks and 
the Minister’s speeches. The purpose of presenting these evidences is to understand: 
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• Who were those stakeholders? 
• How did these stakeholders respond to skilled immigration facing South Africa’s skills shortage 
and high unemployment? 
• What was the stakeholder’s proposed immigration solution? 
As explained in previous chapters, the South African labour force was characterised by its oversupply 
of unskilled labour and a shortage in the supply of skilled workers (Barker, 2007; [CDE], 2010; Crush, 
2014). Whereas the number of skilled foreigners entering South Africa has been on the decline since 
1994, there is a steady increase in the number of skilled South African professionals leaving the 
country ([CDE], 2000). In the medical field, Clemens and Petterson (2008: 11) record that about 7363 
South African doctors were working overseas in eight major destination countries18 in 2000. This 
number accounted for 21per cent of the total of South African registered doctors registered at HPCSA 
in that year. Crush’s (2014: 7) record shows that this figure increased to 13,000 in 2005. The high 
number of doctors leaving the country, compounded by a low number of skilled foreigners entering 
South Africa, implies that there is a skills deficit in the health sector and that there was a need for the 
government to use a robust immigration policy to attract more foreign doctors. 
In addition to the skills shortage, South Africa also faced high unemployment rate (Fallon & de 
Silva, 1994; [DoL], 1998; May & Govender, 1998; Klasen & Woolards, 1999; Knight & Kingdon, 2005; 
Barker, 2007; Von Holdt, 2010). Black South Africans are shown to make up the bulk of the 
unemployed population (May & Govender, 1998: 2). The government’s approach to address high 
unemployment was to implement an employment equity policy to address skewed racial imbalances 
within the labour force (Landau, 2011; Bernstein, 2014; Kahn, 2015). Since high unemployment was 
also caused by the large number of unskilled workers in South Africa who could not meet the demands 
of a growing number of knowledge-based industries, government also embarked on intensive skills 
development programmes such as the establishment of the Sectors Education and Training Authority 
(SETAs) to upskill and empower the South African workforce in order to change the situation (Skills 
Supply and Demand in South Africa DHET, 2016). Key stakeholders’ inputs between the stakeholders 
that supported skilled immigration and those that objected to skilled immigration show that 
stakeholders’ positions on skilled immigration diverged because of stakeholders’ views on these two 
structural conditions and the appropriate strategies to deal with those two conditions.  
 
 
18 These eight countries were Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, Spain, United States and the United Kingdom.  
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Stakeholders who supported skilled immigration 
 
Those stakeholders who supported skilled immigration asked the government to devise an immigration 
policy that could make foreigners’ entry easier and less bureaucratic. In their view, an enabling 
immigration system that could attract skilled foreigners was a viable way to supply skilled labour for the 
domestic labour market and fill the skills shortage gap. Furthermore, as more skilled foreigners are 
participating in South Africa’s economy, skills transfer would also simultaneously happen which could 
accomplish the objectives of skills development among the domestic workforce. As more South 
Africans are upskilled and economy grows, the high unemployment rate among its citizens will also 
drop.  
The quotations below show the two Members of Parliament, Mr Waters and Mr Skhosana, who 
were among the few politicians that supported South Africa to implement a skilled immigration policy 
and also outlined the reasons for their giving such support. Mr Waters argued that South Africa needed 
to compete with other countries for talents in a globalised economy. Facilitating the movements of 
skilled foreigners would also create jobs and reduce unemployment for South Africans. Mr Skhosana 
urged people to see skilled foreigners as assets that could contribute to South Africa’s economic 
development and not t as a drain on the country’s resource  
Mr Waters stated that South Africa is participating in a global economy and must compete. He 
argued that South Africa cannot isolate itself. He agreed that the unemployment rate is high but 
submitted that attracting foreign skilled people would create jobs (Mr Mike Water, Member of 
Parliament, White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, Source: PMG Database, 16 May 
2000). 
Mr Skhosana (ANC) commented that whereas South Africans feel threatened by skilled foreigners, 
it should be the other way around and South Africans should see that the foreigners are helping 
the country on its path to development (Mr Skhosana, Member of Parliament, White Paper on 
International Migration: Hearing, Source: PMG Database, 16 May 2000). 
The academic and research sector also supported skilled immigration. The quotation 
below from the Centre for Development and Enterprise shows that this public policy research 
organisation believed that by enabling skilled immigration, skilled foreigners would bring their 
expertise to the country and simultaneously address both skills shortage and high 
unemployment. Although there were suggestions, mostly argued by stakeholders who objected 
to skilled immigration, that it should not be promoted because government should place more 
emphasis on local skills development in order for South Africa to become sustainable to supply 
its own labour force, the CDE rejects this argument and states that training South African 
workers and upskilling workforce takes time and that although local skills development is 
necessary, it cannot deliver an immediate solution to address the skills shortage challenge.  
102 | P a g e  
 
Although there is a need to train more people in SA this will take time. SA needs as much skilled 
people as possible for the next five to 10 years from abroad. CDE is not in favour of a point system 
as foreigners will be more expensive to employ. Disadvantaged communities will not lose out 
because of skilled immigrants. The SA economy should not be seen as a fixed cake. A growing 
cake (economy) with bigger slices for everyone is needed. The only way to achieve this is through 
the importation of skills. Skilled immigrants should be regarded as fixed capital of investments. 
Internal training must improve but entrepreneurs are urgently needed. It is also very problematic 
that there is a falling number of matriculants that have mathematics and science on higher grade 
(CDE’s response to White Paper on International Migration, February 2000). 
The higher education sector also supported skilled immigration because of the shortage of 
skills that institutions in it had experienced in sourcing qualified employees (Ms A Daly, an academic 
personnel manager from the University of the Witwatersrand, White Paper on International Migration: 
Hearing, Source: PMG Database, 31 July 2000). Ms A Daly asserted that South Africa needed to 
attract skilled foreigners to fill the skills shortage gap. She also very astutely pointed out that the 
government’s political atmosphere that focused on the pursuit of an employment equity policy to recruit 
black South Africans further exposed and deepened the severity of skills shortage. Because of the 
rigged Bantustan education under apartheid, a large percentage of the black South African population 
had been trained to work in labour-intensive industries which resulted in the lack of qualified black 
South African candidates to fill the positions that required a Master’s or a PhD degree in the higher 
education sector (Barker, 2007). Although every effort had been made to advance local skills 
development, Ms Daly expressed the similar view to that of the  CDE  that the training of skilled workers 
would take time before South Africa could  ‘reach a self-sufficiency’ in terms of skills supply and 
demand.  
There are two primary reasons why universities need to be able to employ foreigners  
(a) The first is the lack of suitably qualified black South Africans. The pool of black academically 
qualified people that they sometimes command salaries three times greater than universities 
can offer. Few students, black or white pursue an academic career, and the secondary 
education system, as yet, has failed to produce the critical mass of black students required. 
While Wits is making every effort to enlarge the pool of black academics through targeted 
undergraduate programmes and increased postgraduate intake, it will take some years before 
reaching a degree of self-sufficiency. In the meantime the only way to provide role models for 
black students is by recruiting black non-South Africans… 
(b) The second reason why universities need to employ non-South Africans is the basic need for 
intellectual renewal. To participate fully in international debate it is necessary to bring foreign 
academics to South Africa, as well as enabling South Africans to gain experience overseas (Ms A 
Daly, an academic personnel manager from the University of the Witwatersrand, White Paper on 
International Migration: Hearing, 31 July 2000). 
The private sector, among supporter stakeholders of skilled immigration was instrumental in 
supporting skilled immigration because of their own predicaments. The lack of skills in South Africa 
stagnated the development of many businesses and the bureaucracy around the immigration policy 
made it a time-consuming and frustrating experience should businesses consider importing 
professionals with scarce skills from outside the country. Business South Africa, a business association 
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representing the private sector, pointed out that the lack of skills was the reason behind South Africa’s 
inability to grow the economy in knowledge-based industries (Business South Africa’s submission to 
White Paper on International Migration, 9 May 2000).  
BSA is of the opinion that South Africa cannot attract enough skilled migrants to make up for the 
present brain drain. If our knowledge-based industries and commercial enterprises do not grow 
they will train fewer people under our SETA-based schemes and businesses will not be able to 
absorb those that are trained. We shall then effectively export our own labour by purchasing the 
product from outside South Africa instead of creating it here with skills from whatever source is 
available (Business South Africa’s Submission to White Paper on International Migration, 9 May 
2000).   
With the slow growth of South Africa’s economy, unemployment would rise because the economy could 
not absorb the trained professionals. Hence, the business sector argued that the importation of foreign 
skilled workers could broaden South Africa’s skills pool, accelerate its economic growth and create 
more work opportunities that could then reduce the unemployment rate.  
This table on the next page summarised the above stakeholders’ views and their inputs and 
comments on skilled immigration. It also includes what those stakeholders’ proposed immigration 
strategies were to address skills shortage and high unemployment. As the table below illustrates, 
politicians such as Mr M Water and Mr Skosana were concerned by the skills crisis which prompted 
them to propose strategies that support skilled immigration. Research organisation CDE and Ms Daly 
from the higher education sector, shared the same concern on skills shortage and also proposed 
strategies that support skilled immigration. For the private sector, the table below indicates that 
Business Unity South Africa was concerned about the lack of skills and its impact on business growth. 












Sector Stakeholder(s) Enablements/Constraints Proposed Immigration Strategies 
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Politician Mr M Water, MP South Africa was losing in the 
global competition for talents 
(skills shortage) 
Attracting skilled foreigners to 
create jobs 
Politician Mr Skosana, MP Skilled foreigners can help SA to 
develop economy (high 
unemployment) 






Training and upskilling workforce 
takes time (skills shortage) 





Ms A Daly (Wits 
University) 
Lack of qualified black South 
African candidates (high 
unemployment) 
Importing skilled foreign 
professionals to fill the skills 
shortage gap 
  Importance of intellectual 
renewal (Skills shortage) 
 
Private sector Business Unity 
South Africa 
Struggle to grow knowledge-
based industries because of 
skills shortage (skills shortage 
and high unemployment) 
Importing skilled foreigners to grow 
knowledge-based industries 
 
To sum up, stakeholders that supported skilled immigration believed that by removing restrictions on 
employing skilled foreigners and deregulating bureaucracy in South Africa’s immigration policy, South 
Africa would then be able to attract more skilled foreigners to fill up skills shortage gap. Skills 
development for local citizens will also take place simultaneously while skilled foreigners are filling in 
the skills shortage gap. As more skills are transferred to South African workers and the economy 
grows, more jobs will be created and unemployment amongst citizens would decrease.  
Stakeholders that opposed skilled immigration 
Conversely, there were stakeholders who opposed skilled immigration. These stakeholders 
emphasised to using the training of South African workers instead of immigration as a strategy to 
address the skills shortage and high unemployment. These stakeholders embraced a nationalist 
narrative and asked government to prioritise the training of local workers and to place restrictions on 
the employment of foreign nationals. The purpose of imposing restrictions on skilled foreigners was to 
ensure that employers would exhaust their means to train South African workers. Should skilled 
foreigners become a labour force that was easily accessible, these stakeholders believed that it would 
result in an overreliance on foreign skilled labour and diminish national workers’ job opportunities. 
Employers would be disincentivised to train local workers if skills could be sourced from outside the 
country easily. So by making skilled immigration more difficult, the intention of making skilled 
immigration more difficult for foreigners and for South African employers to employ foreign skilled 
labour so that national workers’ interest (being upskilled and trained with skills) and job opportunities 
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would be prioritised. The DHA’s White Paper in 1999, as seen in the quotation below, mirrored the 
DHA’s view on immigration that skilled immigration could not be made too easy. This was an accurate 
description of the sentiment shared by stakeholders that opposed skilled immigration. This explains the 
DHA’s rationale in justifying its quota system and labour certification process to ensure that measures 
are in place to avoid making immigration a business for all foreign nationals.  
In fact, for as long as employing a foreigner is marginally and substantial more expensive and 
inconvenient for an employer than employing a South African, any alien employed in South Africa 
would by definition fill a position for which a qualified South African is not available (White Paper 
on International Migration (DHA, 1999: 31). 
Many stakeholders who objected to skilled immigration shared what the White Paper stated, as 
indicated above, and believed that skilled foreigners’ presence in South Africa would be detrimental to 
South African workers. A number of politicians such as the Members of Parliament, as shown below 
objected to skilled immigration (Members of Parliament, White Paper on International Migration: 
hearing, 15 May 2000, [PMG]). The quotations below show that Ms Maunye, Mr Chikane as well as two 
other unidentified Members of Parliament on the Home Affairs Committee expressed their view that 
local skills development to train South African workers was a better way to close the skills shortage gap 
and thus South Africa should emphasise more on training locals  and not rely on foreign skills.  
Ms Maggie Maunye (ANC) asked why the CDE not recommends to businesses that they train 
South Africans, rather than inviting skilled people from outside of the country. 
Mr Chikane (ANC) remarked that the country should focus on training, rather than immigration. Mr 
Chikane (ANC) reminded Committee Members of their responsibility to the electorate and to the 
process of building now to develop assets for the future. He mentioned the importance of making 
sure immigrants are not criminals. He mentioned that he sees the disparities of South Africa's past 
are still in place, but that opening the doors to immigrants is not a solution.  
A Committee Member commented that allowing skilled people to come and work in South Africa is 
a vicious circle, since these people tend to want to stay after their contracts have been completed. 
Another Member asked how immigration would be controlled without quotas or a point system 
(White Paper on International Migration: hearing, 16 May 2000, Source: PMG). 
Trade union organisations such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) and the 
Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) were all vocally opposed to easing restrictions on the 
importation of skills. Trade unions’ opposition to skilled immigration was characterised by its 
persistency as it continued to regard the importation of foreign skills as inherently in conflict with local 
skills development. Given South Africa’s low-skilled workforce as a result of the historical apartheid 
legacy, it is understandable why organised labour would be so fervently objecting to easing restrictions 
to facilitate skilled foreigners’ movements (Lewis, 2002; Barker, 2007: 205; CDE, 2010; Crush, 2014; 
Kahn, 2015). Organised labour’s view was that the easing of restrictions on skilled foreigners would 
result in more skilled foreigners in South Africa and negatively impact the employment and training 
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opportunities of South African workers. Hence, the quotes below were taken directly from trade unions’ 
submissions to Parliament on the Immigration Bill and show how those COSATU-led joint submissions 
affirmed their opposing stance to skilled immigration because of their fear of local workers losing 
opportunities to be trained and upskilled.  
Principle 6; Immigration policies aimed at attracting skilled workers must not jeopardise the priority 
of developing skills in the South African workforce and we should not compromise the Department 
of Labour's programme for improved skills training on the basis that attempts are being made to 
attract skilled labour from other countries (COSATU’s submission to Parliament on White Paper on 
International Migration, dated 11 February 2000, Source: Sabinet Legal Database).  
We are concerned about the impact that the overemphasis on highly skilled workers will have on 
national programmes prioritising the development of local skills. Although we welcome provisions 
requiring that corporates provide training programmes for South Africans, this in itself is not 
sufficient. Strategies must be developed both to retain and develop local skills in areas of 
shortage. Failure to do so will only further entrench dependence on foreign skills and will 
discourage local skills development (COSATU’s joint submission with NACTU and FEDUSA on 
Immigration Bill, 18 April 2002).  
Joint submissions led and made by COSATU did not show its strong criticism towards skilled 
immigration until 2006. In the submissions made by trade union organisations in 2000, 2002 and 2004, 
it was emphasised that skilled immigration should not undermine South African national workers’ skills 
development programmes. Although the point was emphasised that skilled immigration should not 
undermine the country’s effort in training South African workers, trade unions did not boldly state their 
objection towards skilled immigration policy, nor did they vent their frustration of the private sector on its 
support for skilled immigration until 2006. COSATU in its 2004 submission still hoped that the 
government would consult with key stakeholders in order to work out a ‘balanced approach for labour 
market stability and reduce long-term reliance on foreign skills’ (COSATU’s submission to Parliament 
on Immigration Amendment Act, 2004, dated 5 August 2004, Source: Sabinet Legal Database). It was 
not until 2006 that trade unions’ objection towards skilled immigration became evident. Government, 
although shown in the preceding chapter as antagonistic to foreigners, agreed with stakeholders who 
supported skilled immigration that the importation of skills is key to address domestic skills shortage. As 
shown below during the 2006 Immigration Amendment Act deliberation process, trade unions 
organisations expressed their exasperation at the government’s  focus to using skilled immigration as a 
strategy to deal with skills shortage and its failure to recognise the possible repercussions of a massive 
wave of skilled immigrants on the South African labour market. Furthermore, they felt let down by the 
government’s failure to acknowledge their calls to prioritise South African. The quotation below also 
shows organised labour’s direct frustration at the private sector for its supporting role behind 
government’s skilled immigration policy.  
[T]his has over time appeared to have fallen away in deference to narrow economic interests, and 
we would argue in direct response to lobbying by the business community…The business 
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community has not shown a meaningful commitment to local skills development, preferring instead 
to apply pressure to remove regulations that prescribe investment in local skills.  This disregards 
the fact that the under-development of skills in South Africa and the region is rooted in apartheid 
and colonial history. Thus there are moral as well as economic imperatives to promoting local skills 
development.  Accordingly, we are of the view that the targeting of foreign skills should be 
implemented in a manner that does not compromise local skills development or exacerbate labour 
market instability (COSATU & NUM’s Submission for Immigration Amendment Act 2006, 10 
August 2006). 
Their exasperation could have been caused the government’s 2006 decision in to relax the restrictions 
on the employment of skilled foreigners. For instance, the extension of the intra-company visa and the 
reiteration on its skilled immigration policy by the Minister in 2006 to the Chamber of Commerce were 
both demonstrations of the alliance between the government and those stakeholders who supported 
skilled immigration As stated above, the trade unions organisations frustration and concern was that by 
allowing more skilled foreigners in, national workers’ job opportunities would be adversely affected and 
that even the prioritisation of training local workers would be undermined.  
In opposition to  the stakeholders who supported skilled immigration, trade unions such as 
COSATU and National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) lobbied for the government to undertake a 
comprehensive long-term immigration policy review with the possibility to remove the immigration 
policy’s emphasis on skilled immigration. In the submission made by COSATU and NUM in 2006 as 
shown below, these two organisations called for government to abandon the economic-centric skilled 
immigration policy.  
Notwithstanding this there has been no indication as to when the Department intends to initiate the 
review process.  Whereas the introduction of the current Bill raises questions as to whether the 
Department has in fact abandoned the overhaul process altogether…we had previously pursued 
only the most urgent reforms affecting migrant workers on the understanding that there would be 
space at a later stage to address further concerns in the later process.  Accordingly, we urgently 
seek clarity from the Department as to whether the review process has in fact been abandoned 
and if not then what are the applicable time frames, in order that we may decide on how we pursue 
our concerns. 
In line with this we are calling on the Department to initiate as a matter of urgency a broad public 
consultative process, involving all stakeholders and NEDLAC, to develop a final immigration policy 
framework and new Immigration Act.  
It is of concern that formal immigration policy objectives, both locally and internationally, have been 
reduced to facilitating the importation of so-called scarce skills and addressing potential threats to 
internal security.  This has meant the relegation of key developmental and transformative 
objectives that would facilitate regional socio-economic development, such as the determination 
and implementation of immigration policy that is compatible with progressive labour, trade and 
industrial policy particularly within the SADC region (COSATU & NUM’s submission on 
Immigration Amendment Act, 10 August 2006) 
 
Stakeholder(s) Enablement/Constraint Proposed Immigration 
Strategies 
Ms Maunye, MP Local skills development Restricting immigration 
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Mr Chikane, MP 
Two other MPs on Home Affairs 
Portfolio Committee 
COSATU Retain South African skilled 
professionals 
Restricting immigration 
COSATU Over-reliance on foreign skills Restricting immigration 
COSATU Immigration policy appeased the 
private sector, undermined 
progress to achieve transformative 
goals 
Restricting immigration 
The above table summarised some of the key findings from the stakeholders in the dataset. As the 
table illustrates, some high-profile members of parliament such as Ms Maunye and Mr Chikane 
opposed skilled immigration because of their concern that it would limit the possibilities of South African 
workers from receiving training opportunities and be upskilled. Similarly, trade union organisations such 
as COSATU also held the same view which resulted in their opposition to skilled immigration. 
Furthermore, as the table shows, trade unions also show their hostility towards the private sector, 
accusing them of being non-cooperative towards the training of South African workers. Opponent 
stakeholders held negative views on skilled immigration. They inherently believed that supporting 
skilled immigration and skills development of national workers are irreconcilable, hence, they uniformly 
supported a nationalistic discourse to make immigration policy more restrictive for skilled foreigners so 
that only those with extremely specialised skills which could not be found in the South African labour 
market would be employed in South Africa.  
Government’s approach on skilled immigration 
Although immigration, borders and refugees are not directly mentioned in South Africa’s Constitution, 
the government and the DHA was of the view that it is part of the DHA’s legislative mandate to monitor 
and regulate the admission of non-citizens (DHA, 2014: 13). Therefore, the DHA’s role in the drafting of 
South Africa’s immigration policy was the most important. From the dataset collected during the period 
of 2000 to 2006, the government did agree with some stakeholders that using skilled foreigners as a 
strategy to boost the domestic skills pool and develop South Africa’s economy. The DHA’s support did 
not, however,  deter the government from adopting certain protectionist provisions in the immigration 
policy which were supported by sectors such as organised labour and politicians that opposed skilled 
immigration  and elements such as quota system and labour certification process. By putting the 
protectionist measures in place, the DHA appeased those anti-skilled immigration sections of the 
society that believed that skilled foreigners’ presence would negatively affect South African workers’ 
interests.  
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In a key address at the Old Assembly Chamber on the 6th  and  7tJuly  2000, the then Minister of 
Home Affairs delivered a speech titled Regulating Migration in the 21st Century: A South African 
Perspective in which one of the key highlights was the acknowledgement of  the urgent necessity to 
import scarce skills from outside the country in order to grow South Africa’s economy. Minister 
Buthelezi mentioned how important it was to 
enable our industry to acquire all the foreign skills it needs to grow - in spite of the keen 
international competition for skilled labour - while training South Africans (Minister of Home Affairs, 
Conference at Old Assembly Chamber, Cape Town, Source: Sabinet Legal Database, 6 to 7t July 
2000). 
South Africa’s need to attract skilled foreigners was mentioned again in the Minister’s 
presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Immigration Bill in 2002in which he stated 
we designed a system which tested the need for foreigners by relying on market dynamics, leaving 
employers to decide which foreigners they need, while we as a Government, would test the 
intensity of employers stated needs through a licensing fee. If an employer pays the licencing fee, 
which makes the foreigner more expensive than a national, then the foreigner would be needed, 
and we could raise the threshold of acceptable need by raising the licencing fee (Introductory 
Speech by Minister of Home Affairs on Immigration Bill, 17 May 2002, National Assembly). 
In the introductory speeches to the Immigration Amendment Bill in 2004, both Minister and Deputy 
Minister of Home Affairs again affirm the vital role of attracting foreign skills in the formulation of the 
Immigration Bill thus 
a sound immigration policy is vital to the country for a number of reasons. Such policy should 
facilitate economic development, attract foreign skills and investment and reflect our commitment 
to human rights and the security of those who live within our borders, both citizens and residents. 
Our immigration policy should be consistent with our foreign policy objectives, particularly with 
regard to SADC and the continent; and consistent with our commitment not to discriminate on the 
basis of gender (Minister in the National Assembly, 19 August 2004; Deputy Minister in the NCOP, 
26 Aug 2004, Source: Sabinet Legal Database). 
The then Home Affairs Deputy Minister Malusi Gigaba was quoted speaking at the Fifth Annual 
Services of SETA conference in 2005.  
It stands to reason therefore that South Africa should also join the ranks of those countries that 
import scarce and critical labour, mindful of the fact that this is not just a stop-gap measure, but as 
part of the global economy, our country will also attract foreign skills and export skills to other 
countries. We can no longer sustain the false belief that the import and export of skills is a 
temporary sojourn that we will abandon as soon as we have developed enough local skills to fill 
the gaps we have (Deputy Minister of Home Affairs at SETA conference, 27 October 2005, 
Source: Sabinet Legal Database) 
 
The consistent reiteration of the importance and urgent need to source critical skills from outside South 
Africa shows the government’s direction in pursuing skilled immigration in the immigration policy 
despite its antagonism to foreigners as shown and described in the previous chapter. The then Deputy 
Minister Gigaba also stated that the DHA’s vision was to envisage skilled foreigners’ participation in 
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South Africa’s economic activities in the long term. Both the Minister’s and the Deputy Minister’s 
speeches are indications  that the DHA was aware of the severe impact that the skills crisis was 
causing to the country’s economy and agreed with the policy direction  that by implementing a skilled 
immigration policy, the challenges created by the skills shortage crisis and unemployment among 
citizens could be resolved.  
Despite  the government’s vocal expressions in support of skilled immigration, little progress 
was made in this regard  because of the pervasive influence that organised labour had exerted over the 
government, one that prioritised the redress of equity issues more than the country’s need for more 
skills (Segatti & Landau, 2011; Kahn, 2015). Segatti’s (2014) study reveals that in the medical field, a 
sector which is plagued by skills shortage, the human resource policy has been directed by the need to 
promote equity of employment rather than appointing qualified hospital managers and doctors. This is 
consistent with the view expressed by organised labour in the dataset which was characterised by its 
discourses to promote South African workers’ employment and training opportunities. As organisations 
such as COSATU and NMU were powerful political actors, they constrained the DHA on its path 
towards building a skills-driven immigration policy (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008; Landau & Segatti, 2011; 
Klotz, 2012). More often, government had to listen and make concessions to trade unions in order to 
get their support. For instance, in the  quotations below drawn from the deliberations conducted during 
the 2004 Immigration Amendment Bill  process, COSATU and NUM expressed that the current 
immigration policy had placed too much emphasis on skilled immigration and sidelined the importance 
of the training and upskilling of South African workers. The trade unions’ positions on skilled 
immigration was a very conservative one, in that it supported skilled immigration as long as local skills 
development was not undermined.  
[W]e believe that a complete review of the preamble would be best left to the long-term policy 
review process.  We have thus confined our comments to the proposed amendments regarding 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the need for scarce skills. 
This falls largely within our broad approach to the emphasis on importation of foreign skills to 
address local skills gaps.  This we believe may only be achieved through a balanced approach 
entailing consultation of key stakeholders in order to provide protection for labour market stability 
and reduce long-term reliance on foreign skills (COSATU & NUM submission to Parliament on 
Immigration Amendment Act 2004, 5 August 2004, Source: Sabinet Legal Database). 
 
The words ‘reduce long-term reliance on foreign skills’ in the above quotation give an indication of the 
trade unions’ vision of the role of skilled foreigners in South Africa’s economic development. Skilled 
foreigners should only be in the country to fill the skills gap as a temporary measure. This vision which 
trade unions held lacked the depth to regard skilled immigration as a long-term solution to South 
Africa’s skills shortage crisis because expanding the breadth and depth of South Africa’s skills pool 
would require time (CDE 2010; Crush, 2014).   
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Despite the trade union organisations’ objections to skilled immigration and their demand for a 
long-term review of the immigration policy, the DHA went ahead with the policy. Minister Mapisa-
Nqakula shot down the request for a long-term review of the DHA’s immigration policy in the 
amendment process in 2006.  
 
[The] Immigration Act provides a workable policy framework, even though it is not perfect. It is not 
the intention of the Department will not be making any radical changes in the near future. The 
report in one of our newspapers a few weeks ago that a new Immigration Act was being prepared 
for implementation next year is not true (Minister’s speech to Chambers of Commerce, 27 June 
2006). 
Although the DHA’s pursuit for a skills-driven immigration policy was stalled and obstructed by, among 
others,  the politically powerful trade unions and politicians, the overall sentiment about using skilled 
foreigners to address South Africa’s skills shortage and high unemployment was a policy that both the 
DHA and the government agreed on. But because of the influence from the opposition, as will be 
shown in the section below, government’s immigration policy was never truly liberalised and thus had 
many red tapes that could not maximise its optimal effect in attracting skilled foreigners.  
Outcomes: what were the changes in the immigration policy from 2002 to 2006 that 
corresponded to stakeholders’ responses to skills shortage and high unemployment 
The Immigration Act 13 of 2002 and its subsequent amendments in 2004 and 2006 signify the 
outcomes between the deliberations of stakeholders and their different approaches towards using 
skilled immigration to address skills crisis and high unemployment. The DHA was conflicted about 
skilled immigration. On the one hand the DHA’s aim to promote and facilitate skilled immigration was in 
line with those stakeholders who shared this view. On the other hand, those stakeholders that objected 
to skilled immigration, most prominently trade union organisations COSATU and NUM as well as high-
profile politicians such as Ms Maggie Maunye (ANC MP)19, influenced the DHA into not relaxing the  
restrictions on skilled foreigners. The opposition’s objection towards skilled immigration was 
characterised by protectionism which aimed to protect South Africans’ work opportunities by 
 
19 Ms Maggie Maunye is a Member of Parliament from the ANC. She would later become Chairperson of Parliament’s 
portfolio Committee on Home Affairs in 2011, serving as the Chairperson until 6 May 2014 (People’s Assembly, n.d.). She 
articulated anti-immigrants’ remarks that were deemed xenophobic in 2011.  She eventually ha to publicly apologise in the 
ANC caucus  for this remark (Office of the ANC Chief Whip,  2011).  
Really, this intake, for how long are we going to continue with this as South Africans? Is it not going to affect 
our resources, the economy of this country? I think that as the Portfolio Committee, we need to sit down and 
discuss this openly; on how long are we going to going to continue with the intake without the support of 
other countries... You know, we see on TV Spain turning refugees back to their countries, and here you will 
be told of human rights laws; you know the constitution is against that and all sorts of excuses, and here we 
have people who are living in poverty daily, people who are unemployed. We’ve never enjoyed our freedom 
as South Africans. We got it in 1994 and we had floods and floods of refugees or undocumented people in 
the country, and we always want to play as if no, there’s nothing like that (Makinana 2011). 
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discouraging the promotion of skilled immigration as a key strategy to address the domestic skills 
shortage crisis. Hence, the changes to the immigration policy from 2002 to 2006, as illustrated below, 
show the DHA caught in a conundrum in its attempt  to reconcile the interests of those that supported 
skilled immigration,  its own desire to use skilled immigration to address skills shortage and high 
unemployment and those that opposed skilled immigration. Because of these conflicting interests the 
DHA could not implement a skills-driven immigration policy which purely pursues economic interests for 
fear of any repercussions if they were to hurt workers’ interests in employment and skills development. 
Archer (1995: 303) describes this type of scenario as ‘compromise’, a term used to describe two 
conflictual parties whose interests are inherently incompatible, and that government has to take an 
approach to appease both sides of stakeholders. The outcomes illustrated below in this section are 
indications that point to the more decisive stakeholders in the deliberation of the Immigration Bill.  
From 2002 to 2006, the outcomes of the deliberation between stakeholders resulted in  
• Section 19 (1) of the Immigration Act: quota work permit which categorically lists skills and the 
quotas for each skills needed annually; 
• Section 19 (5) the extension of intra-company permits; 
• Section 27: the removal of quotas for permanent residency on specific professionals; 
• Labour certification process which aims to ensure that foreigners are only recruited and 
employed when there is no suitable South Africans available; 
• and the scrapping off Training Permit Fee.  
These changes were intended to attract more skilled foreigners to work in South Africa by de-
regulating unnecessary restrictions for foreigners. Those changes indicated the DHA did advance a 
skilled immigration idea in its immigration policy as all the abovementioned policy provisions were 
intended to attract skilled foreigners. However, these changes were also accompanied by provisions 
that inhibited the progress of skilled immigration. These provisions included the retaining of the quota 
system and a labour certification system for foreign skilled workers. The quota system assumes that the 
demand of skills can be predicted and projected which counters the volatile nature of modern economy. 
Labour certification, through its advertisement process, ensures that all national workers in the 
domestic labour market have been diligently searched for before any foreign worker can be recruited. 
Although it is argued that both processes are to be done at the expense of losing skilled foreigners, 
they could be seen as the DHA’s reconciliation effort to appease the opposition in order to garner more 
support for  its skilled immigration policy. The findings from a thematic analysis presented below point 
to the DHA’s effort in the Bill which aimed to reconcile the conflicting interests.  
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Section 19 (1): Quota Work Permit 
The implementation of the quota system in the Immigration Act shows that the DHA had to try to 
reconcile the interests of those that promoted skilled immigration and those that inhibited skilled 
immigration in order to begin the skilled immigration process and to satisfy the demands of those  that 
wanted national workers’ interests protected. Quota Work Permit is a category of work permit under s 
19 (1) of the Immigration Act of 2002, issued to foreigners who have the skills that are on government’s 
Scarce Skills List (Immigration Act13 of 2002, s19). During the discussion on the immigration policy, the 
private sector, organised labour and politicians had contrasting views on the logic quotas in their 
operation in relation to economy. The pro-immigration stakeholders, as will be seen below, believed 
that the use of quotas to project and determine the number of skilled professionals needed for the 
economy is based on the centralised planned economy which is against the volatile nature of a 
neoliberal economic policy, whereas against-immigration stakeholders saw it as an efficient mechanism 
to protect domestic workers’ interests.  
The private sector was against the notion of a quota system and believed that the determination 
of the market’s demand for labour and skills should be left to the market. Their reasons are twofold. 
First, its members argued that the rigid quota system, as pointed out above, was against the nature of a 
modern economy. Secondly, they voiced their concern over the government’s administrative to timely 
and expeditiously update and monitor a quota database. The selected quotations below from Business 
South Africa and PriceWaterhouseCoopers clearly indicate the private sector’s lack of confidence in the 
DHA’s capacity and its objection in using quota in the immigration policy.  
Quotas of any sort are also problematical. A quota can also be used as a protectionist measure or 
a political weapon, neither of which is conducive to economic success. Quotas are artificial and 
rigid measures not amenable to modern work organisation or the encouragement of economic 
activity. They are necessarily based on poor historical data in a volatile new global world of work. 
Vested interests will suffocate the quotas to the detriment of the economy (Business South Africa’s 
Submission to White Paper on International Migration, 9 May 2000). 
However, in terms of the Amended Bill it appears that there will be no choice at all as employers 
are forced to use the quota permit route until the quotas are fully utilised. We are unaware of any 
systems put in place to monitor the issue of quota permits by the Department and are thus 
reluctant to proceed in this manner, particularly in instances where all criterion for the issue of an 
Intra-Company Transfer category of work permit would be met (PwC’s Submission to Immigration 
Amendment Bill 2004, 20 July 2004). 
 
Conversely, stakeholders who objected to immigration supported the quota system and were 
opposed to the idea advanced by pro-immigration stakeholders that the determination of quotas should 
be left to the market. For them, leaving the determination of quotas to the market and abandoning the 
quota system would result in an enormous number of skilled foreign labour coming into the country.  In 
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their view, this would destabilise the labour market for South African workers. The quotation given  
below illustrates  COSATU’s  support for a  decisive role that the state should play in monitoring the 
admission of skilled foreigners as well as organised labour’s support for the  implementation of  the 
quota system to monitor and admit skilled foreigners’ arrival.  
This paragraph has already prematurely predicted the failure of government to deal with those who 
hire illegal immigrants and to legislate on the labour market. It tails to realise the duty and 
responsibility of government to govern and to regulate the labour market and should therefore be 
deleted from the White Paper… COSATU does not share this view. The responsibility of 
determining who and how many people should work in the country must not remain solely with 
industry The State should play a decisive role in regulating entry of foreign workers (COSATU’s 
submission to White Paper on International Migration, 11 February 2000). 
The outcome in the Immigration Bill was that the quota system was incorporated and 
implemented by the DHA, despite the call of some stakeholders to abandon the quota system 
(Business South Africa’s submission to  the White Paper on International Migration, 9 May 2000; PwC’s 
Submission to Immigration Amendment 2004, 20 July 2004). What does the DHA’s adoption of a quota 
system reveal of its attitude towards skilled immigration? The DHA’s incorporation of the quota system 
fulfilled two roles. The adoption of the quota system allowed the DHA to proceed with its skilled 
immigration without its being the recipient of many objections from the opposition stakeholders. It did 
this by assuring them that quotas would be used to monitor skilled foreigners’ entry to avoid an overflow 
of skilled foreigners entering South Africa. Furthermore, since quotas are updated annually, their 
updating would be used as leverage for organised labour to determine quotas in order to protect South 
African workers’ interests.  
Section 19 (5): Intra-company transfer permit duration 
The second pattern that demonstrates the DHA’s attempt at reconciling the  conflicting interests of 
stakeholders was the its amendment in 2006 that extended the duration of intra-company transfer 
permits from two to four years, thus allowing more flexibility for foreign skilled labour to work in South 
Africa. Under the work permit, s19(5) of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 established an intra-company 
transfer permit which may be issued to a foreigner who is employed abroad by a business that has a 
branch in South Africa (Immigration Act,. 13 of 2002, s19(5)). The 2002 Act provides that the duration 
of the permit cannot exceed more than two years (Immigration Act13 of 2002, s19(5)). The Amendment 
Act of 2006 extended the period to four years which allowed foreign workers with this category of work 
permit to work in South Africa longer,  giving them more flexibility without having to re-apply every two 
years (Immigration Act 13 of 2002, as amended, 2006: s19(5)).  
Although the stakeholders who welcomed the government’s extension of 19(5), they had wanted 
the government to extend it to a five-year period on par with what was allowed for tax residence. PwC, 
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in the quotation below, is one of the private sector organisations in the that proposed a five-year period 
for a s 19(5) intra-company permit.  
The maximum period for an intra-company transfer permit has been increased to 4 years. This 
increase is welcomed. However, it still falls short of industry requirements and is not consistent 
with the tax laws that provide for a 5-year window of physical presence before tax residence (so as 
not to act as barrier for the attraction of foreign skills)…There are a number of international 
companies that apply a 5-year period for their international secondments, and it is recommended 
that intra-company transfers should be for a maximum of 5 years (PriceWaterhouseCoopers  
submission to Immigration Amendment Bill 2006, 22 Sep 2006). 
The extension to a four-year period exemplified the DHA’s reconciliation between the two 
conflicting interests on skilled immigration. Stakeholders that opposed skilled immigration such as 
organised labour opposed such an extension. The quotation below shows COSATU and NUM’s 
opposition to this extension.  In their view, this extension undermined local skills development and 
transfer and encouraged a reliance on foreign skilled labour.  
Currently section 19(5) of the Immigration Act …We are strongly opposed to this amendment, 
which is clearly directed at the importation of so-called scarce skills, raising serious concerns 
about the implications it has for undermining the process of local skills development and transfer.  
In our view, where a permit is required for a longer period then it would be more appropriate to 
apply for a quota work permit or general work permit under section 19(1) or (2). Accordingly, we 
are calling for the retention of the current two-year restriction on intra-company transfer work 
permits (COSATU & NUM’s submission on Immigration Amendment Bill2006), 10 August 2006). 
 
The extension of the intra-company transfer permit to a four-year period reveals two points: 
1) It is evidence to affirm the DHA’s acknowledgement of the skilled immigration policy.  
2) The DHA had to balance the interests from both pro-skilled immigration stakeholders and 
against-skilled immigration stakeholders  
As the DHA was well aware of the severity of the skills shortage, extending intra-company transfer 
permits would allow more skilled foreigners to work in South Africa for two more years and then 
contribute to the skills pool and economic development of the country. The government acknowledged 
the need for skilled foreigners to be brought into the country to address skills shortages. The pervasive 
influence of organised labour can be seen in the submission of COSATU and NUM in 2006 that implied 
that the change of policy could not be at too much of an advanced stage. Therefore, the role that the 
DHA took remained conciliatory in its extension of the work permit to a four-year period, not the five 
years requested by PwC.  
Section 27: Removal of yearly limits for permanent residency 
The 2006 Amendment demonstrated the government’s stance and support for skilled immigration also 
by its amendment to s 27 of the Immigration Amendment Act 2004. It removed the ‘yearly limit’ 
prescribed for each sector of industry trade and commerce for skilled foreigners to obtain permanent 
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residency permits. Again, it indicates that the government recognised the value of the expertise and 
skills that skilled foreigners could bring to the country and was removing restrictions in order for South 
Africa to retain those much treasured foreign skills.  
In order to retain foreign skills and strengthen the link between those skilled foreigners and South 
Africa, section 27 of the Amendment Act 2004 stated that issuing of permanent residency could be 
given to a foreigner of sound character who possesses skills falls within 
Residence on other grounds 
27. The Director-General may issue a permanent residence permit to a foreigner of good and 
sound character who— 
(a), has received an offer for permanent employment, provided that— 
(i) such foreigner has proven to the satisfaction of the Director-General that the position exists and 
that the position and related job description was advertised in the prescribed form and no suitably 
qualified citizen or permanent resident was available to fill it; 
(ii) the application falls within the yearly limits of available permits prescribed for each sector of 
industry, trade and commerce, after consultation with the Departments of Trade and Industry, 
Labour and Education; and… (Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004, s28).  
In the 2006 amendment process, this section underwent change and the DHA removed the yearly 
limiting quotas placed on the issuance of such permanent residency permits.  
Amendment of section 27 of Act 13 of 2002, as amended by section 28 of Act 19 of 2004 
8. Section 27 of the principal Act is hereby amended— 
(a) by the substitution in paragraph (a) for subparagraph (ii) of the following subparagraph: 
"(ii) the application falls within the [yearly limits of available permits prescribed for each sector of 
industry, trade and commerce, after consultation with the Departments of Trade and Industry, 
Labour and Education] specific professional category or within the specific occupational class 
contemplated in section 19(1)… (Immigration Act  13 of 2002, as amended, 2006: s27). 
This change was not supported by organised labour. It drew opposition and criticism from this 
sector since organisations such as COSATU and NUM believed that by making it easier for skilled 
foreigners to enter and be offered permanent residency permits, the purpose of developing and training 
skills amongst local workers would be undermined. So in their 2006 submission, they stated their 
objection, 
Section 27(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act currently provides for the issuing of permanent residence 
permits to foreign employees according to pre-determined annual limits determined on a sectoral 
basis.  Clause 8 of the Bill proposes to remove the annual limits or quotas for specific professional 
or occupational categories. We are opposed to the removal of the quotas under this provision 
since once again it would have the effect of undermining local skills development (COSATU & 
NUM’s submission on Immigration Amendment Act 2006], 10 August 2006). 
Despite organised labour’s objection, the amendment was included in the 2006 Amendment Act. It 
shows once again that the DHA’s firm view on skilled immigration and that the DHA could ignore the 
wishes of opposition of skilled immigration such as organised labour and implemented its policy.  
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Training Permit Fee on employers 
There was inconsistency on the part of the DHA in respect of its position on the Training Permit Fee for 
employers who recruit foreign workers (Linda Lamprecht, a senior consultant at 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers to Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, 25 February 2003, Source: Sabinet 
Legal Database). The notion of levy first came up in the White Paper in 1999. A flexible mechanism 
was created so that two birds could be hit with one stone. In the first instance DHA would not have to 
deal with time-consuming administrative work to determine the length of a foreigner’s stay to fill a 
position. The other was that it could ensure that the foreigners recruited by South African employers 
were absolutely needed for the economy as their employment would be more expensive than a South 
African worker because of the Training Permit Fee, thus ensuring the employment opportunities of 
South African workers not negatively affected.  
[A] foreigner employed will be needed and will be employed only for as long as a South African is 
not available for that position, as then a financial incentive exists for the employer to shift from a 
foreigner to a South African, as the latter would be cheaper (White Paper on International 
Migration (DHA), 1999: 31). 
In the draft Immigration Bill gazetted on 15 February 2000, this concept was translated into s 
12(1)(b)(i) training permit fee. It states that an employer must be ‘committed to pay into the training fund 
an amount prescribed from time to time as a ratio of such foreigner's remuneration’ in order for a work 
permit to be issued to a foreigner (Draft Immigration Act, 2000: s12). The DHA’s inclusion of a fee in the 
Immigration Bill was subsequently flagged by Parliamentary State Law Advisors for its 
unconstitutionality and was contested in court (correspondence among State Law Advisors AM Meyers 
& Z Adhikarie, 2000, source: Sabinet Legal Database). The DHA eventually relented and retracted the 
Training Permit Fee from its Bill. There was, however, already an inconsistency of implementation at 
the policy level. Since the Immigration Regulation in 2003 still included the Training Permit Fee, it 
caused confusion amongst stakeholders (Immigration Act, 13 of 2002. Regulations. 2003: 28(3)). PwC 
sought clarity from the government on the Training levy.  
Special Training Levy of 2% 
It was agreed to remove the "additional tax" or 2% training levy payable on the Quota permit and 
Corporate permit categories from the Immigration Act. However, it appears that the Director-
General reintroduced the same criteria via the regulations (which were not released for Public 
Comment as required in the Immigration Act). The Department of Finance had also indicated that 
the Immigration Act is not financial legislation, and may not therefore introduce "additional taxes" 
(Linda Lamprecht, a senior consultant at PriceWaterhouseCooper to Portfolio Committee on Home 
Affairs, 25 February 2003, Source: Sabinet Legal Database) 
The issue on the training permit levy was not clarified nor resolved until the Amendment Act in 2004 
when it was finally clear that the Training Permit Fee was removed from the bill.  
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Although the Training Permit Fee did not affect foreigners, the rationale behind such a fee to 
make the employment of a foreign worker more expensive is itself a form of the protectionism which 
characterised the Immigration Bill. It was a reconciliatory gesture to reconcile the interests of those that 
opposed skilled immigration and those that supported it.  
Almost all stakeholders that supported for the removal of Training Permit Fee which was an 
initiative in the Immigration Bill in 2002 were skilled immigration supporters. Business sector saw this 
fee as a penalisation for employers who hire foreign skilled workers. Quotations shown below from the 
American Chamber of Commerce, the Southern Africa Migration Project, PwC and Business South 
Africa indicate that the private sector viewed the training levy as a form of penalty that would impede 
skills development in the country.  
[A] levy will inhibit opportunities to bring vital skills to South Africa. There is also no debate over the 
fact that South Africa lacks skills. It is difficult, in many specialist disciplines impossible, for South 
Africa to train and develop internally at the speed required for robust economic growth. Therefore, 
BSA does not think it prudent to hamper growth by barring the entry into the country of useful skills 
Business believes in the free movement of skills as far as is practicable (Business South Africa’s 
Submission on Immigration Bill in 2002, 15 May 2002).  
As the "quota permit" appears to refer to a category of permit, where the Department of Labour 
seeks to redress specific skills shortages in South Africa, it does not appear to make sense to 
burden employers who wish to use this category with an additional cost or tax. Such additional tax 
or levy will render the category ineffective as employers will prefer to follow the general work 
permit route (which is not subject to the levy). The training levy on this category creates the 
impression that South Africa is purposefully trying to prevent skilled labour from settling in South 
Africa, as opposed to the stated aim of facilitating the introduction of specialist skills (PwC’s 
Submission to Immigration Regulations, 20 Feb 2003). 
In previous presentations, we queried of your committee the correctness of the Dept of Home 
Affairs to collect and levy "taxes" and which in any case it appeared to us should be collected by 
the relevant SETA for the National Training Fund. In previous meetings, we quite clearly remember 
a request being made by the Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs to expunge this requirement. 
The Chairperson at the time complimented us on pointing this out. For some reason, it seems to 
be a requirement personally of the Policy Advisor to the Minister…cannot understand why this 
regulation, which is so clearly to detrimental to both labour and investment, should remain 
incorporated and in spite of repeated submissions that it is both unwise in terms of our long term 
futures and clearly obstructive, it has again been included…such revenues serve no purpose other 
to penalize an investor. Such a regulation does not advance South Africa's case in any way to 
create this our country of ours as a financial destination of choice and does not advance the cause 
of training other skilled persons in the same category as the expatriate. This is presumably why he 
or she had to be brought in the first place, since there would have been no South African to fill the 
post. Therefore for Home Affairs to raise a punitive tax on this event seems illogical, creating yet 
further bureaucratic tangles (American Chamber of Commerce to Portfolio Committee on Home 
Affairs, 23 February 2003 Source: Sabinet Legal Database).  
 
The regulations pursuant to the Act introduced policies that were not sanctioned by the IA. For 
example, the heavy training levy on employers of foreign labour which was widely criticized by a 
variety of governmental and NGO stakeholders. Regulations pursuant to the Amendment Act 
should be entirely consistent with the Act. Hence the controversial training levy, as one example, 
should now automatically fall away and not be reintroduced via regulations (Southern Africa 
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Migration Project’s submission to the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, 5 August 2004, 
Source: Sabinet Legal Database).  
Organised labour’s position on Training Permit Fee was ambiguous. The fee was aligned with 
their own interest and objectives on the development of local skills, however, the unconstitutionality of 
the fee of which organised labour must also have been aware was a deterrent for them not to express 
their support vocally. Hence, COSATU comments about the fee were vague, as is shown below, 
Sections 12(l)(b) and 16(2)(a) require employers to pay prescribed training permit fees into a 
national training fund as a condition to employing foreign workers. The fees imposed in terms of 
these provisions constitute an additional amount to the national skills levy. It is unclear how this 
additional fee will impact on foreign workers. Further the Bill does not clarify whether this system is 
to apply retrospectively to foreign workers already in possession of work permits or only to new 
work permit holders. In principle we support the emphasis on the development of the local skills 
base. However, since we are unable to assess the impact of additional fees on our membership, 
we must therefore reserve our comments on these provisions (COSATU’s Submission for 
Immigration Bill 2002, 18 April 2002). 
The Training Permit Fee was removed from the 2004 Amendment Act.  Its removal, however, 
was not the result of any powerful lobbying of the stakeholders that supported skilled immigration, but 
rather was due to its unconstitutionality. As a measure to appease stakeholders that opposed skilled 
immigration,  and in particular to ease their fear that skilled immigration would undermine local workers’ 
rights, the DHA suggested the use of a training permit fee imposed on employers who recruit foreign 
workers by making the employment of these foreigners more expensive and more inconvenient. By 
doing so, the DHA hoped that it would get the support from organised labour for its Immigration Bill. 
However, the motive behind the Training Permit Fee shows the government’s insistence on promoting 
local workers and its willingness to sacrifice skills. This ultimately resulted in the South African skilled 
immigration policy’s not being very effective in attracting many skilled foreign workers so far ([DHA], 
1999; 2017; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2013; Segatti, 2014; Hoosen, 2018). 
Labour certification process 
In addition to the quota system, labour certification is another process in the Immigration Bill that fulfils 
two roles: one is to enable skills immigration and mitigate its opposition, the other is to ensure that skilled 
foreigners’ presence would not take jobs away from South African citizens. As with the quota system, 
labour certification allows skilled foreigners to work in the country at posts that cannot be filled by South 
African workers. Through its advertisement process, its ultimate objective is to protect national workers’ 
interest.  
Labour certification was first introduced in the 1999 White Paper on International Migration (DHA, 
1999: 31). The White Paper suggested a model in which employers wishing to recruit foreign nationals 
need to obtain a certificate from the Department of Labour (DoL) stating that the working conditions and 
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wages for the foreign national would not be lower than that of a national worker before the appointment 
can take place. Furthermore, in order to employ a foreign national, an employer must make an 
undertaking to the DoL that no foreign person is taking the employment opportunity away from a South 
African worker. To prove that, an employer needs to demonstrate that all means of recruitment in the 
domestic labour market has been exhausted. This usually takes in the form of an advertisement posting 
on a national newspaper or media with stringent requirements to the format of the advertisement 
(Immigration Act13 of 2002, Regulation 28(6b)). The advertisement requirement is to ensure that the 
vacant job opportunities are made known to the South African public and to demonstrate that there is no 
suitable candidate in the country. Hiring a foreigner is the last resort to keep an employer’s business 
running. It relied on the rationale that,  
[I]f the labour legislation, conditions of employment and collective bargaining agreements were 
always as fully implemented and enforced in respect of foreign workers as they are in respect of 
nationals, by definition any alien employed in South Africa would not be taking a position capable of 
being filled by a South African. In fact, for as long as employing a foreigner is marginally and 
substantial more expensive and inconvenient for an employer than employing a South African, any 
alien employed in South Africa would by definition fill a position for which a qualified South African 
is not available (White Paper on International Migration, [DHA], 1999: 31). 
Criticism has been levelled at this labour certification method of which the most prominent objections 
came from the private sector. For instance, Business South Africa, in the as shown below, suggested 
that any effort to manipulate the market in the recruitment of workers would not be conducive and  but be 
counter-productive to the economy (Submission to White Paper on International Migration, Business 
South Africa [BSA], 12 Jan 2000). 
The suggestion that a position which may be filled by a migrant must first he advertised or South 
African citizens on the basis of minimum conditions of employment determined by the DOL is 
simply untenable. It will make the process subject to bureaucratic entanglement, political, personal 
or other prejudices exercised by officials, and perpetuate the administrative morass in which the 
system currently finds itself… (Submission to White Paper on International Migration, Business 
South Africa (BSA) 12 Jan 2000).  
 
The business sector saw the advertisement process as more red tape. It creates bureaucracy and 
reduces efficiency in sourcing foreign workers. Hence, the business sector objected to the labour 
certification process.  
However, these criticisms did not change the DHA’s course to strengthening its status in the 
Immigration Bill. Despite calls to retract labour certification, it still remains one of the key requirements 
on which a general work permit may be issued to a foreign worker (Immigration Act of 2002, s19). The 
government was unable to do away with it because of pressure from organised labour. Since their main 
interest and concern were the prioritisation and empowerment of national workers, like the quota system, 
labour certification was also a bargaining chip that put opposition’s concern on the potential ramification 
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of skilled immigration at ease. Through labour certification’s advertising process, it ensures that skilled 
foreigners would only be employed at posts that no South Africans want to work or are unable to work. It 
has thus enabled the government to implement skilled immigration but also undermined its effectiveness 
(Bernstein, 2014; Kahn, 2015).  
Stakeholders’ positions on skills crisis and high unemployment vis-à-vis immigration 
policy changes 
The policy changes discussed above are aspects which point to the government’s responses to 
addressing the challenges of skills shortage and high unemployment in the immigration policy. Faced 
with skills shortage and citizens’ high unemployment rate, government navigated to use immigration to 
attract skilled foreigners as well as to make sure that the presence of foreign workers would not affect 
the employment opportunities of national workers.  Although were a series of changes in the 
immigration policy from 2002 to 2006, as  shown above,  there was, however, also  a clear indication 
that government agreed with stakeholders that supported skilled immigration and their view  that skilled 
immigration should be used strategically for South Africa’s economic development. This indicates that 
the government was constrained by stakeholders that opposed skilled immigration on account of their 
belief that developing skills locally and training national workers should be the focus.  
The adoption of the quota system, the extension of intra-company permit to a four-year period, 
the initial suggestion of Training Permit Fee, and the labour certification process are measures that the 
government advanced to assure the opposition of skilled immigration that the admission of skilled 
foreigners would be monitored strictly to avoid depriving South Africans of their employment 
opportunities. By putting these measures in place, further bureaucratic processes were inevitably 
created at the expense of protecting national workers’ employment opportunities. As Kahn (2015: 384) 
argues,  in South Africa the lack of resource has the implication that South Africa’s employment equity 
policy which aims to redress racial and resource inequities is a huge pressure that government and 
those stakeholders who supported skilled immigration needed to overcome. Organised labour has 
persistently emphasised the importance of immigration policy to achieve ’transformative goals’ 
(COSATU & NUM’s submission on Immigration Amendment Act, 10 August 2006). Given the close 
political alliance between organised labour and the ANC, implementing a bold immigration policy purely 
in the pursuit of economic interest and skills shortage was unlikely to happen. 
By implementing the quota system, the extension of section 19 (5) intra-company work permit, 
the amendment to s 27 on the issuance of permanent residency permits for skilled foreigners within 
certain categories, these measures also allowed the government to proceed with its skilled immigration 
policy. On this point, the government’s immigration policy changes also suggest that the government 
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and the DHA agreed with stakeholders such as the private sector and the research and higher 
education sector that immigration could be used strategically to fill the skills shortage gap and to reduce 
the unemployment rate in the country.  
Chapter summary 
 
The following points were clarified in this chapter. First, skilled immigration is an immigration policy 
which was endorsed by both those stakeholders that supported skilled immigration and the DHA. 
Hence, it can be argued that both parties agreed on the severity of the skills shortage and the high 
unemployment rate and believed that by attracting more skilled foreigners, the situation would be 
changed.  
Secondly, the influence of those stakeholders that opposed immigration was pervasive and 
powerful, although not enough to influence the government into overhauling the skilled immigration 
policy entirely, yet their sufficient to thwart the progress of skilled immigration. The DHA’s decision to 
retain rigid quota system, the duration of intra-company permit as well as using the labour certification 
process are examples that demonstrate the influence of stakeholders such as organised labour that 
opposed skilled immigration.  
When looking at the findings from the previous chapter, it becomes clear that by 2006 the DoH was 
faced with an immigration system that had these components:  
• A powerful group of stakeholders opposed immigration due to their antagonism and supported 
prioritising skills development of local workers to address high unemployment and skills 
shortage; 
• A comparatively smaller group of stakeholders that asked for the government to handle 
immigration within the framework of human rights and supported to use skilled immigration to 
address skills shortage and high unemployment; 
• A DHA that although ideationally antagonistic towards foreigners, nevertheless understood that 
foreign skills could address the skills shortage crisis as well as the high unemployment in the 
country. But its management and monitoring of the migration policy was a calibration of 
stakeholders of different interests.  
These lead to the question: how did the above points shape and influence the DoH in its recruitment on 
foreign doctors? 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
Overview 
This chapter brings the whole thesis back to the main research question: how did the deliberation 
among stakeholders and changes to the immigration policy from 2000 to 2006 influence the national 
Department of Health’s (DoH) restrictive approach on the recruitment and employment of foreign 
doctors? The preceding findings chapters can be summarised below: 
• There was a heightened level of antagonism towards foreign nationals from 2000 to 2006 as 
suggested by additional changes to the Immigration Bill which further restricted the rights of 
foreign nationals. Those changes were discussed in detail in chapter 6; 
• There was consensus between government and those stakeholders that supported skilled 
immigration of the country’s need to attract skilled foreigners. Unsurprisingly, the extent to 
which the immigration policy could be implemented to attract skilled foreigners was constrained 
by the opponents of skilled immigration such as some high-profile members of parliament as 
well as trade union members whose influence on the government was more powerful.  
• Although government endorsed the view of skilled immigration, this endorsement and the 
actual reality on the ground was very different. The implementation of immigration regulations 
was heavily burdened by cumbersome bureaucratic practices such as the quota system and 
labour certification process. Archer’s (1995; 2019) explanation of compromise which is used in  
scenarios when two parties have conflicting views and have to settle on a compromise to reach 
an agreement is illustrated in practice by the extension of the intra-company permit  in s19(5) 
and the amendment to s 27 of the Immigration Bill. In both cases, the DHA had to listen to both 
opponents and supporters of skilled immigration and adopted a midway approach in its 
immigration policy.  
Drawing on findings in the preceding chapters as well as the associated literature, this research 
dissertation aims to examine the implications of those abovementioned changes had on the DoH in its 
decision to discourage the recruitment and employment of foreign medical doctors, particularly foreign 
doctors from African countries. This chapter constitutes the final phase of Margaret Archer’s (1995) 
morphogenetic cycle, namely, social elaboration. For Archer, the objective of the phase is to examine 
the effect that the deliberation on the immigration policy had on the national DoH and its policy makers 
in order to answer the research question. This chapter argues that the heightened antagonism towards 
foreign nationals in the country, the deeply entrenched employment equity policy in the recruitment and 
employment of foreign skilled workers and the diminishing influence of civil society together with the 
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state’s centralising power on immigration all influenced the DoH policy makers and their decision to 
restrict the recruitment of foreign health professionals in its policy. 
Answering the research question: Phase three: Social structural elaboration 
The last phase in Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle is called social structural elaboration 
(Archer, 1995: 294). Archer (1995: 294) explains that this is the stage for researchers to determine and 
explain the conditions upon which morphogesis or morphostasis takes place as well as to illustrate the 
forms in which this morphogesis or morphostasis occurs. The ‘forms’ refer to the DoH’s recruitment 
measures on foreign doctors. Archer (1995) asserts that after the socio-interaction phase, culture, 
structure and agency will either transform or reproduce. Morphogenesis means that culture, structure or 
agency is transformed after interaction and morphostasis means that they remain the same and are 
being reproduced. Therefore, the post-cultural, structural and agential relations all play a role in shaping 
the final outcome—the NDoH’s restrictive policy on the employment of foreign doctors.  
The discussion and drafting process of the Immigration Bill as well as the amendment process 
of the Immigration Bill in 2004 and in 2006 reconfigured the relations between stakeholders as well as 
changed the cultural and structural conditions. For instance, as indicated in chapter 6, the amendments 
made to Preamble (c) and (m) of the Immigration Act and the reduced number for members from civil 
society on the Immigration Advisory Board both weakened civil society’s power to negotiate and 
bargain with the government in order to protect foreign nationals’ rights. Such amendments which were 
outlined in the preceding chapters undermined stakeholders such as human rights activists and 
organisations. the preceding findings chapters suggested that culturally there was a heightened 
antagonistic sentiment towards foreigners. This sentiment was prevalent as it not only came from 
ordinary South Africans but also from government officials. They also suggested that there was 
consensus between government and stakeholders to implement skilled immigration to attract skilled 
foreigners, but the extent to which the policy could facilitate the entry of foreigners was premised on 
ensuring that South African workers’ interests would not be undermined. Hence, bureaucratic 
procedures such as the quota system and the labour certification process became part of the 
immigration process to protect South African workers’ employment opportunities.  
In the following sections, I explain the effects that the changes to the immigration policy from 
2000 to 2006 and examine the influence of these changes to the DoH on foreign health professionals.  
Heightened antagonism towards foreigners: Cultural elaboration 
This section explains how the last phase in Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle at the cultural 
level: cultural elaboration influenced the DoH’s stance on the employment of foreign doctors.  
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There was a trend of antagonism of the nationals towards foreign nationals from 2000 to 2006 and this 
played a key role in moulding the DoH’s decision to prohibit the recruitment of foreign doctors in its 
recruitment policy. Chapter 6 has shown that although antagonism towards foreigners had always 
existed within South African society, the discussion on immigration policy between 2000 and 2006 shed 
more light on the negative consequences such as limited jobs and resource distribution. These were 
what stakeholders who objected to skilled immigration feared would be undermining South African 
citizens’ employment prospect if there was a large influx of foreigners into the country. This fear unified 
South Africans and resulted in a heightened level of antagonism directed towards foreign nationals. 
Stakeholders’ particular concern was competition from foreigners’ in the labour market and competition 
especially from black African nationals, exacerbated South Africans’ antagonism towards them. The 
rising unemployment hovering above 20 per cent  of the population and the largely excluded black 
population bore  the brunt of unemployment caused anxiety and fear in the  government that the 
situation would worsen  should there be an influx of more immigrants entering the country (Department 
of Labour [DoL], 1998: 12; Klasen & Woolards, 1999: 12; Barker, 2007: 174; Crush, 2008). This is 
corroborated evidence in surveys and literature produced by scholars i that a major factor inhibiting 
South Africa’s skilled immigration policy was the government’s and people’s concern whether relaxing 
immigration would be detrimental to nationals’ interest (Rasool & Botha, 2014; Fauvelle-Aymar, 2015; 
Niyimbanira & Madzivhandila, 2016). The concern for nationals’ jobs and the exclusion of black African 
immigrants are both manifested in the DoH’s prohibition in its recruitment policy.  
Politicians, panicking over their failure to deliver jobs to people, saw the public sentiment 
towards foreigners as something that they could use to their advantage to shield their constituencies 
from holding themselves accountable. In the findings chapter, therefore, there are datasets that 
displayed politicians’ negativity about foreigners such as the comment of the Chairperson of the Home 
Affairs’ Parliamentary Committee and COSATU secretary White Paper on International Migration: 
Hearing, PMG, 5 May 2000; Mr S Mokoena, Secretary of COSATU in the North West Province (PMG), 
1 Aug 2000 ). On both occasions, these two politicians expressed negative views about foreign 
nationals, describing them as law-breaking individuals and explicitly stated that foreigners do not have 
constitutional rights in South Africa.  
As have discussed in the literature review chapter, this type of institutional xenophobia had a 
profound impact on foreign nationals and is the direct cause of foreigners’ vulnerable position in South 
Africa. When witnessing the public’s anger towards foreign nationals, those politically connected 
furthered fumed this antagonism by expressing sceptical and negative views about black foreign 
nationals and questioning whether their motives for entering South Africa was to drain South Africa’s 
resources. It is even not uncommon for politicians to implicitly condone nationals who attack foreign 
126 | P a g e  
 
nationals (BL Masetlha, Home Affair’s Director-General, Presentation to the Portfolio Committee of 
Home Affairs, 15 April 2002; Member of Parliament, Immigration Bill: Hearing, 14 April 2002). Konanani 
and Odeku (2013) criticise the fact that government officials’ lack of action and their deliberate intention 
of flouting laws in some cases are the key causes of the rampant attacks on foreigners. The state 
apparatuses, with politicians’ lobbying and support, entrenched the narratives to describe foreign 
nationals as ‘others’ who are depriving South Africans –the rightful beneficiaries of the country’s 
resources such as jobs – and incited heightened antagonism amongst nationals towards foreigners. To 
exclude those ’others’, some state immigration interventions such as ‘citizenship‘, ‘deportation‘ are 
techniques deliberately concocted by the government, according to some migration scholars, to create 
divisions between people and reinforce the existing boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘others’ (Peberdy, 
2009; Anderson, Gibney & Paoletti, 2011). This ultimately contributed to heightened antagonism 
amongst the local population. The coping mechanism of the politicians was to mobilise the public to 
exclude foreign nationals’ participation in South African society and to impose laws to restrict their 
freedom to conduct economic activities.  
In the health sector, the exclusion of foreign nationals most particularly from developing 
countries was almost synonymous to the exclusion of black foreign nationals in the workforce (Segatti, 
2014; Rural Health Advocacy Group, 2017). Given the large population of black foreign nationals in 
South Africa and South African nationals’ deprivation of jobs, the threat which immigration and 
foreigners were perceived by South African fuelled South Africans’ antagonism. This antagonistic 
sentiment made black foreigners a scapegoat for South Africans to blame for their joblessness (Walsh 
& Desai, 2010; Vahed & Desai, 2013; Konanani & Odeku, 2013). South African exceptionalism, which 
Nyamnjoh (2006) uses to describe South Africans’ complacency in looking down at her neighbours, 
made South African nationals believe that black foreigners from countries with failing economies are in 
South Africa to take what should belong to  the nationals. In South Africa’s health sector, the majority of 
foreign health professionals that had been working in the country prior to and around 2006 were 
medical professionals from developing countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Cuba,  Nigeria, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe (Kassiem, 2006, Breier, 2008; Segatti, 2014). Many of these doctors openly 
admitted that they were incentivised by South Africa’s better remuneration, better professional 
environment and the political stability in the South African health market (Karsiem, 2006). The straining 
labour market and few job opportunities in the health sector, together with foreign doctors from 
developed countries who were incentivised by the remuneration offered by South Africa’s health sector, 
prompted government to use policy to restrict the employment of foreign doctors so that the interests of 
newly-graduated South African doctors can be addressed. Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw (2016) pertinently 
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note that the common approach by South Africans to black African foreigners in South Africa is ‘please 
go home and build your own country’.  
In contrast, white immigrant doctors are more likely to be treated marginally better. In Segatti’s 
(2014: 47 & 67) study, she shows how a white British surgeon was deferred by the examination board 
members in comparison to his two Zambian applicants and an incident  in which a medical trainee of 
European origin was given preference ahead of other black African interns in internship placement. As 
some scholars have argued, institutional racism has always existed in the heath sector (De Wet & 
Erasmus, 2003; Breier, 2008; Segatti, 2014). Whiteness is often regarded as the image of authority in 
the health field, whilst blackness was seen as inferior and less authentic. This discussion of the 
immigration policy from which the antagonism emanated further heightened antagonism and this 
antagonism was almost exclusively directed at black foreigners, exacerbated this discrimination 
exposing black medical doctors to face discriminatory treatment,  not only on the accord of  their 
nationality but also on ethnicity. Migration scholars have thus commonly observed and argued that 
xenophobia towards foreigners has been targeting black foreign nationals in particular in post-apartheid 
South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Crush, 2008; Peberdy, 2009).  
Therefore, the DoH’s recruitment policy and its prohibitive stance for recruiting foreign doctors 
from developing countries, particularly the ban of recruitment of foreign doctors from African countries, 
was invariably embedded in the predominant antagonism in South Africa towards foreign nationals, 
especially black Africans nationals. The discussion and drafting process of the immigration policy 
reignited nationals’ anxiety about South Africa’s scarce jobs and resource distribution. The large 
number of black African nationals in South Africa, the large percentage of unemployed South Africans, 
politicians’ political manoeuvring of the narrative and the already existing racism and discrimination in 
the health sector caused by institutional xenophobia all contributed and affected the national DoH’s 
decision in its resistance to the recruitment of medical doctors from developing countries. 
Employment equity policy: Structural elaboration 
This section explains how structural elaboration as referred in Archer’s (1995) last phase of the 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle influenced the DoH in its resistance to the recruitment of foreign 
doctors. By the end of chapter 7 of this thesis  it  became clear that government’s acknowledgement  
that it would use skilled immigration to address the skills shortage and high unemployment resulted in 
the DHA’s implementation of an employment equity policy to ensure the preservation and prioritisation 
of the employment opportunities for South African citizens. On the hand, the employment equity policy 
allowed skilled immigration to be included in the immigration policy and assured opponent stakeholders 
that national workers’ interests were prioritised. On the other hand, the implementation of an 
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employment equity policy created more bureaucracy in South Africa’s immigration policy, thus 
negatively affecting the policy’s effort in attracting skilled foreigners. The employment equity policy 
takes the form of labour certification and quotas.  
• Under the quota system, the DHA in collaboration with other key government departments 
such as the Department of Trade and Industries and the Department of Labour, would develop 
a database and update it annually to determine the number of foreign skilled labour and the 
categories of skills needed for South Africa’s economic development (DHA, 1999: 30).  
• Under labour certification, employers have to demonstrate that the type of skills that they need 
cannot be found in the South African labour market. This demonstration takes the form of an 
advertisement in the national newspaper or media. The search for a foreign candidate may 
only begin after there is no response to the advertised position. 
Both measures were in place to prevent an overflow of skilled foreigners as well as to ensure that 
foreigners’ presence would not be depriving citizens of their jobs. The ultimate objective was to 
preserve jobs for South African workers. Furthermore, what was noted in the finding chapters was that 
stakeholders that opposed skilled immigration often did not differentiate between skilled foreigners and 
those foreigners who are unskilled or whose skills can be easily sourced within the country. For 
instance, stakeholders referred to in chapter 6 such as Mr Khaye, Mr Matshiane and MP Bishop Tolo 
had exclusively referred to the negative labour market impact that would be brought about by unskilled 
foreigners (Mr Mthuthuzeli Khaye, a business person White Paper on International Migration: 
Hearing,PMG, 16 May 2000; Mr Matshiane, an ordinary South African, White Paper on International 
Migration: penultimate report, PMG, 31 Oct 2000; White Paper on International Migration: Hearing, 18 
May 2000, PMG). Hence, their opposition to skilled immigration was because of the incorrect 
perception of foreign nationals being unskilled, therefore negating the population of skilled foreigners 
who could make a contribution to South Africa. Hence, government’s approach towards skilled 
immigration adopted a blanket approach which was to use restrictive measures to ensure that the 
employment of foreigners would not have any impact on South African workers’ rights and interests 
despite that these measures can be argued unnecessary and time-wasting as many of those scarce 
skills cannot be sourced inside the country (Lewis, 2002: 748; Bhorat & Lundall, 2004: 1048, as quoted 
by Barker, 2007: 224).  
In the health sector, the labour certification and the quota were both translated into the DoH’s 
recruitment policy that imposed various restrictions on the employment of foreign medical doctors in 
order to preserve jobs in the sector for South African doctors. The DoH’s policy states that the DoH will 
only allow health employers to recruit foreign health professionals if they have presented sufficient 
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evidence to prove that there is no qualified South African to fill the vacancy (DoH, 2006: 5.1.1, 2010: 
45). It further requires health employers to monitor quotas on the total number of a foreign workforce at 
health facilities. When there is sufficient number of health professionals available, the recruitment of 
foreign health professionals needs to be put on hold (DoH, 2010: 14). Under the policy, the employment 
of South African medical doctors took precedence over foreign doctors despite the severe shortage in 
the system  in which there are no national doctors available, nor apparently has any concrete evidence 
been found to show  that South Africa’s supply of doctors would be sustainable in the near future 
(Breier & Erasmus, 2009; Segatti, 2014). For the DoH, in order to fulfil the employment equity policy, 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Broad- Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBEEE), the 
prioritisation of national doctors’ employment outweighs the urgent need for medical skills in the health 
system. Furthermore, the DoH imposes restrictions to deliberately sabotage or demotivate foreign 
medical doctors’ enthusiasm to work in South Africa. These restrictions included their non-renewable 
fixed-term contract, the quota percentage for the total foreign workers in the health workforce, the 
certainty of their employment being left to the discretion of employers and HR officers ([DoH, 2010, s6 
& 14; Segatti, 2014: 67). The Strategic Framework for Human Resource released in 2006 aimed to limit 
the number of foreign health workforce to under 5 per cent of the total health workforce in South Africa 
(Monare, 2006). 
The restrictions imposed on the recruitment of foreign doctors show that although skilled 
immigration has been included in the country’s immigration policy, the government still lacked 
commitment to pursue a skills-driven immigration policy in order to achieve its optimal effect in 
attracting skilled foreigners. Bernstein (2014) and Crush (2014) both assert that immigration as a 
recruitment strategy for scarce skills has not been a priority on government’s agenda. Instead, as can 
be seen, the employment of foreign doctors has been relegated to the last-ditch option instead of 
seeing the option constructively as something that could contribute to the South African health sector. 
Government wants the employment of foreigners to be short term and wants to make sure that all 
South Africans are employed before any foreign candidates can be considered and labour certification 
and the quota system come into operation. 
Scholars have argued that these measures designed to prioritise national workers can inhibit 
the progress of skilled immigration (Barker, 2007; Erasmus & Breier, 2009; Segatti, 2014; Kahn, 2015). 
Because these mechanisms aim to prioritise workers by nationality, they function in a way similar to   
that of employment equity policies such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Broad- Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (BBEEE). Though they could achieve the goal to redress skewed 
employment distribution, these equity policies nevertheless defeat the objective of skilled immigration 
and do not help expand the skills pools in South Africa (Breier & Erasmus, 2009). Employers are often 
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faced with a predicament. Because of the lack of qualified black South Africans to fill vacancies 
because of the inequalities caused by apartheid, they often have to choose between promoting 
immigration or employment equity. The former and the latter are seen as irreconcilable and the 
promotion of the former would be detrimental to the latter (Barker, 2007; Erasmus & Breier, 2009). 
South Africa chooses to promote equity at the expense of skills development. As a senior health official 
was quoted saying ‘the department has worked hard to improve salaries in the public health sector and 
must allow time for South Africans to fill these posts. No self-respecting country in the world prioritises 
foreigners over its own’ (Segatti, 2014: 41).  
Confronted by South Africa’s skills shortage and high unemployment rate, the government 
enabled the skilled immigration approach and had labour certification and quota system in place to 
ensure that foreign recruitment would not undermine the employment opportunities of local workers. As 
both mechanisms were designed to prioritise national workers’ interest, the protectionist approach was 
the dominant theme that rendered the recruitment of any foreign skilled labour as the last option. 
Hence, the DoH’s recruitment of foreign health professionals policy continued this trend to treat the 
recruitment of foreign doctors as the last resort. Despite the DoH’s putting in place measures such as 
using a range of financial and non-financial incentives to retain South African doctors as well as 
building more medical schools, partnering with the private sector and utilising the Nelson Mandela/ 
Fidel Castro Medical Collaboration programme to increase training capacity, the doctors’ shortage 
issue is far from being resolved (Crush et al., 2015; ECONEX, 2015; Van Dyk, 2017; Crush & 
Chikanda, 2018). The effect that these measures would accomplish will not happen immediately, 
moreover, some interventions may fall short of the objective to produce more doctors’ output for the 
health sector (Bateman, 2013; Bloom, 2015; Crush et al., 2015; ECONEX, 2015; Kahn, 2018; Wessels, 
2018). Thus, the DoH’s strict monitoring of foreign doctors’ total percentage in the workforce to restrict 
foreign medical professionals’ number in South Africa’s health system further exacerbated the doctors’ 
shortage issue.  
Power dynamic between supporters and opponents of immigration: Agency elaboration 
The DoH’s resistance towards the recruitment of foreign medical doctors exposed those stakeholders 
who were opposed to skilled immigration and their pervasive influence on the government and the 
country. The deliberation and the drafting process of the immigration policy reveal the powerful 
influence of stakeholders that resisted skilled immigration, but it also shows that there is a small but 
steady group of stakeholders who supported it. However, in terms of their influence on government, 
that of supporter stakeholders of skilled immigration was insufficient to make a breakthrough difference. 
They assert that what is needed is an efficient immigration policy that will attract skilled foreigners, 
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however, it was facing huge difficulty to push through such a policy because of its lack of support from 
within the government as well their own weakened position after the enactment of the Immigration 
Amendment Act in 2004.  
Without support from the government, the application of skilled immigration in South Africa 
remains weak and the rights for foreign nationals continue to be at risk of being undermined (Amit, 2011; 
Klotz, 2012; Konanani & Odeku, 2013). Segatti and Landau (2011: 2) assert that sections of the governing 
African National Congress (ANC) and the lower- to mid-level of government departments have pursued 
an agenda that is centred on security and sovereignty and is based on a narrowly defined notion of 
national interest. This approach bore many resemblances to that pursued by the apartheid regime. It is 
this section of the society that held most of the power in drafting policy on immigration matters. The lack 
of support from it resulted in a lack of political willingness to push forward a skills-driven immigration 
policy. Furthermore, as the ANC is a member of a tripartite alliance of which organised labour COSATU 
is a partner, trade unions’ opposition to skilled immigration made any attempt to steer the immigration 
policy in a direction towards  the pursuance of skills and a thriving  economy more difficult.. Trimikliniotis 
et al (2008) argue that trade unions are anti-immigration in South Africa because of their interest in 
protecting national workers and their jobs, therefore inevitably resulting in their anti-immigration stance. 
Cerna (2009) observes that countries with high union density always struggle to push forward an 
immigration system that could best attract skills. In South Africa, similar to what those scholars astutely 
observe, the powerful role that organised labour enjoys in the political arena and its tripartite relationship 
with the governing party mean that implementing an immigration system that could best attract skills is 
difficult.  
The powerbase of the opposition to skilled immigration, compounded by the weakened civil 
society, which was demonstrated in the preceding chapters, resulted in its pervasive anti-skilled 
immigration stance adopted by the DoH. Although skilled immigration was repeatedly affirmed by the 
DHA as a key pillar that drove South Africa’s immigration policy, the DoH did not follow the DHA’s lead 
and it never recognised the need for skilled immigration due to the shortage of skills in the South African 
health sector. In the absence of the DoH’s acknowledgement of skilled immigration, its recruitment policy 
regarding foreign health professionals in 2006 and its more recent version in 2010 do not show any signal 
that is aligned to the DHA’s skilled immigration policy. Instead a range of other strategies such as building 
more medical schools and utilising the Nelson Mandela/ Fidel Castro Medical Collaboration programme 
were pursued whilst the DoH was wilfully oblivious of the contribution that foreign doctors could make to 
the sector.  
Both versions of the policy discourage the recruitment of foreign doctors. The policy imposes 
stringent requirements in regulations to rule out possible potential applicants. For instance, the DHA 
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exempts employers from advertising vacant positions for persons who possess specific skills, which are 
listed in the government’s Scarce Skills List, as part of skilled immigration policy.  ‘Medical doctors and 
qualified practitioners’ had always been on the exemption list from advertisement for the DHA from 
2002 to 2004 (Immigration Act 13 of 2002, Regulation, 2002: 68; Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, 
Regulation, 2003: 68; Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, Regulation, 2004: 70). However, this situation 
changed in 2005 as this occupation was not included in the DHA’s scarce skills list of 2005 and (later) 
of 2006. According to the report in the Cape Times, the Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition 
(Jipsa) which was in charge of updating the Scarce Skills List for the DHA published the list only after 
having consulted with the Departments of Labour and Trade and Industry without having consulted the 
DoH (Immigration Act of 2002, 8 February 2006, Gov Notice No. 28480; James & Waller, 2006; Centre 
for Development and Enterprise, 2010: 16). From that  it can be seen that despite of the urgent needs 
for the country to ramp up skilled immigration, particularly in the health sector, the DoH was 
unenthusiastic  about collaborating with other government departments to speed up skilled immigration 
in its own sector. Instead, the DoH’s recruitment policy in 2006 and its revised policy of 2010 insisted 
that all health employers need to go through the advertisement process before they could recruit 
foreign doctors from outside the country (DoH, 2010: S45). 
  The DoH’s recruitment policy in respect to foreign health professionals is a clear indication of 
the power dynamics between stakeholders supportive of skilled immigration and others in opposition. 
The lobby in opposition to skilled immigration was so influential that their view was shared by the DoH  
The DoH, under the influence of those that objected to skilled immigration, discouraged  the recruitment 
of foreign medical doctors, particularly of doctors from South Africa’s neighbouring countries. Despite 
some support from stakeholders that advocated for immigration reform to attract foreign skills, because 
of the lack of government support, their effort did not result in any fruitful breakthrough reform in the 
immigration policy or was able to convince the DoH to adopt a proactive stance in recruiting foreign 
doctors 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter continued and completed Archer’s morphogenetic cycle approach: Phase three: Social 
Elaboration. The objective of Archer’s phase three is to examine the effects on agency and structure. 
This chapter analysed and explained the implications of the changes to the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 
to the DoH’s recruitment policy in respect of foreign medical doctors (Immigration Act 13 of 2002). It 
answered the central research question, namely, how did the deliberation among its stakeholders and 
changes to the immigration policy from 2000 to 2006 influence the national Department of Health’s 
(DoH) restrictive approach to the recruitment and employment of foreign health professionals? The 
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chapter described how much the discussion on and the drafting process for the immigration policy from 
2000 to 2006 had changed the stakeholders’ and government’s view of the skills crisis, rising 
unemployment and South African’s antagonism towards foreigners. It resulted in institutional 
xenophobia which has heightened South African’s antagonism towards foreigners, resulted in the 
national employment equity policy as well as strengthened the pervasive influence of the opposition 
forces against skilled immigration with all three factors converging and influencing the DoH in its 
decisions to discourage and restrict the recruitment of foreign doctors.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Overview 
This chapter concludes this research dissertation with a summary of the key issues raised in the 
findings and discussion chapters. It then reiterates the importance of Archer’s 
morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle approach and the use of archived documentary data as primary data 
sources for social science research. Finally, this chapter provides valuable insights into South Africa’s 
immigration and health systems. It points out the issues at stake to enable skilled immigration and 
affirmed South Africa’s need for more foreign doctors. This last section concludes this chapter by 
putting forward a methodological suggestion to use the quantitative method to test the robustness of 
the findings generated from this study and recommends future researchers to explore the feasibility of 
the DoH’s allowing foreign doctors to work in the private sector as a strategy to increase health 
workforce capacity. 
Essence of the dissertation 
This dissertation successfully demonstrated the great demand for medical doctors in South Africa and 
analysed the DoH’s policy of discouraging and prohibiting foreign doctors, particularly African doctors 
from South Africa’s neighbouring countries from working in South Africa and thus contributing to the 
alleviation of the medical doctors’ shortage crisis in the country. It is argued that the DoH’s reluctance 
to employ these skilled medical professionals was a reflection of the government’s institutional 
xenophobia of which its opposition to skilled immigration derived. By examining South Africa’s 
immigration policy from 2000 to 2006, this dissertation has established that institutional xenophobia is 
manifested in South Africa’s immigration policy. The perception of seeing foreigners as a threat may 
have been the cause of the DoH officials’ reluctance to explore the lucrative resource of foreign medical 
doctors in the country. As a matter of fact, despite the urgent need for more medical doctors, the 
government’s approach to recruiting foreign doctors was largely characterised and eclipsed by the 
country’s protectionist immigration policy which regarded the use of immigration as the last resort to 
solve the crisis of the skills shortage. To understand South Africa’s restrictive immigration policy on 
foreign nationals, this dissertation has further unpacked how the restrictive immigration policy came into 
being.   
First, South Africans’ antagonism towards foreign nationals had been in existence since the 
end of apartheid. The deliberation and drafting process of the immigration policy refreshed South 
Africans’ memories of the apartheid history and reminded South Africans of why they should not allow 
foreigners to enter the country for fear that they would takes jobs away from South Africans. This 
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antagonism was not diminished by the era of democracy but was rather significantly heightened during 
the process of the debate and drafting process of the immigration policy. This dissertation has argued 
that this heightened antagonism was a driver for the DoH’s institutional xenophobia to exclude 
foreigners and resulted in its recruitment policy that placed high bars in restricting the recruitment of 
foreign doctors. 
Secondly, prior to the drafting of the immigration policy, South Africa’s employment 
environment was characterised by its lack of high-end skills and rising unemployment. These two 
factors resulted in an agreement among policy makers in which jobs must be prioritised for South 
African citizens. The employment of foreigners should only be allowed and they should only be 
employed in those highly specialised fields with their tenure be temporary as a short-term method to 
address those skills gaps in the high-end skills fields. The overall emphasis and priority for the 
government were to build local capacity, whilst the potential skills contribution that skilled foreigners 
could bring to the country were not considered an integral part of building skills development (Crush, 
2014; Kahn, 2015). Hence, the government’s and the DHA’s approaches on utilising foreign human 
resources shared its short-termness, characterised by a sense of hope that South Africa’s dependence 
on foreign skilled labour would be for a relatively short period of time and South Africa would be skills 
sufficient very soon. Under such a vision, the incorporation of skilled immigration policy and envisioning 
skilled foreigners as an integral part of South Africa’s economic development was very difficult to 
achieve.  
Thirdly, the opposition stakeholders and forces towards skilled immigration were both powerful 
and pervasive. Further, such opposition significantly eclipsed the influence of stakeholders that 
supported skilled immigration. The dissertation has demonstrated that a large number of stakeholders 
with close political connections with government such as organised labour were all lukewarm towards 
skilled immigration. Even in scenarios such as the highly-specialised fields that do require foreign 
skilled labour, these stakeholders did not prioritise the attraction of skills but rather adopted a 
conservative approach preferring to have measures such as the quota system and labour certification 
process put in place in order to protect the interest of South African workers. In the absence of 
steadfast support within the government, there was little leverage for supporter stakeholders of skilled 
immigration to advance skilled immigration and to implement skilled immigration policy. Because of the 
alliance between government, organised labour and its constituencies, protecting unskilled workers’ 
rights and interests became the priority not only for the trade unions but also for the government. Any 
attempt to liberalise and introduce a skilled immigration policy faced major political resistance under 
such powerful political alliances.  
136 | P a g e  
 
Overall, this dissertation has argued that these three factors, which were discussed above, 
created an environment that shaped the DoH’s recruitment policy which discouraged the recruitment of 
foreign medical doctors. The recruitment of foreign medical skills was left out on the agenda on account 
of the DOH officials’ antagonism towards foreigners and the DoH’s shared belief that addressing 
unemployment should begin with prioritising the employment of local citizens in the health sector 
regardless of the scarcity of medical skills and the lack of South African doctors in the country.  
Reflection on the study 
This research dissertation has illustrated the operationalisation of the highly abstract morphogenetic 
cycle approach in social science research through tracking the development and formulation of South 
Africa’s immigration policy from 2000 to 2006. It also demonstrated the value of archival documentary 
data in conducting social science studies. By reviewing archived parliamentary documents, key 
stakeholders’ thoughts and the courses of actions that those stakeholders took to influence 
government’s immigration policy could be understood. This helped interrogate the question which 
asked how this deliberation among stakeholders influence the DoH and in its recruitment of foreign 
doctors.  
Margaret Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic cycle allowed me to conduct the research and 
analyse data through the separate examinations of human agency and social structure. As her theory is 
derived from critical realism, it distinguishes social structure and human agency and the independent 
roles they play in the formation of social events. Since critical realists such as Archer argue that real 
causal relations can only be found in the analyses between the relations of social structures and human 
agency (Sayer, 2000; Danermark et al, 2002; Fleetwood, 2014: 207), the socio-interaction phase is 
then explained by the changing interrelationship between the structures of resource distributions and of 
material and ideal vested interest groups (Archer, 1995: 297). By examining the relations between 
various stakeholders and their responses to the conditioning influences (antagonism, skills shortage 
and high unemployment), the preceding finding chapters identified key changes to the Immigration Bill 
during the deliberations between stakeholders about the immigration policy. These changes to the 
immigration policy affected the DoH in its decision on the recruitment of foreign health professionals.  
In addition to showing the operationalisation of Archer’s morphogenetic cycle approach, this 
research dissertation had demonstrated the value of using parliamentary archived data as research 
data to conduct social science study. Prior (2003) and Scott (1990) both assert that documentary 
sources of information could be useful in exploring people’s deliberation in social science studies. This 
study relied on archived parliamentary data to analyse and understand the development of South 
Africa’s immigration policy and to understand the various relations between stakeholders and structural 
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and cultural conditions. All of these created a framework to answer the main research question. Since 
documentary data is highly relevant to the study of history, Carter (2000) argues that what documentary 
data could offer is its usefulness in giving social scientists an understanding the formation or 
emergence of social reality. Furthermore, since what underlines her approach is its three phases that 
follow a chronological order of events, using documentary data was most efficient in assisting me to 
conduct this study. 
Contribution to scholarship  
This research dissertation highlighted the obstacles at stake which prevented and slowed down South 
Africa’s progress to skilled immigration. Because of the dire skills shortage in the medical field and 
across all sectors, an enabling immigration system is a viable solution to address the shortage. The 
DoH ‘s recruitment policy mirrors the stance of South Africa’s immigration policy and the stakeholders 
who crafted the policy. The study argued that institutional xenophobia which underlined South Africa’s 
ineffective immigration system had been manifested in South Africa’s antagonism towards foreigners, 
its employment equity policy which promotes national workers and the powerful influence of the 
opponents to skilled immigration (Segatti, 2011: 67). This ineffective immigration system and the 
negativity about foreign nationals that in turn underpins institutional xenophobia influenced the DoH in 
its decisions and thus resulted in the restrictive policy on the recruitment of foreign health professionals.  
Furthermore, South Africa needs more doctors to build a sustainable society of healthy people. 
Despite the measures put in place to  increase doctors’ output in South Africa, the effectiveness of 
these measures is debatable and is unlikely to solve the shortage of doctors’ in the short term 
(Bateman, 2013; Bloom, 2015; Crush et al., 2015; ECONEX, 2015; Kahn, 2018; Wessels, 2018). This 
research dissertation coincided with the appearance of the COVID-19 pandemic which has affected 
hundreds of thousands of South Africa. Due to the shortage of doctors, there has been much 
speculation and many projections about the government’s ability to cope with the outbreak. The 
estimate provided by the South African Centre for Epidemiological Modelling and Analysis (Sacema) 
based at Stellenbosch University, in conjunction with the National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
(NICD) projects that 87,900 people could die at an infection rate of 10 per cent of the population; 176, 
000 people could die at 20 per cent of the infected population and at 40 per cent  351, 000 people could 
die should there be no intervention to curb the outbreak (Cowan, 2020; Dinham, 2020). But any 
intervention to curb the spread of the infectious disease would have to rely on an adequate supply of 
health professionals. The magnitude and severity of this virus will eventually expose the incapacity of 
the South African healthcare workforce of which one of the key challenging area is the lower number of 
doctors in the country, particularly the lack of doctors in the public sector. Data released by the World 
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Bank (2017) records that physician to patient ratio for Spain, Italy and South Africa were 4.1 per 1000 
patients, 4.1 per 1,000 patients and 0.9 per 1,000 patients in 2017. If Covid-19 could wreak such havoc 
in countries like Spain and Italy and severely strain their health systems which are far more advanced 
than that  of South Africa, there is no doubt that South Africa would be facing an unprecedented 
devastation should the pandemic continue to spread in the country. Hence, this dissertation also gives 
credence to the DoH’s need to lift the ban on the recruitment of foreign doctors. 
Finally, this dissertation also made a valuable contribution to civil society’s role in promoting 
skilled immigration. It has explained why, despite South Africa’s advanced and human rights-based 
Constitution, xenophobia still thrives and foreigners’ legal rights continue to be undermined. Most 
importantly, it has emphasised that the lack of political support to promote skilled immigration at the 
governmental level and the negative perception on foreign nationals has left those in civil society the 
only ones to promote skilled immigration. Unless civil society could work more collaboratively with the 
government to advocate for the benefits of skilled immigration, it is unlikely that any major breakthrough 
in this regard to happen.  
Limitations and recommendations  
Despite the many analytical advantages that Archer’s (1995: 261) morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle 
approach offered, the major criticism directed at Archer’s work is her dichotomy between primary 
agency and corporate agency. Karlsson (2020) argues that Archer’s distinctions on primary and 
corporate agencies falsely assume that agents’ objectives and agents’ planned courses of action are 
always consistent thus negating the scenario in which agents’ objectives and agents’ courses of actions 
are inconsistent. Karlsson (2020) draws attention to the gap which points to scenarios in which the 
objectives and courses of action are inconsistent. It could be possible when agents’ objectives are 
absent but there are t courses of action taken unintentionally but nevertheless the unintended 
consequence itself is moving towards achieving the objectives. Also, there could be a possible scenario 
in which agents’ objectives were present, but there are no courses of action taken by those agents. In 
those scenarios, Archer’s theory appears limited and insufficient to produce a more rounded 
explanation for social reality. To transpose Karlsson’s (2020) work into the context of this dissertation 
means that there could be stakeholders whose actions to influence immigration policy were unintended 
but were nevertheless effective. The roles which were played by those stakeholders were not 
adequately analysed and captured in the dataset.  
Furthermore, as with all qualitative research, Crankshaw (2014) argues that a common 
criticism of the results of this qualitative or intensive research is that findings generated by a qualitative 
research method is that they do not show the extent to which that the antagonism towards foreigners, 
139 | P a g e  
 
the deeply entrenched employment equity system and the powerful influence of the opposition to skilled 
immigration has influenced the DoH’s recruitment policy. For social science research relying solely on a 
qualitative method, it is obvious that findings generated by such methodology needs to be tested for its 
robustness. In order to estimate the extent of the operation of the causal mechanisms that I have 
discussed, further research can employ quantitative survey methods in order to test the theories 
developed in this dissertation. An obvious solution is to use a quantitative research method, such as a 
questionnaire survey conducted among DHA and DoH employees, to estimate the extent of the 
operation of a causal mechanism. However, as Crankshaw (2014: 512) cautions against falling into the 
delusion that the use of  such a quantitative method itself implies the use of statistical evidence to 
establish causation, he argues that a descriptive method that only estimates quantities in a population 
be used. To quote Sayer (1992: 192): ‘When our knowledge of causal mechanisms is good, 
quantitative methods can play an important role in estimating the extent or size of a group or a causal 
process in a large population.’  
In addition, further research in the dire doctors’ shortage in South Africa,  can explore the 
option of the DoH to allow foreign medical doctors to practise in the private sector and what related 
issues are at stake to enable it. Given that the DoH’s rationale in recruiting and employing foreign 
health professionals is solely focusing on capacitating rural and underserved areas of which hospitals 
are public-funded, it may make more sense if foreign health professionals would be allowed to practise 
medicine in South Africa if they are self-funded and are practising in the private sector.  
This dissertation has shown that the antagonism that South Africans directed at foreign 
nationals was the frustration felt by South African’s on account of the state’s limited resources and the 
distribution of those few resources. A more practical solution to assist with moving forward is thus 
suggested here. This would be to treat foreign doctors as investors bringing their own funding and 
medical equipment to open a private practice. In this way, their presence would not undermine South 
African’s access to state resources such as work opportunities and more South African doctors may be 
available to work in the public sector if the DoH could offer competitive remuneration and comparable 
work conditions. However, the feasibility of this proposition can be an area of further research for 
interested researchers. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has concluded this dissertation with a succinct summary of the key discussions and 
answered the central research question.  
Furthermore, it has reflected on the methodology and social theory employed. It  has 
highlighted that although qualitative research, such as in the case of this dissertation, may produce an 
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in-depth result, it will need quantitative research to test the findings’ robustness in order to complement 
the shortcoming of qualitative research method.  
In addition, this chapter has emphasised the key contribution that this dissertation has made to 
the migration scholarship since  it highlighted several issues such as the role of the employment equity 
policy and the pervasive influence of organised labour in the shaping of South Africa’s immigration 
policy. It emphasised that these are the issues at stake that have prevented the government from 
putting into practice a skilled immigration plan.  
Finally, this dissertation has suggested a field of research which is highly relevant to the current 
national dynamic. It has recommended that future researchers should consider reviewing the feasibility 
of the DoH to allow foreign doctors entering the country in a self-funding model, essentially treating 
them as foreign investors. It suggested that this model could be a solution to build capacity and address 
the shortages in the health sector.  
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Appendix I: List of Collected Meeting Reports, Parliamentary 
Documents and Bills 
Date Meeting/Documents Type Source 
25 Oct 1999 White Paper on International Migration: Hearings Meeting PMG 
16 Nov 1999 White Paper on International Migration: Hearings Meeting PMG 
2000 Notes on Immigration Bill Document Sabinet Legal 
11 Jan 2000 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)’s 
submission on White Paper on International Migration 
Document Sabinet Legal 
12 Jan 2000 Business South Africa (BSA)’s submission on White 
Paper on International Migration 
Document Sabinet Legal 
Feb 2000 Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE)’s 
submission on White Paper on International Migration 
Document Sabinet Legal 
11 Feb 2000 COSATU’s submission on White Paper on International 
Migration 
Document Sabinet Legal 
15 Feb 2000 Immigration Bill (draft) Government Notice No. 621 of 
2000 Gazette No. 20889 
Meeting Sabinet Legal 
14 April 
2000 
Migration Policy, Deputy Minister on Electoral Bill: 
Briefing 
Meeting PMG 
8 May 2000 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)’s 
submission on White Paper on International Migration 
Document Sabinet Legal 
15 May 2000 White Paper on International Migration: Hearings Meeting PMG 
16 May 2000 White Paper on International Migration: Hearings Meeting PMG 
18 May 2000 White Paper on International Migration: Hearings Meeting PMG 
11 June 
2000 
Foreign Spouses Ruling: Briefing  Meeting PMG 
6&7 July 
2000 
Regulating migration in the 21st century-a South African 
perspective: keynote address by Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
Document Sabinet Legal 
2 Oct 2000 White Paper on International Migration: Input by Ministry Meeting Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group 
(PMG) 
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3 Oct 2000 Outline of the presentation of DHA to the portfolio 
committee of Home Affairs on the White Paper on 
International Migration 
Document Sabinet Legal 
29 Oct 2000 Committee Report on White Paper on International 
Migration 
Meeting PMG 
31 Oct 2000 White Paper on International Migration: penultimate 
report 
Meeting PMG 
2001 Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs on 
the study tour of Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique 
Document Sabinet Legal 
7 May 2001 Briefing by the Minister Meeting PMG 
8 May 2001 Minister’s presentation to Portfolio Committee of Home 
Affairs 
Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
14 May 2001 Briefing by Director General on Departmental Activities Meeting PMG 
22 May 2001 Minister’s speech on Home Affairs Budget Debate Meeting Sabinet Legal 
5 June 2001 Select Committee on Social Services Briefing by DHA on 
White Paper on International Migration 
Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
Aug 2001 CDE’s submission to the Immigration Bill 29 June of 
2001 
Document Sabinet Legal 
20 Aug 2001 Letters exchange between Minister and House Speaker Document Sabinet Legal 
10 Sep 2001 Immigration Bill, Births and deaths Registration 
Amendment Bill; SADC Committee Report 
Meeting PMG 
20 Sep 2001 Parliamentary Media Briefing Meeting Sabinet Legal 
24 Sep 2001 Immigration Bill, Director-General’s contract: Discussion Meeting PMG 
8 Oct 2001 Status of Immigration Bill [B46-2001], Tabling of Revised 
Immigration Bill [B79-2001], Director-General’s contract 
Meeting PMG 
23 Oct 2001 Immigration Bill: deliberation Meeting PMG 
29 Oct 2001 Immigration Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
30 Oct 2001 Immigration Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
22 Jan 2002 Immigration Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
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11 Feb 2002 Programme for processing Immigration Bill Meeting  PMG 
11 Mar 2002  Programme for processing Immigration Bill [B79-2001]; 
Summary of constitutional decisions affecting DHA 
Meeting  PMG 
17 March 
2002 
Programme and process of dealing with Immigration Bill Meeting PMG 
18 March 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Briefing by Minister Meeting PMG 
19 March 
2002 
Minister’s Remark Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
April 2002 Black Sash’s submission on Immigration Bill  Document Sabinet Legal 
12 April 
2002 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers (PwC) submission on the 
Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
12 April 
2002 
World Trade Organisation & World Bank joint 
submission on the Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
14 Apr 2002 Immigration Bill: briefing Meeting PMG 
15 April 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Briefing Meeting PMG 
15 April 
2002 





Immigration Bill: Hearings Meeting PMG 
16 April 
2002 
South African Revenue Service’s submission on the 
Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
17 April 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Hearings Meeting PMG 
18 April 
2002 
COSATU, NACTU & FEDUSA joint submission on the 
Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
21 April 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Briefing by Chairpersons; Hearings Meeting PMG 
22 April 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Hearings Meeting PMG 




South African Police Service’s submission on the 
Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
23 April 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Departmental Briefing and Deliberations Meeting PMG 
23 April 
2002 
International Education Association of South Africa 
(IEASA), South African Universities Vice-Chancellor’s 
Association (SAUVCA) and the Committee of Technikon 
Principals (CTP) submission on Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
23 April 
2002 
National Consortium for Refugee Affairs submission on 
the Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
23 April 
2002 
South African Human Rights Commission submission on 
the Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
23 April 
2002 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
submission on the Immigration Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
24 April 
2002  
Immigration Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
25 April 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
25 April 
2002 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development’s 
submission on Immigration Bill [B79-2001] 
Document Sabinet Legal 
25 April 
2002 
Lawyers for Human Rights’s submission on Immigration 
Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
28 April 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
29 April 
2002 
Immigration Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
05 May 2002 Immigration Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
14 May 2002 Immigration Bill: Deliberations and Voting Meeting PMG 
17 May 2002 Minister’s speech Second Reading of the Immigration 
Bill [B79-2001] 
Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
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20 May 2002 Budget and Programmes 2002/3: Briefing by Director-
General 
Meeting PMG 
27 May 2002 Department Budget: Discussion Meeting PMG 
03 June 
2002 




Minister’s speech Home Affairs Budget Debate Meeting Sabinet Legal 
20 August 
2002 
Minutes of Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs Meeting Sabinet Legal 
26 Aug 2002 Implementation of Immigration Act; Refugee Affairs and 





Immigration Regulation. Gazette No. R7524 449(24100) Bill Sabinet Legal 
28 Jan 2003 Immigration Regulation: Briefing Meeting  PMG 
18 Feb 2003 Immigration Regulation: Briefing Meeting  PMG 
19 Feb 2003 Minister’s remark on Immigration Regulation Meeting Sabinet Legal 
20 Feb 2003 PriceWaterHouseCooper (PwC)’s submission on 
Immigration Regulation 
Document Sabinet Legal 
21 Feb 2003 Immigration Regulation, Government Gazette No. 
24952, Government Notice 487 of 2003 
Bill Sabinet Legal 
21 Feb 2003 Cape Town Regional Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry’s submission on Immigration Regulation 
Document Sabinet Legal 
23 Feb 2003 Email exchange between American Chamber of 
Commerce and Parliament 
Document Sabinet Legal 
24 Feb 2003 Immigration Regulation: Briefing Meeting PMG 
25 Feb 2003 Minor adjustments to Immigration Regulations Document Sabinet Legal 
3 March 
2003 
Immigration Regulation: Discussion Meeting  PMG 














Minister’s remark on Immigration Regulation Meeting Sabinet Legal 
27 June 
2003 
Immigration Regulation, Government Gazette No. 
27725, Government Notice No. R 616 
Document Sabinet Legal 
8 Sep 2003 Minister’s remark on Immigration Regulation Meeting Sabinet Legal 
6 March 
2004 
Immigration Regulation, Government Gazette No. 
26126, Government Notice No. 352 of 2004 
Bill Sabinet Legal 
24 May 2004 Committee Programme Meeting PMG 
7 June 2004 Department Capacity and Immigration Regulation: 
Briefing by Minister 
Meeting  PMG 
24 June 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill, Government Gazette No. 
26507 of 2004 
Bill  Sabinet Legal 
26 June 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill (draft) Bill  Sabinet Legal 
13 July 2004 PriceWaterHouseCooper (PwC)’s submission on the 
Immigration Amendment Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
22 July 2004 Western Cape Immigration Practitioner Forum’s 
submission on the Immigration Amendment Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
1 August 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill: Briefing overview Meeting  PMG 
2 August 
2004 
National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC)’s agreement on Immigration Amendment Bill 
[B11-2004] 
Document Sabinet Legal 
2 August 
2004 
Minister’s remark on the presentation of the Immigration 
Amendment Act 
Meeting Sabinet Legal 
2 August 
2004 
Presentation to the portfolio committee on Home Affairs 
on Immigration Amendment Bill 
Meeting Sabinet Legal 




Business Unity South Africa (BUSA)’s submission on 
Immigration Amendment Bill 
Document  Sabinet Legal 
2 August 
2004 
Law Society of the Northern  Provinces (LSNP)’s 
submission on the Immigration Amendment Bill  
Document Sabinet Legal 
2 August 
2004 
Sonnerberg Hoffman’s submission on the Immigration 
Amendment Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
2 August 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill: Briefing by DHA Meeting PMG 
3 August 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill: Hearing Meeting  PMG 
4 August 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill: Hearings Meeting  PMG 
5 August 
2004 
Southern African Migration Project (SAMP)’s submission 
on the Immigration Amendment Act 
Document Sabinet Legal 
5 August 
2004 
COSATU and NUM’s joint submission on the 
Immigration Amendment Bill 2004 
Document  Sabinet Legal 
6 August 
2004 
Association of Immigration Practitioners of South Africa 
(AIPSA)’s submission on Immigration Amendment Bill 
Document Sabinet Legal 
10 August 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
11 August 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill: Deliberations Meeting PMG 
12 August 
2004 
Immigration Amendment Bill: Voting Meeting PMG 
19 August 
2004 
Minister’s speech on the Immigration Amendment Bill, 




Deputy Minister’s speech on the Immigration 
Amendment Bill, 2004, to the National Council of 
Provinces 
Meeting PMG 
18 Oct 2004 United Nations High Commission for Refugees: Briefing Meeting  PMG 
17 May 2005 DHA’s presentation to the Portfolio of Home Affairs Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
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18 May 2005 Budget Vote Speech Meeting Sabinet Legal 
21 June 
2005 
DHA National Immigration Branch’s presentation to the 
NCOP select Committee on Social Services 
Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
27 June 
2005 
Immigration Regulation, Government Gazette No. 
27725, Government Notice No. R616 of 2005 
Document Sabinet Legal 
8 August 
2005 
The Africa’s Children rights Presentation in Parliament Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
8 August 
2005 
Refugee’s presentation to the National Assembly: In 
need of Protection 
Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
10 August 
2005 
Lindela Refugee Centre Activities; Refugee stakeholder 
meeting: Committee Planning 
Meeting  PMG 
24 August 
2005 
Minister’s speech to the Portfolio Committee Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
26 August 
2005 
Law Society of South Africa’s submission on refugee 
laws 
Document Sabinet Legal 
26 August 
2005 
A Congolese’s presentation to Parliament  Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
29 August 
2005 
Plight of refugees in South Africa: Hearings Meeting  PMG 
30 August 
2005 
Zimbabwe Exiles Forum’s submission to the Portfolio 
Committee of Home Affairs 
Document Sabinet Legal 
7 Sep 2005 Committee Reports Document Sabinet Legal 
12 Sep 2005 Immigration Service Delivery and Staff shortages; 
Security at Lindela Detention Centre 
Meeting PMG 




DHA’s response to questions relating to refugee matters Meeting  Sabinet Legal 
8 February 
2006 
Specific Professionals Categories and specific 
occupational classes 
Document Sabinet Legal 
25 May 2006 Xenophobic Attack in Plettenberg Bay: Report by Wester Meeting PMG 




COSATU and NUM’s joint submission on the 
Immigration Amendment Bill 2006 




Civil Union Bill, Films and Publications and Immigration 
Amendment Bills: Briefing by Minister 




Presentation to the Portfolio Committee: Immigration 
Amendment Bill 2006 




Minister’s remark on the presentation of the Civil Union 
Bill, 2006, the Immigration Amendment Bill, 2006 




Civil Union Bill, Films and Publications and Immigration 
Amendment Bills: Briefing by Minister 




PriceWaterHouseCooper’s submission on the 
Immigration Amendment Bill 2006 
Document  Sabinet Legal 
11 October 
2006 
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA)’s submission on the 
Immigration Amendment Act 2006 
Document Sabinet Legal 
16 October 
2006 
Civil Union Bill, Films and Publications and Immigration 
Amendment Bills: Hearing 
Meeting  PMG 
23 October 
2006 
Immigration Amendment Bill: Submission by Trade 
Unions, deliberation and adoption 
Meeting  PMG 
23 October 
2006 
Summary of Submissions on the Immigration 
Amendment Bill [B28-2006] 
Document  Sabinet Legal 
19 June 
2007 
Implementation of the HRH plan: overview of progress 
with implementation 
Document  Sabinet Legal 
24 August 
2004 
National Department of Health (DoH) human resources 
for health 
Document  Sabinet Legal 
2 October 
2001 
Presentation on HPCSA to the Portfolio Committee on 
Health 
Document  Sabinet Legal 
15 May 2001 DoH’s presentation Document  Sabinet Legal 




Priorities for 2001 National Department of Health Document  Sabinet Legal 
17 March 
2000 
DoH’s annual budget report Document  Sabinet Legal 
1 April 2006 Recruitment and employment of foreign health 
professionals in the Republic of South Africa 
Document  Sabinet Legal 
2010 Employment of foreign health professionals in the South 
African health sector 
Document  Sabinet Legal 









































Plan to cut foreign doctors slated Newspaper Sabinet 
Reference 
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6 July 2006 Failing to grasp the medical nettle Newspaper Sabinet 
Reference 


























African medical brain drain to SA to be ended Newspaper Sabinet 
Reference 
7 April 2006 Plan to give SA’s health sector a new lease of life Newspaper Sabinet 
Reference 
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Appendix II 
Litigation expenses 2011/12 to 2014/15  
(a) (i) Department of Health (national) 
No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R30 554 000.00 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R6 149 000.00 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R4 587 000.00 
(bb) 2014/2015 R5 160 000.00 
(ii)        Limpopo Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R2 163 000.00 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R7 000 000.00 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R5 000 000.00 
(bb) 2014/2015 R44 979 000.00 
Free State Department of Health 
The Department does not budget for litigation, only budget for legal costs. Damages are paid from the 
suspense account at Loss Control. 
North West Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R160 306.00 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R5 481 155.00 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R8 627 455.00 
(bb) 2014/2015 R10 143 311.00 
Mpumalanga Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Amount 
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(aaa) 2011/2012 R9 000 000.00 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R9 540 000.00 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R10 224 000.00 
(bb) 2014/2015 R10 838 000.00 
Northern Cape Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 Not available 
(bbb) 2012/2013 Not available 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R4 164 000.00 
(bb) 2014/2015 R2 269 000.00 
Eastern Cape Department of Health 
The Department does not budget for legal claims. Each institution pays for the incident that took place 
in the said institution. 
(b)(i) National Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R34 963 642.96 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R14 591 772.64 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R4 019 425.11 
(bb) 2014/2015 R3 590 903.37 
(ii) Limpopo Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R3 863 017.12 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R7 308 503.41 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R20 116 859.24 
(bb) 2014/2015 R30 871 283.16 
Free State Department of Health 
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No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R5 473 097.65 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R2 935 534.00 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R673 373.00 
(bb) 2014/2015 R16 500 000.00 
North West Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R753 602.57 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R7 899 232.50 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R12 959 528.18 
(bb) 2014/2015 R25 119 377.36 
Mpumalanga Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Amount 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R17 614 054.79 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R11 310 058.70 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R44 408 386.64 
(bb) 2014/2015 R5 529 663.88 
Northern Cape Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Settlement amount of Litigation 
claims 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R10 287 277.90 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R218 560.00 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R12 249 662.00 
(bb) 2014/2015 R6 132 184.49 
Eastern Cape Department of Health 
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No. Financial Year Settlement amount of Litigation 
claims 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R68 558 445.27 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R94 689 268.23 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R134 570 588.97 
(bb) 2014/2015 R91 942 415.20 
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health 
No. Financial Year Settlement amount of Litigation 
claims 
(aaa) 2011/2012 R49, 221, 493.92 
(bbb) 2012/2013 R56, 806, 519.72 
(ccc) 2013/2014 R208, 460, 451.50 
(bb) 2014/2015 (as at 6.03.2015) R209, 054, 884.73 
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Appendix III  








Black 37.7% 15.7% 
Coloured 20.9% 15.1% 
Asian/Indians 11% 7.1% 
White 4.6% 3.2% 
Total 29.4% 12.7% 
1995 
Black 40.6% 25.6% 
Coloured 23.1% 19.1% 
Asian/Indians 16.7% 14.2% 
White 5.7% 4.1% 
Total 32.1% 20.2% 
1995 
Black 36.2% 36.2% 
Coloured 21.8% 21.8% 
Asian/Indians 13.2% 13.2% 
White 4.6% 4.6% 
Total 28.5% 16.3% 
 
